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Abstract
This dissertation is composed of three chapters. In the first chapter, I build
and estimate a dynamic labor supply model that takes into account human
capital accumulation, borrowing constraints and unobserved heterogeneity in
skills and preferences in order to understand the impact of the EITC on life-
cycle wage paths of single women. In the model, the EITC has an impact
on women’s decisions through two main channels. First, it alters the rewards
from work by shifting the per-period budget constraint. This in turn causes the
women to make different hours of work and saving decisions. Second, through
the change in the experience stock, the EITC also alters future rewards from
work. This channel leads to a further change in the current hours of work
and saving decisions of women. The results indicate that EITC is effective in
promoting wage growth for single women over the life-cycle. Further analysis
reveals that the change in the experience stock, rather than the immediate effect
of the EITC on the per-period budget constraint, plays the prominent role in
generating wage growth. Moreover, the change in net worth as a result of the
tax credit indicates that EITC provides debt relief for women with negative
net worth while it leads to an increase in the consumption expenditures for
those with positive net worth. Using the estimated model, I conduct three
distinct counterfactual experiments. First, I analyze the impact of imposing an
asset test with a value that is similar to the asset limits in other federal cash
transfer programs for low-income individuals. Second, I examine how single
women without children respond to the adjustments in the credit schedule that
are proposed by President Obama. Finally, I evaluate alternative designs for
ii
the EITC, such as different cutoffs for the payment regions or different subsidy
amounts, with respect to their effectiveness in promoting wage growth.
The second chapter constructs a job search model with wage renegotiations
that takes into account the strategic behavior on the firm side. Workers search
both when unemployed and employed while firms decide whether to target their
vacancies to unemployed or employed workers and whether to match the offers
coming to their employees. The novel feature of the model is to make use of the
superior information the incumbent firm has over the poaching firm with respect
to employees’ skills. This channel captures a firm’s discrimination between
its workers as it matches only the outside offers that come to the high-skilled
workers and lets the low-skilled workers go. In this setup, lemons problem does
not exist because workers have idiosyncratic preference types. The existence
of idiosyncratic preferences allows for the possibility of recruiting high-skilled
workers even when the incumbent firm matches their outside offers. The result
is that in equilibrium firms post their vacancies in both markets. In addition,
more skilled workers have lower job-to-job mobility compared to workers with
skills from the lower tail of the distribution.
In the last chapter, my coauthors and I build a structural model of Chap-
ter 13 bankruptcy that captures the salient features of personal bankruptcy
under Chapter 13. We estimate our model using a novel data set we construct
from bankruptcy court dockets recorded in Delaware between 2001 and 2002.
Our estimation results highlight the importance of debtor’s choice of repay-
ment plan length on Chapter 13 outcomes under the restrictions imposed by
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the bankruptcy law. We use the estimated model to conduct policy experi-
ments to evaluate the impact of more stringent provisions of Chapter 13 that
impose additional restrictions on the length of repayment plans. We find that
these provisions would not materially affect creditor recovery rates and would
not necessarily make discharge more likely for debtors with income above the
state median income.
Primary Advisors: Hülya Eraslan, Robert A. Moffitt
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I am indebted to my advisors Hülya Eraslan and Robert Moffitt for their
guidance, encouragement, and comments. I would also like to thank Jorge Balat,
Elena Kranokutskaya, Nick Papageorge, and Yuya Takahashi for their insightful
suggestions. I’m grateful to Ali Khan for introducing me to the magical world of
theoretical economics and for many engaging conversations. I greatly appreciate
the helpful conversations with Ryan Bush, Gwyn Pauley, Emre Tiftik, Metin
Uyanik, Lu Xu, Sezer Yasar, Sevcan Yesiltas, and Alexandria Zhang during
the writing of this dissertation. I would also like to express my gratitude to
Zara Allen, Yagmur Ari, Ali Bayraktar, Sefika Kumral, Savas Karatasli, Esra
Soytutan, and Feriha Soytutan for giving me a reason to smile every day for
the past six years. Special thanks goes to Eda Özel, my best friend, for her
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every day on top of being the best mentor in the world. Her patience, dedi-
cation, embracing friendship and never-ending trust enabled me to become a
true researcher. I am extremely grateful and lucky that she was by my side
throughout this journey. She is an irreplacable role model and I am looking
forward to many more adventures and joint papers with her in years to come.
Finally, I would like to thank my lovely husband, Emek Karaca. Every
page of this dissertation was written with his invaluable and constant support.
Without his unconditional love and beatiful mind, this dissertation would not
have been possible. I thank him for completing my life and my heart. I dedicate
this dissertation to him.
vi
This thesis is dedicated to my dear husband Emek,
for being my best friend,
for holding my hand every step of the way,




Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Dedication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
1 Does the Earned Income Tax Credit Help Single Women Climb
the Wage Ladder? 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3 Institutional Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.1 Eligibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3.2 The Credit Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3.3 State-level EITC Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
viii
1.5 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.5.1 The Choice Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.5.2 Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.5.3 The Woman’s Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.5.4 Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.5.5 The Solution Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.5.6 Theoretical Predictions on the Impact of the EITC . . . 39
1.6 Estimation and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.6.1 Estimation Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.6.2 Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
1.6.3 Parameter Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
1.7 The Impact of the EITC on Single Women . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
1.8 Policy Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
1.8.1 Expanding the Tax Credit for Childless Women . . . . . 62
1.8.2 Imposing an Asset Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
1.9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
1.10 Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
1.11 Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2 Wage Renegotiations with Labor Market Frictions 85
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
2.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.3 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
ix
2.3.1 The Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
2.3.2 Matching and Wage Bargaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
2.3.3 Unemployed Workers’ Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
2.3.4 Employed Workers’ Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
2.3.5 Firm’s Market Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
2.4 Numerical Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
2.6 Tables and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
3 An Anatomy of U.S. Personal Bankruptcy under Chapter 13 124
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
3.3 Legal Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
3.3.1 Creditors’ Legal Remedies Outside of Bankruptcy . . . . 131
3.3.2 Main Features of U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Law Prior to
BAPCPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
3.3.3 Bankruptcy Procedure under Chapter 13 . . . . . . . . . 132
3.4 The Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
3.4.1 Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
3.4.2 Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
3.5 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
3.5.1 Discharge and Payment Outcomes under Chapter 13 . . 145
3.5.2 The Debtor’s Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
x
3.6 Econometric Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
3.6.1 Likelihood Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
3.6.2 Parametrization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
3.7 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
3.7.1 Effects of Debtor Characteristics on the Distribution of
Recovery Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
3.7.2 Importance of Shocks in Bankruptcy . . . . . . . . . . . 163
3.7.3 Goodness of Fit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
3.8 Policy Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
3.8.1 Requiring Five-Year Plans for Above-Median-Income Debtors166
3.8.2 Imposing a Minimum Proposed Recovery Threshold . . . 168
3.8.3 Implications for Overall Recovery Rates . . . . . . . . . 169
3.9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
3.10 Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173





1.1 The Credit Schedule for 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
1.2 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
1.3 Earnings and EITC Recipients by Age and Education
Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
1.4 Age, Education, and Hours Decomposition for EITC
Recipients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
1.5 Estimates for the Cost of Child Care . . . . . . . . . . 70
1.6 Estimates for TANF Participation and Benefits . . . . 71
1.7 Estimates for SNAP Participation and Benefits . . . . 72
1.8 Estimates of the Transition in the Number of Children 73
1.9 Estimates of the Transition in Age of the Youngest
Child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
1.10 Estimates of the Flow Utility Parameters . . . . . . . 75
1.11 Estimates of the Wage Equation and the Net Asset
Lower Bound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
1.12 Estimates of the Type Probabilities and the Error
Distributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
xii
1.13 The Impact of the EITC on Employment, Hours of
Work, Wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
1.14 Percent Change in Wage under EITC (Target Group) 78
1.15 The Impact of an EITC Expansion for Childless Women
on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
1.16 The Impact of an Asset Limit on Employment, Hours
of Work, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.1 The Baseline Specification for the Numerical Solution118
3.1 Data Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
3.2 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
3.3 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
3.4 Variable Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
3.5 Maximum Likelihood Estimates - Confirmation Prob-
ability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
3.6 Maximum Likelihood Estimates - Dismissal Probability 176
3.7 Maximum Likelihood Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
3.8 Effects of Changes in Debtors’ Conditions . . . . . . . 177
3.9 Implementing BAPCPA-Required 5-year Plans . . . . . 178
3.10 Imposing a 30% Recovery Rate Threshold . . . . . . . . 178
3.11 Imposing a 30% Recovery Rate Threshold - Outside
Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
xiii
List of Figures
1.1 EITC Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
1.2 The Distribution of Net Worth in the Sample . . . . . 80
1.3 Average Wages by EITC Recipiency . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
1.4 Within Sample Fit for Wage, Asset, Employment, . . 81
1.5 The Distribution of the Change in Work Hours for
the EITC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
1.6 The Life-Cycle Wage Path of the Women in the Tar-
get Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
1.7 Introducing the EITC at Different Stages of the Life-
cyce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
1.8 The Distribution of the Change in Net Assets for
the EITC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.1 Incumbent’s and Poaching Firm’s Wage Offers When
wpf + x ≤ ε . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
2.2 Incumbent’s and Poaching Firm’s Wage Offers Across
Skill Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
2.3 Fraction of Job-to-Job Movers Across Skill Groups 120
xiv
2.4 Incumbent’s Wage Across Different Levels of x . . . 121
2.5 Poaching Firm’s Wage Across Different Levels of x . 122
2.6 Fraction of Job-to-Job Movers Across Different Lev-
els of x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
3.1 Distribution of Plan Length in Months . . . . . . . . . 180
3.2 Distributions of Proposed and Actual Credit Recov-
ery Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
3.3 Conditional Distributions of Recovery Rates . . . . . 182
3.4 Timing of Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
3.5 Model-Generated Conditional Distributions of Re-
covery Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
3.6 Distributions of Recovery Rates for Extreme Debtor
Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
3.7 Model Fit (left columns: model; right columns: data) 186
xv
Chapter 1
Does the Earned Income Tax
Credit Help Single Women
Climb the Wage Ladder?
1.1 Introduction
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), the dominant tax-based cash assis-
tance program in the U.S., is commonly credited for causing taxpayers to choose
work over welfare dependency. This pro-work effect is found to be more pro-
nounced particularly for single women with children1, as several studies find
EITC expansions to be the prime reason why employment rose among single
women with children during the 1990s (Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Meyer and
Rosenbaum, 2001). However, without promoting wage growth in the long run,
EITC can create dependency on another form of government transfer - tax-
credits. A key question to ask, then, is: What is the impact of the EITC on
wage growth?
The objective of this paper is to take a first step at evaluating whether
1The EITC did not offer any credit to childless women until 1994.
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the EITC helps single women climb the wage ladder. To provide an answer
to whether the EITC promotes wage growth, I first develop and estimate a
dynamic labor supply model. I then use the estimated model to simulate life-
cycle labor supply, employment, wage and net asset paths of women with and
without the tax credit. This allows me to assess the impact of the EITC on
wage growth by comparing the magnitude of the dynamic, long-term effects of
the EITC to its immediate impact through easing the budget constraint on the
life-cycle profiles of single women. Next, I conduct three distinct counterfactual
experiments. First, I consider the consequences of an expansion in the credit
schedule for childless workers as proposed by President Obama. Second, I assess
the significance of imposing an assets test with a value similar to the asset limits
in other federal cash transfer programs for low-income individuals. Finally, I
evaluate whether it is possible strengthen the impact of the EITC on wage
growth by altering the parameters of the credit schedule such as the cutoffs for
payment regions or the amount of the subsidy.
The analysis in this paper is based on the estimation of a life-cycle labor
supply model in which forward-looking single women make joint work and sav-
ing (or borrowing) decisions. Specifically, starting from the year they complete
education and enter the labor market, single women decide on annual hours of
work and the level of net savings under borrowing constraints. Based on these
decisions, the amount of the EITC a woman receives is determined as the level
of the tax credit depends on her labor market earnings in the previous year. In
the model, I also allow for participation in other government transfer programs
such as the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) and Supplemental
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Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). I do not model participation in these
programs as endogenous decisions, rather I specify the probability of receiving
any benefit as exogenous stochastic processes that depend on women’s observ-
able characteristics. The model also takes into account any changes in the family
composition over the life cycle, in the form of arrival and departure of a child.
In addition, by incorporating observed and unobserved heterogeneity in skills
and preferences, I try to match the rich dynamics that are observed in the data.
The theoretical and empirical framework in this paper focuses on three
dynamic mechanisms that have significant impact on the wage growth of sin-
gle women. The first one is human capital accumulation2 which is exploited
by several studies in the literature, e.g., Eckstein and Wolpin (1989a); Van der
Klaauw (1996); Altuğ and Miller (1998); Francesconi (2002); Keane and Wolpin
(2010); Keane, Todd, and Wolpin (2011). Human capital accumulation creates
a link between the work choice and future wages. In particular, a woman’s work
choice adds to the stock of work experience, which in turn affects future wages
and thus, future work choices. This feature of the model creates an ‘investment
return’ to the current choice of work hours. Second, the model imposes bor-
rowing constraints by setting a lower bound on the level of assets that depends
on women’s characteristics such as age and educational attainment, similar to
Keane and Wolpin (2001). By limiting the extent to which women can trans-
fer resources across periods, this borrowing constraint alters the work choices
2In this paper, when I use the term human capital accumulation I refer to experience
accumulation. Moreover, the fact that higher experience leads to wage growth does not
necessarily imply skill formation. Experience in the labor market is valuable because it may
convey information on a worker’s unobserved characteristics such as punctuality, reliability
or motivation.
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of women, and thus modifies the wage growth path as well as human capi-
tal accumulation over the life cycle. Nevertheless, the existence of borrowing
constraints does not eliminate the consumption smoothing motives created by
a positively sloped age-earnings profile over the life cycle. Finally, the credit
schedule of the EITC creates one other dynamic channel. The amount of tax
credit, determined by annual earnings, is received in the following year as a tax
refund. Therefore, the current work choice of a woman can alter her monetary
resources for the following period through the level of tax credit she receives.
By easing the budget constraint, the tax credit creates an additional channel
through which current work hours affect future labor supply decisions.
My analysis focuses on single women for three main reasons. First and
foremost, single women form the prime population for tax-based cash assistance
along with welfare programs as they are generally characterized with low levels
of education, low income and high poverty (see Blundell, Dias, Meghir, and
Shaw (2013)). Furthermore, as Gladden and Taber (2000) point out, learning-
by-doing or human capital accumulation is crucial for workers with low income
and low levels of education since wage growth differences between the low and
moderately skilled workers stem mainly from differences in the level of work
experience. Since any change in the work experience would be translated into
a different path of wage growth, low-income women form the prime group to
evaluate whether a tax-credit helps climbing the wage-ladder. Finally, I restrict
my analysis to single women as they lack the safety net created by spousal
earnings. This implies that external factors such as household bargaining or
spousal preferences over women’s leisure do not affect the labor supply decisions
4
made by single women.
For the empirical analysis, I use data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID). This data set is well suited for the analysis for two main
reasons. First, it collects detailed information on annual hours of work, annual
earnings, the level of education, number of children, cost of childcare, partici-
pation in welfare programs as well as on the assets and debt of single women.
Moreover, the PSID provides data over a significantly long time frame, contrary
to other similar data sets such as the Survey of Income and Program Partici-
pation (SIPP). One drawback of PSID, however, is that it doesn’t present any
information on the level of the EITC individuals receive. I resolve this issue by
calculating the amount of credit each woman receives using the actual policy
parameters set by the federal and the state governments, depending on annual
earnings and size of the family.3
I estimate the parameters of the model using a two-step method. In the
first step, I estimate the parameters of the exogenous processes in the model,
such as child care costs, participation in other government programs and the
change in family composition. In the second step, I estimate the remaining
parameters using method of simulated moments (MSM). Specifically, I simulate
a data set using the parameters from the model, and I match the moments from
the simulated data to the moments from the observed data. The choice of the
estimation method is dictated mainly by the data structure provided by the
PSID. Although PSID gives detailed information on the variables that are key
3With this calculation I am assuming every EITC eligible individual claims tax credit.
Given that the EITC participation rates vary between 80-86% (Scholz (1994)) implies that
this assumption is reasonable.
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to the model, it only does so at a few points in time. Furthermore, it doesn’t
give information on women’s work experience stocks4 as developed in the model.
As a result, by using a simulation-based estimation approach, I am able to fill
the gaps in the data on assets and work experience. The identification of the
impact of the EITC comes from the variation in the policy parameters across
time and states.
The results of the estimation display significant returns to experience for
low-income single women. In particular, a one percent increase in the experi-
ence stock constructed based on annual work hours, leads to a 0.22% increase
in the wage rate of a woman. The parameter estimates from the wage equa-
tion further highlight the importance the detrimental effect of career breaks on
women’s life-cycle earnings. In particular, a woman who worked full-time in
the previous year earns an average wage almost 6.7% higher than a woman who
took a career break in the previous period. Using the parameter estimates from
the model, I then assess the impact of the EITC on labor supply, wage and net
worth paths of single women over the life cycle. Using the 2002 schedule for
the tax credit, I show that employment rate increases by 4 percentage points
as a result of the EITC. Moreover, I find that the EITC generates significant
intensive-margin responses5, contrary to what previous literature has argued,
once the dynamic effects of the EITC are taken into consideration. This result
is in line with the findings of Imai and Keane (2004); Keane (2009, 2011); Keane
4I construct a woman’s experience stock as the total hours of work she has worked since
she entered the labor market. Because the PSID switched to biennial interviewing, I cannot
observe the experience stock of some women from the data.
5Intensive-margin responses refer to the change in hours of work conditional on employ-
ment. Extensive-margin responses, on the other hand, refer to the change in the employment
decisions.
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and Rogerson (2012) which argue intensive-margin responses might be under-
estimated if human capital accumulation is not explicitly taken into account.
Furthermore, I show that as a result of the labor supply responses to the tax
credit, the average wage rate of a single women increase by 5% as a result of the
EITC. Further analysis proves that this increase in the wages is actually gener-
ated by the additional human capital accumulation created by the tax credit.
I then consider the heterogeneity in the responses to the EITC and find that
high school dropouts along with women who have two or more children are the
two groups that benefit the most from the tax credit. Additionally, I show that
receiving the tax credit early in the life cycle generates a higher wage growth.
The counterfactual experiments in the paper analyze adjustments to the
design of the credit schedule for the EITC. Specifically, I first consider an expan-
sion of the tax credit received by childless women as recently proposed by Pres-
ident Obama6. The results show that the expansion is successful in generating
an increase in the employment rate and average wages without disincentivizing
work hours and savings. Next, I investigate the impact of introduction of an
asset limit as part of the eligibility requirements for the tax credit. Such asset
limits exist in major public benefit programs, e.g., Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families (TANF), Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP),
and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). The results show that this additional
restriction for eligibility might inhibit single women’s ability to move along the
path to financial security and self-sufficiency. Specifically, the asset test causes
significant declines in the employment rate and the average net worth compared
to their values under the current EITC schedule. The decline in net assets is
6See www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/eitc_report.pdf
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especially disturbing as the sample in consideration consists of single women
who lack the safety net provided by spousal earnings. This result also implies
that an asset test possibly makes these women more vulnerable to the labor
market shocks they may face, by eliminating the protection created by their
asset stocks. This finding on the detrimental impact of an asset test may pro-
vide insight to the recent discussions in the policy circles7 that argue imposing
asset limits as a requirement for eligibility might be hindering the effectiveness
of government cash-transfer programs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the liter-
ature this paper contributes to and Section 3 explains the details on the credit
schedule as well as the eligibility requirements of the EITC. Section 4 describes
the sample used in the empirical analysis and displays some key facts from the
data. In Section 5, I introduce the life-cycle labor supply model developed in this
paper and discuss the solution method. Section 6 presents the empirical analy-
sis by describing the estimation method, identification arguments and then, by
interpreting the parameter estimates. In Section 7, I explore the impact of the
EITC on the extensive and intensive margin responses along with wage growth
and net asset accumulation. Section 8 looks at policy experiments in which
the credit is expanded for childless women and the eligibility for the tax credit
requires an asset test in addition to the requirements concerning labor market
earnings. Section 9 concludes.
7For example, see http://goo.gl/Fgs3fc or http://goo.gl/KZtt9b.
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1.2 Related Literature
There is a large literature on the static labor supply effects of the EITC.
Blundell (2006); Eissa and Hoynes (2006, 2011); Hotz and Scholz (2003); Hoynes
(2009); Liebman (1998) are a few examples of excellent surveys that provide vast
evidence on how EITC payments increase the labor force participation in the
population. Nevertheless, comparatively little research has connected life-cycle
decisions and EITC payments8. One notable exception comes from Heckman,
Lochner, and Cossa (2002), who study the potential effects of wage subsidies
on skill formulation by comparing on-the-job training models with learning-by-
doing models and argue that the learning-by-doing models, which are favored
by provisional evidence, indicate that wage subsidies promote skill formation.
Even though the paper does not take into account the potential endogenous
labor market entry effects of the EITC, it quantifies the change in the average
human capital stock of single women with low levels of education. The results
show that EITC may reduced the long-term wages, even though the skill levels
do not decline. Blank (2012), is an other example that constructs a dynamic-
discrete choice model of employment and welfare participation, and estimates
it using a sample of single women from PSID. Without taking into account the
saving or borrowing decisions or heterogeneity in skills or preferences, she finds
that the EITC only leads to an increase in part-time employment. However, the
paper does not explicitly consider the effect of the tax credit on life-cycle wage
8Ben-Shalom, Moffitt, and Scholz (2011); Hotz and Scholz (2003) both consider the dy-
namic impact of EITC payments in the form of human capital accumulation and they argue
that EITC should theoretically decrease the returns to human capital accumulation in the
phase-out region by taxing both current and future income, whereas it should have an opposite
effect in the subsidy region. Neither of these papers provides any empirical analysis.
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paths of individuals. The most recent study on this topic is by Athreya, Reilly,
and Simpson (2014). In a setting where wages are exogenous, they find that the
EITC reduces consumption volatility along with an increase in the labor supply
of unskilled single mothers, especially at the extensive margin. In sum, to the
best of my knowledge, none of the papers in the literature considers the impact
of the EITC on life-cycle wage paths of women through the changes in their
optimal behavior concerning employment, hours of work and saving/borrowing.
One other related literature this paper contributes to studies the dynamic
structural links created by welfare or earnings subsidy programs that are similar
to the EITC. One example is the seminal paper by Miller and Sanders (1997)
that estimates a dynamic model to conduct an empirical analysis on how AFDC
affects the educational attainment and subsequent labor market performance of
young women. Their results show that negative duration dependence in welfare
overwhelms the human capital effect. A more recent example is a paper by
Blundell, Dias, Meghir, and Shaw (2013), which sets up a dynamic model of
education, labor supply and saving decisions of women in order to understand
the ramifications of the reform on Working Families Tax Credit, the dominant
earnings subsidy program in UK. In particular, they consider the insurance
value created by the tax credit and analyze whether women with different levels
of educational attainment prefer increases in income support or tax cuts that
are equally costly.
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on structural estimation of
dynamic models of female labor supply. A number of studies emphasized the link
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between women’s labor force participation and human capital accumulation, of-
ten examining how marriage, fertility and participation interact (Keane, Todd,
and Wolpin, 2011). Examples include Eckstein and Wolpin (1989a); Van der
Klaauw (1996); Altuğ and Miller (1998); Francesconi (2002); Keane and Wolpin
(2010). However, almost all papers in the literature ignore the saving or bor-
rowing decisions of women. Blundell, Dias, Meghir, and Shaw (2013) is one
exception, though they only allow for borrowing for the schooling investment.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to develop and estimate a
dynamic female labor supply model that incorporates the saving and borrowing
decisions of women along with the effect of credit constraints.
1.3 Institutional Background
EITC, which was enacted in 1975 primarily as a temporary credit to off-
set Social Security taxes, is a refundable tax credit for low-income individuals.
Congress made the credit permanent in 1978 and repeatedly increased its value
until 1987. After that, EITC has undergone three major expansions; with the
Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986, the Omnibus Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of
1990 and with OBRA of 1993. OBRA 1993 was the largest among these ex-
pansions as it almost doubled the payments to eligible individuals along with




In order to claim EITC, an individual must file an annual income tax
return. Among the individuals who file their tax returns, those who have a
Social Security number and who are U.S. citizens or resident aliens all year or
are married to U.S. citizens or resident aliens are considered for the tax credit.
Furthermore, before 1994 a taxpayer had to have a “qualifying child” subject to
certain age, relationship and residency tests in order to be eligible. Since 1994,
childless adults may also claim EITC, as long as they are older than 25. Finally,
EITC has special rules for members of the military, ministers, members of the
clergy and those receiving disability benefits9.
EITC is a means-tested cash transfer program and thus, the most impor-
tant eligibility rule for the program is concerned with labor market earnings of
individuals. In particular, individuals or families must have positive earnings
in order to be eligible. The labor market earnings is formally defined as “the
sum of wage, salary and self-employment income” by the IRS10. The restriction
of positive earned income implies that at least one individual in a family must
be working in order to claim EITC. One other condition for receiving the tax
credit is to have earned income and adjusted gross income (AGI)11 less than
the EITC limit which varies by the number of children and marital status for
certain years. Although EITC did not include an asset test originally, starting
with 1996 limitations on investment income came into effect. In terms of tax
9http://goo.gl/Q4JJCe
10http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/What-is-Earned-Income%3F
11AGI is an individual’s total gross income minus allowances for personal exemptions and
itemized deductions.
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credit purposes, the definition of investment or asset income includes earned in-
terest, dividends, capital gains, royalties and rent from personal property, and
returns from passive activities such as business pursuits in which the person is
not actively involved12. Specifically, the investment income limit was $2,350 for
the first year it came into effect while it increased slightly to $2,800 in 2006.
1.3.2 The Credit Schedule
There are three important factors that define the credit schedule for the
EITC. First and foremost, the credit schedule depends on earned income. Specif-
ically, the schedule consists of three regions: subsidy (phase-in), flat (plateau)
and phase-out. At the lowest level of earnings, or in the subsidy region, EITC
benefit equals to a fixed percentage of earnings and an individual with a level
of earnings that is equal to the subsidy region threshold receives the maximum
credit. Taxpayers with earnings above the subsidy region threshold continue
receiving the maximum credit for a small interval of earnings. However, once
the level of earnings reaches the flat region threshold, EITC benefits are taxed
away at the phase-out rate. Therefore, the subsidy rate, phase-out rate, and
two earnings thresholds, which determine the end of the subsidy and the flat
regions, define the credit schedule. Table 1.1 presents the credit schedule for
the tax year 2013. In the table, credit rate represents the subsidy rate and the
minimum income for maximum credit represents the threshold that defines the
end of the subsidy region.
Second, as can be seen from Table 1.1, there are separate credit schedules
for different family sizes. In particular, the credit rate and the phase-out rate
12http://www.cbo.gov/budget-options/2013/44810
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increase with the number of children. However, the increase in the phase-out
rate is much lower than the increase in the credit rate. Moreover, the maximum
credit varies significantly with the number of children. As an example, while
the maximum credit is $487 for taxpayers with no child, it increases to $6,044
for taxpayers with three or more children. The eligibility range for earnings is
also considerably larger for families with more children. Since more generous
payments are offered to taxpayers with more children, EITC is generally con-
sidered as a pro-natal policy. On the other hand, the EITC has been criticized
for imposing substantial marriage penalties as single and married individuals
faced the same earnings thresholds until 2002. This means that, if a single par-
ent receiving the EITC got married before 2002, the addition of the spouse’s
earnings may have reduced or eliminated the credit, even though the spouse
was also eligible for the credit. To address this issue, the Economic Growth and
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 raised the level of beginning income for
the phase-out region for couples to $3,000 above the level of beginning income
for single individuals. Moreover, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
of 2009 (ARRA) has increased that amount to $5,000 in 2009 and indexed the
threshold to inflation.
Finally, the EITC is defined as a refundable transfer program, which means
that if the credit exceeds a taxpayer’s income tax liability, the excess amount is
paid as a tax refund. This refundable portion on the EITC is usually referred
to as the outlay component. Eissa and Hoynes (2006) show that the outlay
component of the EITC amounts to a significant portion of the total payments.
In particular, in 2004 $35 billion out of a total cost of $40 billion was due to the
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outlay component. This fact is crucial for the analysis in this paper as I focus
on the outlay component of the EITC in the empirical analysis and assume the
tax credit payments determined by labor market earnings are received as a tax
refund in the following year.
1.3.3 State-level EITC Programs
Starting in late 1980s, states began to enact their own EITC schedules
as add-in programs to the federal EITC. The first state to approve an EITC
program as a supplement to the federal EITC was Maryland in 1987. These
state EITC rules are usually simpler than the federal schedule as they are mostly
defined as a fixed percentage of the federal EITC. As an example, for the tax
year 2001 the EITC rate in Maryland was 16%, which implied that Maryland
residents were to receive an additional supplement that amounted to 16% of the
federal EITC.
State EITC rates vary a lot across years and across states. In 1996, the
only states that provided EITC supplements were Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota,
New York, Rhode Island, Vermont and Wisconsin. However, as of 2013 the num-
ber of states with EITC programs increased to 22. Moreover, the generosity of
these programs range from 3.5% in Louisiana to 40% in the District of Columbia
for the tax year 2013. Another difference in the state-level EITC schedules
across states comes from the refundability of the benefits. Although most of
the states that provide EITC supplements offer refundable benefits, there are
still some states such as Delaware, Maine and Virginia with a non-refundable
benefit system. In these states, EITC supplements act only to decrease the
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state tax liability of individuals and families.
1.4 Data
I utilize the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to create the sample
I use in the empirical analysis. The PSID is a longitudinal study that began in
1968 with a core nationally representative sample called the Survey Research
Center (SRC) sample, and an oversample that mainly represents low-income and
black families, called the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) sample. The
PSID added an additional Latino sample in 1990 but dropped the individuals
in this sample after 1995, due to missing out on the full range of post-1968
immigrants. Still, in order to continue its nationally representative sample, the
PSID included a sample of post-1968 immigrants after 1997.
Until 1997, the PSID collected annual data on demographic characteris-
tics, labor market earnings, annual work hours, childcare expenditures, receipts
from welfare and other government programs every year. However, after 1997
PSID switched to biennial interviewing due to insufficient funding which makes
tracking individuals’ labor market histories harder13. In the analysis, I use PSID
waves from 1993 to 2007, which provide demographic information for the years
between 1993 and 2007. However the labor market information obtained from
these waves refer to the years 1992-2006. Furthermore, I include both the SRC
and the SEO samples in order to create a sample of low-income individuals.
I drop the observations that belong to the Latino and the immigrant samples
due to two main factors. First, these samples do not represent the full range of
13PSID continues to collect data on Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits
for each year, even after switching to biennial interviewing.
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post-1968 immigrants. Secondly, the PSID stopped interviewing the majority of
the individuals that belong to these samples after 1995 due to insufficient fund-
ing. Information on demographic characteristics, labor market status, earnings,
annual work hours, childcare costs along with welfare and food stamp bene-
fits come from the individual and family files of the PSID. Making use of the
Supplemental Wealth Files the PSID provides, I construct net asset14 profiles.
The PSID collected wealth information every 5 years until 1999, and every 2
years after that. In construction my net asset measure, I use the wealth files
from 1994, 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005. The asset information provided by the
PSID is very comprehensive as it includes the values of real estates, farms or
businesses, vehicles, stocks, mutual funds, bonds, and liquid assets. The wealth
files also specify the value of home equity and other debts.
I restrict the sample I use for the empirical analysis to single women who
are classified as never married for the years I observe them in the data. More-
over, I include observations for a given woman only if she is between ages 16
and 70, is not self-employed, has valid data on education, race, state of res-
idence, number of children, annual work hours and labor market earnings. I
also exclude observations from women who change their state of residence as
well as women who are students, who are in the military, who are retired or
disabled. Finally, I drop the observations of women who are interviewed only
once during the years 1992 to 2006. The remaining sample consists of 1,407
women with 7,090 observations over 15 years15. Out of these 1,407 women, 50%
14Throughout the paper, I use the term net assets to refer to the net worth of individuals.
Net worth or net assets is defined as assets minus the liabilities an individual has.
15Out of these 7,090 observations I observe labor market information such as earnings or
annual work hours for 4,593 and the value of assets for 2,573 observations
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are observed for at most 8 years and 21% over the whole period. For this sample
of women, I use information on age, years of education, state of residence, num-
ber of children, age of youngest child, annual earnings16, annual work hours,
child care expenditures, welfare benefits, food stamp benefits and net worth.
Although the PSID does not provide information on the amount EITC benefits
a woman is entitled to, I use federal and state EITC policy rules to calculate
the annual tax credit a woman receives17. Furthermore, in order to remove the
effect of outliers, I censor earnings, annual work hours, child care expenditures
and net worth at the top and bottom 5 percentiles for each wave of the data
I’m using. Finally, in constructing the net worth measure I use in the rest of
the paper, I exclude the value of home equity. The reasons for excluding the
value of home equity are twofold. First, in the data only 102 observations have
a value of home equity different from 0. Second, these 102 observations form
a considerably wide range of home equity values, from $-121,000 to $143,000.
One explanation for this observation might be the housing bubble that emerged
around 2001.
Table 1.2 provides summary statistics for the sample. As can be seen from
the table, women are on average around 33 years old and mostly black. The
fraction of black women in the sample is high due to including observations from
the SEO sample that overrepresents blacks. In terms of the level of education,
the sample consists mainly of high school graduates. On average, these women
16All monetary variables are adjusted to 2006 dollars.
17I am not using information on asset income from the PSID. This is mainly because the
asset income information is not consistent with the asset levels reported in the Supplemental
Wealth Files. In addition, since the asset information is provided only for 5 years out of the
whole observation period, I cannot impose the asset income restrictions to the data while
calculating the EITC amount each woman receives.
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have one child and the age of youngest child is around 3 years old18. The fact
that women on average have only one or no child might be the result of having
a young sample of women. As for the labor market status, more than 85% of
the women in this sample are employed and these women who are employed,
on average, work a little less than full-time. Full-time jobs usually necessitate
working 8 hours a week and 50 weeks a year, which add up to around 2,000
work hours per year. Since the women in this sample work around 1,800 hours
on average, the average working hours is less than the hours a full time job
necessitates. Furthermore, this sample can be described as consisting of low-
income women as the annual earnings of the average woman is a little more
than $25,000. Due to the low levels of labor market earnings, 38% of the total
observations fall in the eligibility range of the EITC based on labor market
earnings. More specifically, the average federal EITC received is about $1,900
while the maximum credit can be as high as $4,645. The average of the state
EITC, however, is very low mostly even among the women who are eligible for
the EITC mostly because only a few states offered state EITC programs until
the early 2000s. The fraction of TANF and SNAP recipients in the sample is
significantly lower than the fraction of EITC recipients. However, even though
the fraction of TANF and SNAP recipients are low, the average benefits for
the eligible women are considerably higher than the average benefits the EITC
provides. The final key variable for the analysis is net worth, which is defined
as the value of checking accounts, stocks, and vehicles less any debt. The most
striking aspect of net worth in the sample is its wide range, from around -$33,032
18The number of children is capped at 2 as for tax credit purposes having more than
2 children is not different from having 2 children. Imposing this restriction decreases the
average number of children from 1.01 to 0.88 in the sample.
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to $72,133. Still, even though some women have high levels of net worth, the
average in the sample is only $3,249. Moreover, 26% of the sample has negative
net worth, while 20% has zero and 54% has positive net worth. The distribution
of the net worth in the sample is displayed in Figure 1.2.
Since the sample in consideration consists of low-income women, the age-
earnings profile is flatter than the education-earnings profile. The top panel in
Table 1.3 presents how average earnings and annual work hours vary across age
groups. As expected, average annual earnings increase with age even though
the increase is not significant. Moreover, earnings rise with age, even though
older women tend to work fewer hours annually. In particular, the women in
the sample work the most between ages 25 and 30. Since the average earnings
of older women are higher even though they are working less, it can be inferred
that the wage rate increases as women get older. With respect to the tax credit,
the table shows that more than 40% of the women who are younger than 40
receive EITC. The percentage of EITC recipients is slightly lower for women
who are younger than 25, mainly because of the eligibility rule that states
childless individuals can receive EITC only if they are 25 years old or older.
Since the average level of earnings rise as women age, it is not surprising to see
that the EITC recipiency rate declines with age. Furthermore, this trend in the
percentage of EITC recipients across age groups is reflected in the average EITC
payments. For this reason, the average amount of tax credit is the highest for
the women who are aged between 25 and 30.
The bottom panel of Table 1.3 displays the trends for average earnings,
work hours and EITC receipts across education groups. Most significantly,
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average earnings increase with the level of educational attainment of women.
Furthermore, more educated women work for considerably more hours than
less educated women. These two observations lead to a steep decline in the
EITC recipiency rates as women get more educated. Furthermore, not only the
fraction but also the average tax credit the eligible women receive declines as
the education level of the women gets higher.
In order to understand the group of women who receive the EITC a little
better, Table 1.4 provides information on the age, education and annual work
hours of EITC recipients. According to the table, half of the recipients are
above age 30, while most of them are between ages 30 and 40. As for education,
almost half of the women who receive the tax credit are high school graduates.
Interestingly, high school dropouts are less likely to receive the tax credit than
high school graduates in the sample. Further analysis of the data reveals that
this is because high school dropouts are less likely to work than the high school
graduates. Finally, the last column of the table shows how much EITC recipients
work annually. Since EITC recipients have low labor market earnings, one might
think that they also have short working hours. However contrary to this belief,
the table provides evidence that in fact more than 65% of the women who
receive the EITC work either full time or have more than one part time job.
Note that, a part time job requires about 1,000 annual work hours while a full
time job requires about 2,000 annual work hours. With these definitions, the
last column of the table reveals that the majority of EITC recipients work more
than 1,300 hours. In order to have more than 1,300 annual work hours, these
women must either work full-time or have more than one part-time job. The
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fact that these women have long working hours but low earnings leads to the
conclusion that they suffer from low wages. Figure 1.3 provides evidence for
this argument by comparing the average wage of EITC recipients with that of
non-recipients across ages. This figure also shows the extent of an OLS bias.
More specifically, if the wage level is regressed on EITC eligibility along with
some controls, this OLS regression would reveal that being eligible for the EITC
is correlated with receiving low wages. This might lead to the wrong conclusion
that EITC actually leads to women receiving low wage rates. However, the
fact that EITC eligibility requires having low earnings should also be taken into
consideration.
To sum up, women in the sample I construct for the empirical analysis tend
to have noticeably low labor market earnings and net worth. In addition, almost
40% of the observations are coupled with earnings that fall in the eligibility
region of the EITC. Further analysis reveals that EITC recipients are mostly
high-school graduates and are between ages 30 and 40. Most notably, the women
who receive tax credit have long working hours and low earnings. This leads
to the conclusion that these women suffer from low wages. A natural question
is: how much does EITC help these low-wage women over their labor market
careers in terms of human capital accumulation and wage growth? To answer
this question, the next section presents a life-cycle labor supply model.
1.5 Model
In this section, I provide a life-cycle model for single women who ratio-
nally choose their optimal life-cycle paths for net savings (or borrowing and
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consequently consumption) and annual hours of work. In the model, I allow for
participation in welfare and food stamp programs as well as family composi-
tion changes over the life-cycle in the form of arrival and departure of a child.
However, these dynamics are exogenously determined in the model.
I start modelling women’s decisions as they complete their education and
enter the labor market. The age at which a woman enters the labor market,
thus, depends on her education level and is denoted by t0i. Specfically, I assume
that high school dropouts start working at age 16, high school graduates at
age 18, college dropouts at age 20, and finally college graduates and those with
post-college education enter the labor market at age 22. After entering the labor
market, women make annual decisions concerning their work hours and levels
of net saving. Working life is assumed to end deterministically at age 60, but I
assume women live for 10 more years and consumer their accumulated assets.
The model accounts for three important dynamic mechanisms, first and
foremost being human capital accumulation. By working more hours, women
accumulate experience which have long lasting effects on their earnings. Specif-
ically, the wage rate a woman faces depend on the experience stock, persistent
unobserved heterogeneity, previous and current work hours choices as well as
the market skill rental price. The impact of the previous work hours choice on
the wage rate is crucial for incorporating the detrimental effect of taking time
out of the labor market for single women. Even though having a career break
does not cause a decline in the experience stock in the model, by allowing the
wage rate to depend on previous hours choice, the model captures the detri-
mental impact of taking time out of the labor market and thus, the dynamic
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links in the earnings processes of women.
Secondly, the model allows for saving and borrowing. By deciding on how
much to save, women in fact determine the amount of funds to transfer across
different stages of their life-cycle. Since I focus on low-income women in this
paper, I also incorporate borrowing constraints to the model. In particular, the
model imposes a lower-bound for the level of assets which depend on women’s
age and schooling level. However, I allow this lower bound to be negative,
which implies that women can borrow even when their net worth is negative.
In addition to the borrowing constraint, the model imposes a lower bound for
consumption. In particular, women’s saving or borrowing choices are feasible
only if the level of consumption exceeds a consumption floor, c.
The final intertemporal link comes from the structure of the EITC. By de-
ciding on how many hours to work, a woman essentially determines the amount
of tax credit she receives next period, taking as given the policy parameters19.
In addition, I assume that women have static expectations concerning the tax
system, which implies that any change in the tax credit or tax policy comes
unexpectedly. This assumption is motivated by previous work in the literature
documenting the lack of knowledge of the tax policies20.
In addition to these dynamics, the model also accounts for participation in
19As mentioned earlier, EITC payments are received as a tax refund. A tax refund based
on the earnings from the current year is generally received between January and May of the
following year. Since I am modelling the annual decisions of women, I assume the EITC pay-
ment based on the labor market earnings from the current period is received in the following
period.
20See for example Olson and Davis (1994) and Romich and Weisner (2000)
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government transfer programs such as the Temporary Assistance to Needy Fam-
ilies (TANF) and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). How-
ever, rather than explicitly modelling the decisions to participate in these pro-
grams, I model the probabilities of receiving any benefits that capture both
eligibility and the participation decision as stochastic processes.
In the remaining of this section, I describe the details of the model with
specific parametrizations, provide a discussion on the predictions of the model
and explain the solution method.
1.5.1 The Choice Set








h represents the choice for annual hours of work and dsit ∈ D
s represents
the level of savings (or borrowing) net of interest income. The alternative choices






1 Less than 1300 hours,
2 Between 1300 and 1950 hours,
3 Between 1950 and 2200 hours,
4 More than 2200 hours,
(1.1)
dsit = Ai,t+1 − (1 + r)Ait ∈ {a1, . . . , a10}, (1.2)
where Ait is woman’s level of assets.
The annual hours of work choice includes 5 alternatives: no work, working
less than 1300 hours, between 1300 and 1950 hours, between 1950 and 2200
hours and more than 2200 hours. If a woman chooses an alternative that requires
work, I assume the woman’s annual work hours is equal to the midpoint of
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each bin. For example, if a woman chooses alternative 2 which implies that she
chooses to work less than 1300 hours, I assume she works for 650 in that period21.
The net saving decision22, on the other hand, involves choosing from one of
the 10 discrete alternatives between -$5,000 and $15,000. Note that, through
the choice of net savings, a woman also decides on her level of consumption
conditional on the receipts and expenditures defining her budget constraint.
The model also allows for borrowing which implies that dsit can take on negative
values. I discretize annual work hours and net saving in order to make a women’s
choice set entirely discrete. This specification is crucial for the analysis as it
increases the tractability of the problem.
1.5.2 Preferences
Period utility, given in equation (1.3), defines a woman’s preferences over
the choice variables, dhit and d
s
it, conditional on observed state variables Xit and
















































21The intervals determining the alternatives for the hours of work choice are constructed so
that the mean and the standard deviation of work hours based on this definition is approxi-
mately equal to the annual hours of work distribution in the data.
22I follow Keane and Wolpin (2001) in this particular formulation for the saving decision.
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The period utility is seperable between consumption and leisure. Further-
more, the first component of the period utility defines the value of consumption
while the second component represents the value of leisure, or equivalently the
disutility from work. The utility from consumption has an augmented CRRA
form with the constant relative risk-aversion parameter, 1 − θc. To ensure the
concavity of flow utility with respect to consumption, I assume θc < 1. The
function, λc(.) captures the differences in the marginal utility of consumption
resulting from observed and unobserved heterogeneity. More specifically, this
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where Xit represents observed characteristics of the woman such as the number
of children, Nit; the education level and age
23, yit. In this formulation, the
parameters αu2 , α
u
3 , and α
u
4 represent the varying disutility a woman gets from
choosing different work alternatives as well as the fixed psychic cost from work.
The remaining parameters αu5 -α
u
8 capture the decrease in the disutility from
work if the woman chooses the same work alternative as she did the last period.
Permanent unobserved heterogeneity enters the model through the woman’s
latent type24, k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , K}, which captures the persistence in preferences
for saving and leisure and its correlation with the observed characteristics of a
woman.
Similarly, λh(.) refers to a function that shifts the marginal disutility of
23I use both t and yit to denote age. However, t refers to the periods of the model which
can also be defined as a year.
24Although the woman knows her own type, it cannot be observed by the econometrician.
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work based on observable and unobservable characteristics of a woman.
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According to the specification given by equation (1.5), marginal disutility of
work depends on a woman’s latent type, age, along with a random preference
shock, εhit which follows a normal distribution.
1.5.3 The Woman’s Problem
Given the preferences and the choice set, I now define a woman’s life-cycle
problem formally. A woman maximizes her present discounted lifetime utility
from age t0i to the terminal age Ti, both determined by the woman’s educational
attainment. The choice set D in each period, t, is constructed by the Cartesian
product of the sets of discrete alternatives Dh × Ds. Let dit denote a vector
of dummy variables djit, j = 1, . . . , 50 such that d
j
it is equal to 1 if the woman
chooses jth element of D. In addition, let U jit be the utility associated with this
choice. Then, the maximized utility at any period t is given by:












where Xit is the state space at period t, which represents the information set of
the woman at that period. The state variables at period t include the age of the
woman yit, the level of her assets Ait, schooling level Si, the state she resides in
SRi, her race Ri, experience stock Hit, the federal and state earned income tax
credit to be received at that period EITCit, the number of children Nit, the age














. Next, I define the transitions for each of
these state variables in detail.
1.5.4 Constraints
A woman’s annual income is composed of her earnings, withit; federal
and state EITC payments received, EITCit; the amount of SNAP benefits the
woman receives, SNAPit; as well as the amount of TANF benefits, TANFit.
Out of this annual income, the woman pays federal and state income taxes Tit,
child care costs CCit if she has a child, and makes consumption expenditures.
The remaining amount earns interest and is transferred to future periods to
determine the level of assets for the next period, Ai,t+1. I further assume that
there exists a consumption floor, so that a choice pair (dsit, d
h
it) is feasible only
if consumption is above the minimum consumption threshold, c. Even though
the budget constraint defines the transition for the woman’s assets, the model
also imposes a borrowing constraint that is determined by woman’s age and
educational attainment. This borrowing constraint requires the level of assets to
stay above some nonpositive threshold every period. In sum, the intertemporal
budget constraint a woman faces can be summarized by the following three
equations:
Ai,t+1 = (1 + r)Ait + withit + EITCit − Tit − CCit1{Nit > 0}
+ 1{P SNAP = 1}SNAPit + 1{P




it) ≥ c, (1.8)














Next, I explain each component of the budget constraint in detail.
As mentioned in the preceeding section, I define annual work hours hit





0 if dhit = 0,
650 if dhit = 1,
1625 if dhit = 2,
2075 if dhit = 3,
2600 if dhit = 4,
(1.10)
and given this definition, I calculate woman’s annual labor market earnings by
multiplying the annual work hours hit with the wage she earns, wit.
The wage process is determined as an exponential function of the woman’s
latent type, hours of work choice, age, race, schooling level, experience stock,
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where k is the latent type of the woman, yit is the age, Ri is the race, Si is the
educational attainment, SRi is the state of residence and Hit is the accumulated
hours of work. The existence of the latent type in the wage equation captures
the impact of the unobserved skill endowment of a woman on the wage level.
Furthermore, the third term in equation (2.2) reflects the varying returns to dif-
ferent hours of work choices. More specifically, the parameters αw2j for j = 1, 2, 3
represent the differences in the wage offers a woman faces when she chooses dif-
ferent annual work hours. The parameter αw4 measures the difference in the
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skill rental prices between the black and white women due to discrimination
against black women in the labor market. In order to measure the discrimina-
tion, the variable Ri is defined as a dummy that takes on a value of 1 if the
woman is black. In addition, the dynamic wage process allows for endogenous
state dependence through experience accumulation and a change in the current
wage offer depending on the previous hours of work choice of the woman. The
following equation defines the process for experience accumulation.
Hi,t+1 = Hit + hit. (1.12)
Finally, I assume that the idiosyncratic wage shock εwit is serially independent.
In particular, the random wage shock and the preference shock are assumed to


















The federal and state EITC payments received by the woman depends
on previous period’s earnings. As previously mentioned, in this analysis I only
consider the outlay component of the EITC which implies that a woman re-
ceives federal and state EITC in the form of a tax refund25. Note that, in this
formulation, I am implicitly assuming that a woman makes all necessary tax
payments during the year. For this reason, when she files for taxes she will
not be liable for any additional taxes and she will not receive any tax refund.
Therefore, the only posibility for a woman to receive a payment in the form of
25Since I assume the decision period of the model to be a year and that all the decisions
are made at the beginning of a year, even if the tax refund is received in January, the credit
will be a part of next period’s income and thus, enter next period’s budget constraint.
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a tax refund is to be eligible for federal and thus, state EITC if she lives in a
state that offers a state EITC program.
The federal tax credit that a woman is going to receive in the next period






r1itEit if Eit ≤ b1it,
r1itb1it if b1it < Eit ≤ b2it,
max{r1itb1it − r2it(Eit − b2it)} if Eit > b2it,
(1.14)
Each component of this piecewise function defines a particular payment region
of the EITC schedule. If the earnings of the woman is less than b1it, then the
woman is in the subsidy region and the tax credit is equal to a percentage r1it
of her earnings Eit. However, if the woman’s earnings fall between b1it and b2it,
then she is in the flat region and receives the maximum level of the tax credit
possible, which equals to r1itb1it. Finally, if the woman’s earnings are above the
threshold b2it, then the woman is either in the phase-out region or she is not
eligible for the tax credit at all. In the phase-out region, the amount of credit is
taxed away depending on how far the level of the woman’s earnings is compared
to the threshold b2it whereas the amount of credit simply equals to zero if the
woman is not eligible for EITC. The policy parameters r1it, r2it, b1it and b2it
depend on the number of children, marital status and the calendar year.
If a woman is eligible for federal EITC and if she resides in a state that
offers a state EITC program, then she also receives tax credit from the state.
The level of tax credit the woman receives from the state is determined as a
percentage of the federal EITC she is entitled to. More specifically,
SEITCi,t+1 = r3itFEITCi,t+1, (1.15)
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where the policy parameter r3it is set by the state and varies with the calendar
year and for some states, with the number of children. Finally, the total EITC
payments a woman receives is simply the sum of the federal and state EITC
benefits.
EITCi,t+1 = FEITCi,t+1 + SEITCi,t+1 (1.16)
Due to the complicated structure of the tax system, I assume women have static
expectations concerning the evolution of the federal and state EITC schedule
parameters so that E(rji,t+1) = rjit, ∀j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and E(bji,t+1) = bjit, ∀j ∈
{1, 2}. Therefore, any change in the policy rule comes as a surpise. Moreover,
I assume that women can face up to four policy regimes over their life-cycles.
In particular, I adopt the 1990, 1993, 1996 and 2002 regimes and assume they
operate over the periods prior to 1990, between 1991 to 1995, between 1996 to
2001 and 2002 onwards, respectively.
The federal and state income tax a woman pays enter the budget constraint
through Tit. In order to calculate the amount of the federal tax liability, I use
the actual tax brackets and the marginal tax rates for a given calendar year.
In these calculations, I assume women pay taxes as the head of the household
and use the appropriate tax policy parameters for that status. In order to find
the state income tax a woman needs to pay given the level of her earnings and
the state she resides in, I use the tax simulator, TAXSIM, developed by the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
A woman incurs child care costs only when she has a child. The child
care cost depends on the number of children the woman has, the age of her
youngest child, and her hours of work choice. In particular, I assume the child
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care costs vary depending on whether the youngest child is an infant, a toddler,
a child or a teenager. A woman might pay child care costs even when she is not
working. This means that the child care costs might involve the expenditures a
woman makes for her child’s care and that these expenditures do not necessarily
only include the costs of day care or schooling. However, in the data, there are
also several mothers who don’t make any child care expenditures. Therefore, I
consider the child care costs to be a truncated version of a latent variable process.
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where the random child care expenditure shocks are normally distributed, εccit ∼
N(0, σ2cc). Furthermore, the actual child care cost process is given by
CCit = max{0, CC
∗
it}. (1.18)
In the model, TANF and SNAP participation decisions are not endoge-
nous but rather defined as stochastic processes. Still, according to the model
a woman makes her life-cycle decisions conditional on TANF and SNAP par-
ticipation and receipts. More specifically, I model the probabilities of receiving
any TANF or SNAP benefits as seperate logistic functions. The rules for the
welfare program state that a woman is eligible for TANF benefits if she passes
an income eligibility test. Moreover, the thresholds for this income eligibility
test vary with the state of residence and the family size. In terms of the welfare
participation decision, previous work in the literature shows that the stigma
from welfare participation depends on observable characteristics such as the
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level of educational attainment, age and race. For these reasons, I model the
TANF participation probability as a logistic function that is determined by the
earnings of the woman, her education level, how many children she has, her
race, her age, the calendar year, and the state she resides in. Note that this
probability captures the eligibility for the program as well as the participation
decision.






where Xptit = [Eit, Eit1{vit > 1996}, Si, Ri, yit, vit, SRi]. If the woman partici-
pates in welfare, the actual benefits are determined based on earnings and a
policy rule that is state and family-size dependent. For this reason, I approxi-
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Similar to welfare, eligibility for SNAP is determined by an income test
for which the thresholds are specific to state of residence and the family size.
In addition, net income test for SNAP also takes into account the amount of
welfare receipts a woman is entitled to. Taking the eligibility rules into account,
the probability of participating in SNAP is approximated as
Pr(P SNAPit = 1) =
exp(Xpsit α
ps)
1 + exp(Xpsit α
ps)
, (1.21)
where Xpsit = [Eit, Si, TANFit, vit, yit, Ri, SRi]. Once again, the inclusion of
woman’s age, race and schooling level is meant to capture the varying stigma
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from the participation decision based on the observable characteristics of the
woman.
If eligible, a woman’s actual SNAP benefits are determined by a policy
rule that takes into account her earnings and welfare benefits. This policy rule
changes according to state policies, calendar year and the family size. Therefore,
I model the amount of SNAP benefits of an eligible woman as an exponential
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where εsnapit ∼ N(0, σ
2
snap).
The transition in the number of children and the age of the yougest child
are modeled so as to match the dynamics in the data. First, in order to limit
the size of the state space I cap the number of children, so that a women can at
most have 2 children26. Secondly, from the data I observe that the change in the
number of children does not only happen through birth or the child exceeding
the age of 17. Adoption, taking custody of an existing child, the death of a
child or the child leaving the house to live with another family member are also
common events. This means, the number of children a woman has can increase
or decrease at any age. For these reasons, I specify the transition in the number
of children as follows.











) ∀m ∈ {1, 2}, (1.23)
26Having more than two children matters only for the state EITC policy of Minnesota.
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Pr(Ni,t+1 = 0) = 1−
2∑
m=1
Pr(Ni,t+1 = m), (1.24)
where Xnit = [yit, Si, N
y
it1{Nit > 0}, Nit]. In this specification, the probability of
a change in the number of children varies with the woman’s age, her schooling
level, age of her youngest child if she has a child, and the number of children
she already has.
For the reasons explained above, the age of the youngest child is not
deterministically changing in the data. In order to deal with this, I construct
four groups for the age of the youngest child and calculate the transition matrix
for the age of a woman’s youngest child so that the probability of a change in
the age of the youngest child is determined by the age of the woman and how
many children she has according to the following process.














) ∀m ∈ {2, 3, 4}, (1.25)
Pr(Nyi,t+1 = 1) = 1−
4∑
m=2
Pr(Nyi,t+1 = m), (1.26)
where Xkit = [yit, Nit, N
y
it].
1.5.5 The Solution Method
The life-cycle maximization problem of a woman can be reformulated in
a dynamic programming framework. Specifically, the value function can be
written as the maximum over alternative-specific value functions denoted as V j
for j = 1, . . . , 50 that satisfy the Bellman equation:
V (Xit) = max
{











it = 1, Xit
)
. (1.28)
The expectation in equation (1.28) is taken over the joint distribution of the ran-
dom shocks as well as the future values of the state variables. Furthermore, the
terminal-period alternative-specific value functions consist only of the contem-
poraneous utilities. In particular, I assume there is no value for death and that
there is no bequest motives. Therefore, for all values ofXi,T+1 and j = 1, . . . , 50,
I set V j(Xi,T+1) = 0.
Due to the finite-horizon structure of the model, I use backward recur-
sion as the solution method. Backward recursion entails solving the model
as a function of the entire state space for each period. More importantly,





it = 1, Xit
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for all points in the state space. Given the contin-
uation value in period t, the optimal saving decision conditional on each hours
of work alternative is calculated for by comparing the remaining discounted
utility on a grid of possible consumption levels implied by the different sav-
ing/borrowing decisions, for each of the five alternatives for the hours of work
choices.
In order to reduce the computational burden created by evaluating the
value functions over the entire state space, I utilize two methods. First, I
reduce the size of the state space by discretizing the continuous state variables.
If, however, a value outside the grid of an element of the state space needs to
be computed, I use linear interpolation and extrapolation. Secondly, I use an
approximation method developed by Keane and Wolpin (1994) which requires
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for a subset of the state
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space at each t and estimating a regression function as a polynomial in those
state space elements. The values from the fitted polynomial are used to pinpoint
the value of this function for the remaining points in the state space. Finally,
in order to calculate the multivariate integrals when taking expectations, I use
Monte Carlo integration.
1.5.6 Theoretical Predictions on the Impact of the EITC
The static labor supply theory predicts that the EITC will encourage em-
ployment among single women as the program gives incentives that decrease the
disutility from work for those people who are unemployed without the credit27.
However, the impact of the tax credit on hours of work of single women depends
on which region the women’s earnings fall into before the credit is introduced.
In particular, in the subsidy (phase-in) region EITC acts as a wage subsidy,
which leads to a negative income effect and a positive substitution effect due to
leisure becoming more expensive. Still, without further assumptions on the pref-
erences, it is not possible to determine theoretically whether the income effect
or the subsidy effect dominates. Consequently, the direction of the intensive-
margin responses of the women who are in the subsidy region is theoretically
ambiguous. In the flat region, the budget constraint of a woman shifts out by
an amount that is equal to the level of the maximum credit. Therefore, in this
region the EITC creates a negative income effect that leads to a reduction in
the work hours. Since the amount of the tax credit declines with each dollar
27This prediction is actually concerned with labor force participation. The tax credit pro-
vides incentives to those women who choose to remain out of the labor force. Nevertheless, the
model does not take into account labor force participation decision of the women. Therefore,
the predictions on labor force participation are fully reflected in employment decisions
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earned when a woman is in the phase-out region, the EITC acts as a tax that
decreases the net wage earned by the single woman. For this reason, the EITC
produces a negative income effect along with a negative substitution effect as
labor becomes less rewarding. Accordingly, the overall impact of the EITC on
work hours depends on the distribution of women across the payment regions.
Although the theoretical prediction of the static labor supply model on the im-
pact of the EITC on work hours is ambiguous, as more EITC recipients have
earnings in the flat and phase-out regions the expectation is for the EITC to
reduce the work hours of eligible single women.
On the other hand, the model in this paper takes into consideration an-
other channel through which the EITC has an effect on employment and hours
of work, i.e., human capital accumulation. Human capital accumulation in this
model works in a way to increase the rewards from work as it takes into account
the impact of current hours of work decisions on future wages. More specifically,
by working more in a given period, a woman increases her experience stock and
thus, faces higher wage offers in the future.
The dynamic model predicts positive employment effects similar to the
static labor supply model. As before, the tax credit provides incentives that de-
crease the disutility from work and thus, leads some of the women who choose
to remain unemployed without the credit to start working. In addition to this,
the dynamic model also takes into account that the introduction of the credit
increases the future rewards from work for women who are unemployed without
the credit. Therefore, the expectation is to have a higher change in the em-
ployment rate resulting from the introduction of the tax credit in the dynamic
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model.
In order to understand the prediction of the model on hours of work, once
again the behavioral responses of the women in each region need to be sepa-
rately evaluated. Note that, in all payment regions the human capital effect
works in the same direction. Essentially, no matter in which region a woman’s
earnings fall, due to human capital accumulation she always has a motive to
work more in order to achieve a higher wage level. Whether this human capital
effect dominates the income and substitution effects that are created by each
payment region, however, requires more elaboration. As mentioned above, in
the subsidy region the credit creates a substitution and an income effect that
operates in the opposite directions. The dynamics of the model adds the human
capital effect into the picture, which works in the same direction of the substi-
tution effect. In other words, the human capital effect leads to an increase in
the hours of work similar to the substitution effect that operates on the women
in this region. Still, it is not possible to theoretically identify whether the in-
come effect cancels out the favorable intensive-region responses created by the
substitution and human capital effects. Even so, it is possible to compare the
prediction of the dynamic model to that of the static model. Due to human
capital accumulation, in the dynamic model the intensive-margin responses are
expected to be higher, i.e. the change in the work hours of the women in this re-
gion should either be less negative or more positive in the dynamic model. The
same argument follows for the flat and phase-out regions as well. Even though
the EITC taxes both the current and future rewards from work in the phase-out
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region, the dynamic model introduces a link through which women are incen-
tivized to work more in order to increase the future rewards from work. In both
of these regions, the human capital effect counteracts the negative income or
substitution effects created by the credit. However, it is not possible to pro-
vide a statement whether this human capital accumulation channel completely
cancels out the incentives created by the program to decrease hours of work in
these regions. Moreover, the strength of the human capital channel depends
on the age of the woman, marginal disutility she gets from work based on her
observed and unobserved characteristics and the experience stock she currently
has. Nevertheless, contrary to the static model, the impact of the EITC on
work hours of single women is theoretically ambiguous in the flat and phase-out
regions in the dynamic model. Consequently, estimating the model will provide
further insight on the magnitudes of these individual effects as well as the net
impact of the EITC on intensive-margin responses. Note that, the above anal-
ysis is made by ignoring the changes in the asset stocks of these individuals. If
the borrowing or saving motives of individuals are also taken into account, it
gets even harder to determine the direction of the change in work hours. In that
setting, the marginal utility of consumption based on the woman’s observed and
unobserved characteristics, her current asset stock as well as her impatience are
also crucial for understanding the net impact.
The impact of the EITC on asset accumulation can not be analyzed
through the static labor supply model. One contribution of the model in this
paper is to allow for such an evaluation. In this model, the EITC might have an
effect on the net asset stock, which is defined as assets minus liabilities, through
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two main channels. First of all, the tax credit increases the resources available
to a woman in each period as long as she remains eligible. This means that, if
the woman were to spend the same amount on consumption expenditures, EITC
leads to asset accumulation. However, due to human capital accumulation, the
woman adjusts her consumption expenditures as well. More specifically, human
capital accumulation implies that the woman expects to experience an increase
in her earnings as she grows older. This is simply due to an increase in her
experience stock with every year she works. The expectation of a positive age-
earnings relation implies that the woman has consumption smoothing motives
in order to achieve a stable path of consumption over the life cycle. If the
EITC is increasing the slope of this age-earnings profile, or in other words if the
EITC is helping women to achieve higher wage levels over the life-cycle, then
the women will have stronger desires for consumption smoothing which implies
that the level of consumption expenditures especially in younger ages will rise.
Once again, the EITC creates two competing forces. Whether the income ef-
fect or the human wealth effect dominates depend on the discount factor, the
coefficient of relative risk aversion, the interest rate and the degree of disutility
a woman gets from working. For this reason, the model’s prediction for the
impact of the tax credit on asset accumulation is also ambiguous.
In sum, even though the model in this paper predicts that the EITC leads
to an increase in the employment rate, it fails to provide a definite conclusion on
the direction of intensive-margin responses and asset accumulation. This creates
the need for an empirical analysis through which the forces mentioned in this
section, such as the human wealth effect, are identified and the net effect can
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be evaluated. The rest of the paper is an attempt to provide such an analysis.
1.6 Estimation and Results
In this section I first describe the estimation method I use in this paper.
Next, I explain the identification arguments and discuss the parameter esti-
mates. Finally, I assess the success of the model in terms of fitting the patterns
observed in the data. The parameter estimates presented in this section are
used in the rest of the paper to perform counterfactual experiments.
1.6.1 Estimation Method
I estimate the parameters of the model following a two-step procedure. In
the first step I estimate the exogenous transitions in the state variables, such
as the number of children, the age of the youngest child, the child care cost,
TANF participation and benefits along with SNAP participation and benefits.
In addition, I set the discount factor β to 0.96 and the risk-free interest rate r to
0.02. The predetermined values for the risk-free interest rate and the discount
factor imply that women have some degree of impatience, since the interest
rate is slightly lower than the discount rate. In the second step, I estimate the
remaining parameters of the model using the method of simulated moments
(MSM). More specifically, the estimation procedure follows an iterative process.
First, I estimate the exogenous elements of the model from the data and set
the values for the discount factor and the interest rate. Then, I calculate the
moments from the data. In the third step, given an initial guess of the parameter
vector, I solve the life-cycle optimization problem of single women conditional
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on the estimated exognous elements from the first step. Next, I simulate 7 paths
for each woman reproducing the age and time structure of the data. Simulating
7 paths for each woman leads to a total of 9,849 paths. Finally, I calculate the
moments from the simulated data and calculate the weighted average distance
between the sample moments and the simulated moments from the model. The
iterative process continues until this distance is minimized.
More formally, let Ω denote the parameter vector, M̃S(Ω) denote the vec-
tor of moments from the simulated data and MN(Ω) denote the vector of mo-
ments from the observed data. Then, the estimated parameter vector Ω̂ solves




′WN(MN − M̃S(Ω)), (1.29)
whereWN is a symmetric, positive-definite weighting matrix. Following Del Boca,
Flinn, and Wiswall (2014), I construct this weighting matrix as the inverse of
the covariance matrix of MN , which is estimated by resampling the data
28.
In particular, I compute the vector M gN for each of the Q resamples from the












where the number of draws, Q is set to 200.
The moments that form MN and consequently M̃S(Ω) include the mean
and the standard deviation of annual work hours by age, education, and the
28Del Boca, Flinn, and Wiswall (2014) show that the estimator Ω̂ is consistent for any given
positive-definite weight matrix given that the model is identified. Note that the weight matrix
WN is positive-definite by construction.
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number of children; employment rate by age,education, and the number of chil-
dren; mean wage by age,education, and the number of children; the mean net
assets by age and eduation groups; along with the 10th, 25th, 75th percentiles
of net assets. I also calculate the correlations between wage and work hours,
contemporaneous wage and lagged hours, as well as the correlation between the
contemporaneous and lagged hours choices.
1.6.1.1 Type Probabilities and Initial Conditions
The initial conditions for the model consist of the values for schooling,
race, the state a woman resides in, the number of children she has, the age of
her youngest child, previous period’s choice of work hours, the level of net assets
and the amount of EITC she is entitled to at t0i, the initial period of the model. I
take the values of the woman’s schooling, race, state of residence and the level of
net assets as given in the data. For the women whose initial net worth is missing
in the data, I draw a value of net assets from the distribution of initial assets
conditional on these women’s educational attainment. Note that, in the model
a woman starts her working career at an age determined by her educational
attainment. For this reason, I assume that a woman has no experience and no
children at the time she starts her working career29. The assumption that the
initial level of experience is zero implies that any experience a woman gains
during school years is not effective enough to increase her human capital stock.
In addition, since t0i marks the first period a woman works, I further assume
that previous period’s work hours choice and the level of EITC a woman receives
29In the data, if the woman has no child, the age of the youngest child is coded as 1.
Therefore, the transition probabilities given in equations (23) and (24) can be calculated even
if the woman has no child in a given period
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is zero in this period.
Although the schooling level of a woman is taken as given in the data, it
is unlikely that this variable is exogenous. The schooling choice a woman makes
earlier in life, or the decision to stop schooling and to start working may reflect
skill endowments or innate ability that I cannot observe. Moreover, these skill
endowments would further affect the work choices of the woman later in the life
cycle. In sum, the educational attainment of a woman might be the outcome
of an endogenous process that is not taken into account by my model. In order
to tackle with the possible bias this endogeneity might entail, I assume that
the educational attainment of a woman is exogenous conditional on her latent
type, k. In turn, the type probability is specified as a logistic function of the


























According to equation (1.31), the latent type of a woman is determined based
on whether the woman is a high school drop out and whether she has at least
some college education.
1.6.1.2 Measurement Error
The measurement error in the observed wage and asset data is crucial,
as the wage and asset outliers significantly affect work and net saving choices
and thus, the parameters of the model. In order to diminish this influence, I
assume both wages and assets are subject to measurement errors. In particular,
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I assume the measurement error on wages have a multiplicative structure so
that,
wobservedit = wit exp(η
w
it), (1.33)
where ηwit is normally distributed as η
w
it ∼ N(0, σ
2
mw). The measurement error
on assets, on the other hand, is assumed to follow an additive process.
Aobservedit = Ait + η
a
it, (1.34)
with ηait ∼ N(0, σ
2
ma) and σma = σma,0 + σma,1Ait. With this additive structure
for the measurement error, the variance of the measurement error varies with
the level of assets. I further assume that the measurement errors on assets and
wages are independent of each other and of the other error terms in the model,
in addition to being serially independent.
1.6.2 Identification
The identification of the parameters of the model rely on a combination of
functional form and distributional assumptions as well as two sets of exclusion
restrictions. The first set of exclusion restrictions necessitates the existence of at
least one variable that affects the selection of individuals into certain states while
not changing the outcome equation. In the context of this paper, an example of
the selection equation is the marginal utility of leisure while the outcome is the
wage equation. In this setting, the number of children a woman has, serves the
role of an exclusion restriction as it shifts the marginal utility of leisure even
though it does not enter the wage equation. The second exclusion restriction
requires at least one variable to shift the outcome equation while not altering the
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selection equation. Experience that enters the wage equation serves the role of
this type of an exclusion restriction. A similar argument follows for the marginal
utility of consumption and the borrowing constraint equations. The number of
children a woman has, for example, shifts the marginal utility of consumption
even though it does not have an impact on the borrowing constraint. Schooling
level, on the other hand, is one of the determinants of the lowest asset threshold
although it does not alter the marginal utility of consumption.
The coefficient of relative risk aversion, θc, which determines the curvature
of the utility function and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1− θc is
identified through the differences in the net saving-age profiles of women with
similar observable and unobservable characteristics. Furthermore, the marginal
utility of consumption is specified as an exponential function in order to make
the identification less challenging.
Next, the distribution of the latent types and type-specific parameters are
identified through the panel structure of the data. Repeatedly observing the
choices of the same woman conditional on the observable characteristics allow
me to separate the persistent unobserved heterogeneity from transitory unob-
served shocks. However, as types cannot be identified without a normalization,
I impose a ranking on the skill endowments in estimation. I assume type 1
women have the lowest skill endowments while type 4 women have the highest.
Finally, the impact of the EITC is identified through the variation in the
policy parameters across time and states. The number of states with state-
level EITC programs varies a lot across years. For example, in 1986, only
Maryland was offering state EITC while in 2001 the number of states with
49
state EITC programs increased to 15. Moreover, the level of the tax credit
differs substantially across states. In 2001, while EITC eligible individuals in
Maine were receiving state-level tax credit that was equal to 5% of their federal
EITC, in Vermont the state-level EITC was equal to 32% of the federal credit.
This difference across states considerably varies across time which helps with
the identification of the impact of the EITC on work hours, employment and
asset accumulation.
1.6.3 Parameter Estimates
I first present the results from the first step of the estimation procedure
which are used as an input in solving the life-cycle optimization problem of
a woman. Next, I report the parameter estimates from the second step that
utilizes MSM.
Table 1.5 presents the estimates for the cost of child care equation. The
estimates show that childcare cost increases as the number of children increase,
as expected. However, an additional child raises the cost of childcare only by 3
percent. This tells us that even though having more children necessitates higher
childcare costs, the women also benefit from economies of scale when they have
more children. One reason for this might be due to older child taking care of
the younger one when a woman has more than one child, which can eliminate
the need for a baby-sitter. Moreover, younger children may use the clothes, toys
and other belongings of the older children. Among the women with the same
number of children, those whose youngest child is an infant pay the highest child
care costs. Although the cost of a toddler is not significantly different from an
50
infant, the childcare cost considerably decreases when the youngest child is older
than 6.
As mentioned before, the probability for TANF participation captures
both eligibility and the participation decision. Table 1.6 reports that there is
no significant difference between black and white women in terms of welfare par-
ticipation. Moreover, even though states impose their own earnings thresholds,
participation in welfare for women who live in different states is not signifi-
cantly different. With regards to the TANF benefits observed in the data, the
results display that a woman’s earnings is the most important determinant. As
expected, welfare receipts decline as annual earnings increase.
Similar to TANF participation, the black and white women do not differ
in terms of the probability of SNAP participation as well. Nevertheless, SNAP
participation is lower among women who are older, who have higher annual
earnings and who are more educated. On the other hand, women with higher
TANF benefits have higher SNAP participation. As for the benefits, having
more children lead to a rise in the benefits while higher annual earnings and
higher TANF benefits received lead to a decline. The reason for this is that
the women’s earnings and welfare receipts add to the eligibility income used for
the calculation for benefits. As a woman’s income increases, benefits are taxed
away.
Finally, tables 1.8 and 1.9 present the estimates used in calculating the
transition matrix for the number of children and the age of the youngest child.
The remaining parameters are estimated using MSM and tables 1.10-1.12
report the results. Note that, the parameter estimates themselves are not of
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key interest for the purposes of this paper. Rather, the behavioral patterns
indicated by the model are the focus of the empirical analysis. Nevertheless, I
next discuss the important findings based on the parameter estimates.
First, the CRRA parameter measured by θc is 0.5123 which implies a
coefficient of relative risk aversion of 1 − θc = 0.4877. This estimate is in line
with the findings of several papers in the literature such as Keane and Wolpin
(2001), Gooree et al. (2003), Imai and Keane (2004), and Sauer (2004). In
contrast, the CRRA parameter I estimate is considerably high compared to
the typical value used in the life-cycle consumption literature. The value of
θc commonly accepted in this literature is around -2 (Hubbard et al., 1994),
which implies a lower willingness to substitute consumption intertemporally
and a higher level of prudence. Keane and Wolpin (2001), who also include
borrowing constraints in their analysis, argue that in models without borrowing
constraints a high degree of prudence is needed in order to justify the observed
pattern of young people with steep earnings profiles not to borrow heavily. That
being said, the sample of women this paper focuses on are subject to income
uncertainty and have a high willingness to substitute intertemporally as they
are single low-income women. The fact that these women are single plays a
crucial role for this argument, as they do not have a spousal income that serves
the role of a safety net.
The lower bound for net assets shows the lowest amount of assets (or the
highest amount of debt) held by the women in the sample before taking into
account the measurement error in assets. To give an example, the highest level
of debt allowed for a 25-year-old woman who is a high school dropout is around
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$3,264 while it is $64 for a 45-year-old high school dropout. On the other hand,
schooling has a more significant impact on the amount of the highest amount of
debt permitted, as for a 25-year-old woman who has a college degree or more,
the bound becomes $1,776. In addition to the borrowing constraint, I estimate
a consumption floor and find that it is around $2,118 for this sample of women.
The parameters of the wage equation are consistent with the literature.
For example, the parameter of the educational attainment implies that an addi-
tional year of schooling increases the wage the woman faces by 4.1%. Moreover,
the results display significant returns to experience. In particular, a 1% increase
in the experience stock leads to a 0.14% increase in the wage rate. Consider
a woman who worked part-time for 15 years. She would have 1,500 hours of
experience stock. Next, consider a woman who worked full-time for 15 years.
This woman would have 3,000 hours of experience. The estimated returns to
experience indicates that the woman who worked full-time would face a wage
rate that is 14% higher than the wage rate of the woman who worked part-time.
The estimates further show that the wages of black women are 17% lower than
the wages of white women. This estimate might reflect the discrimination in
the labor market in terms of lower skill rental prices for black women or that
black women have lower skill endowments independent of the type, which can-
not be captured by model. Finally, the wage equation estimates also show the
importance of career breaks. For instance, a woman who worked between 1950
and 2200 hours last period receives a wage rate that is 6.7% higher than the
wage rate of a woman who had a career break in the previous period.
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In terms of the latent types of the women, I find that unobserved hetero-
geneity plays an important role in explaining differences in the outcomes. In
particular, I estimated the model with four latent types and in the estimation
I imposed a ranking on the skill endowments ascending from type 1. The es-
timates suggest that types differ substantially. For example, in the log wage
equation, types 3 and 4 are estimated to earn wages about 6% higher than ei-
ther type 1 or 2. Although types 1 and 2 have similar skill endowments, type
1 women get a greater utility from consumption and less disutility from non-
leisure time. Type 3 and type 4 women have high skill endowments and include
most of the women with college education. Type 4 women have lower utility
from consumption and a slightly higher disutility from work. Furthermore, the
type probability equations imply that women with more education are much
more likely to be of high skill types.
Figure 1.4 displays the within sample fit of the simulated model to the
life-cycle profiles of mean log wage, mean asset, employment and mean annual
hours of work. In general, the model is able to fit the shape of the life-cycle
profiles for mean wage, employment rate and mean work hours well. The figure
shows that the model underestimates the mean net assets between ages 50 and
60. At the same time, it slightly underestimates the mean log wage before
age 30. A comparison of data moments and the simulated moments also show
that the model does a good job in predicting the employment rates, work hours
choices and wage rates across demographic groups30
30The tables that compare the simulated moments with the moments from the data are
provided in the online appendix.
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1.7 The Impact of the EITC on Single Women
I now examine the predictions of the model with regards to the impact
of the EITC on women’s wage growth over the life-cycle. I first consider the
differences in women’s behavior with and without the EITC. The simulations
with the EITC assume that the 2002 tax schedule is in effect. Next, I consider
the life-cycle effects of an EITC introduction. More specifically, I first simulate
the consequences of an EITC introduction early in the working life and compare
the results life-cycle profiles generated by an EITC introduction later in the life
cycle.
Table 1.13 displays the impact of the tax credit on mean employment,
annual hours of work, log wage, and net assets. The first two columns present
the average of these variables when the human capital accumulation channel is
closed. In particular, these simulations assume that the experience stock or the
choice of previous work hours have not effect on the wage rate. The change in
the employment rate and in the intensive-margin responses or in other words,
the change in the average work hours of the women conditional on employment
is consistent with the findings of the previous studies. In particular, the change
in the employment rate without allowing for human capital accumulation is
2.6% or 2 percentage points. The change in the average work hours of employed
women is -0.15% which is not significantly different than zero. Unfortunately, it
is not possible to compare the change in average wages and average net assets
to any studies as to the best of my knowledge there is no paper in the literature
that present any evidence on those. However, Table 1.13 indicates that the
average wage rate increases by 0.27% with the EITC, which is due to the rise in
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the employment rate. Net assets on the other hand increase more significantly
than the other key variables. This is due to the debt relief the EITC provides
as it is directly increasing the period income of the single women.
The last three columns of Table 1.13 provides evidence on the importance
of the human capital accumulation channel for the impact of the EITC. More
specifically, once the wage rate reacts to the experience stock as well as the pre-
vious work choices of women, the EITC has an additional effect of increasing
the future rewards from work. Therefore, both the extensive and the intensive-
margin responses become stronger with EITC once human capital accumulation
channel becomes functional. As a result of the stronger employment and hours
of work responses, the EITC significantly raises the average wages in the pop-
ulation. Note that, the percentage changes reported in this table are for the
whole sample, while only 38% of the women are eligible for the EITC. As a re-
sult, the 5% increase in the average wages in fact corresponds to a 20% increase
in the average wages of the women who are EITC eligible. For this reason, it
is clear that EITC is influential in helping single women in climbing the wage
ladder.
Figure 5 presents the distribution of the change in the work hours for the
EITC target group. For this simulation, I mark the women who are eligible for
EITC at least once over their life-cycles in a setting where EITC is not offered.
Then I track their intensive-margin responses under EITC. The table shows
the distribution of the change in the average work hours over the life-cycle as
a result of the EITC. The resulting average change in the work hours of these
women is around 5%. However, the figure provides evidence that almost 70% of
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the women in this target group respond to tax credit by increasing their work
hours. Even though the theoretical predictions of the dynamic model on the
change in hours of work is ambiguous, this exercise indicates that the human
wealth effect is in fact stronger than the income effect in the payment regions
of the credit schedule.
The life-cycle wage path of women who are in the target group is displayed
in Figure 6. In fact, the figure shows how successful EITC is in helping women
climb the wage ladder. Evidently, EITC leads to a significant rise in the wages
for women at all ages. The main reason for this is the rise in the employment
and annual hours of work as a result of the EITC. Since women work more
under the tax credit, they accumulate a higher experience stock, which leads to
higher wages. Furthermore, as the impact on the wage profile is generated from
the accumulation of the experience stock, the wage growth is higher for older
woman, even though their average annual work hours is lower than the average
without the EITC. The increase in wages can go as high as 25% which means
that the work incentives provided by the EITC are effective in generating wage
growth for single women. Note that, the EITC leads to a wage growth even
though for some women the intensive-margin responses are negative.
Table 1.14 decomposes the percent change in the wage rate across different
age and education groups as well as with respect to the number of children a
woman has. As can be seen from the table, women who are above 50, who are
high school dropouts and who have two children or more benefit the most from
the tax credit. Since the wage growth is almost entirely due to the additional hu-
man capital accumulation created by the credit, it is expected the older women
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to have a higher percentage change in the average wage rate. Moreover, high
school dropout are the group with the lowest wages on average and therefore,
they form the group that experiences the highest wage growth. Finally, women
with two children or more receive the highest tax credit according to the EITC
schedule. In addition, they are the women who work for the shortest hours. For
this reason, the effect of the EITC is stronger on this group. The primary reason
for the lack of any the small EITC impact on the group of childless women is the
age restriction the EITC eligibility imposes on taxpayers without a qualifying
child. More specifically, women without a child cannot benefit from the tax
credit until age 25, and even after age 25, because the amount of the credit they
are entitled to is not very high we see a relatively insignificant impact on these
women’s wage growth. The same argument applies for the small wage changes
for the group of women who are younger than 25. These women are less likely
to have a child and thus, face the least generous credit schedule.
Although Table 1.14 indicates that older women benefit more from receiv-
ing the EITC, if the tax credit is introduced at different ages over life-cycle
the end result might be different. In order to investigate this, I next consider
whether introducing EITC at different stages of the life cycle has varying im-
pact on the wage growth profiles. In doing so, I first simulate the wage paths
of single women with an unanticipated EITC introduction at age 25. Then,
I simulate the wage paths of the same women once again, but this time the
introduction of the tax credit happens at age 45. In both cases, I use the 2002
tax credit schedule for the simulations. Figure 1.7 shows that in both cases,
the introduction of the EITC promotes wage growth. However, if the women
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experience the EITC introduction at an early age, then the impact on wage
growth is more significant. Receiving tax credit later in life considerably shifts
the wage profile as well. Nevertheless, the average wage level stays lower than
the average wage level simulated with an early EITC introduction. The rea-
sons for that are twofold. First, at later stages in the life cycle, women have
higher average earnings and thus, are less likely to receive EITC. Second, as
the tax credit promotes wage growth through human capital accumulation, the
impact of a higher experience stock in early ages in the life cycle leads to a more
considerable shift in the wage profile.
EITC can influence the net worth of women in two particular ways. First,
the tax credit helps the women who are having a hard time in making ends
meet. These women are highly indebted and due to credit constraints, they fail
to make the expenditures they need. By providing cash transfers, the EITC
offers debt relief to these women. More specifically, these credit-constrained
women use the tax credit mostly to make expenditures such as paying the credit
card debt or bills that are past due (Smeeding, Phillips, and O’Connor (2000)
and Mendenhall, Edin, Crowley, Sykes, Tach, Kriz, and Kling (2012)). Second,
because the tax credit generates human capital accumulation, it is increasing the
slope of the age-earnings profile for the eligible women. The steeper age-earnings
profile in turn creates stronger consumption smoothing motives, which lead to
an increase in consumption especially in early ages. Whether the increase in the
lifetime wealth or the increase in consumption dominates cannot be determined
theoretically. However, the last row of Table 1.13 shows that without the human
capital accumulation channel, the EITC leads to a 1.72% increase in the average
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net assets for the whole sample. Once again, considering the fact that only
40% of the women in this sample are eligible for the EITC, the change in
the average net worth of the eligible women is almost 4.5%. The rise in net
assets due to the tax credit is not surprising, because without human capital
accumulation the consumption-smoothing motives are either very weak or non-
existent. Once I allow for human capital accumulation in the model, however,
the rise in the net assets falls significantly. The reason for that is the wage
growth the EITC generates. As a result of the stronger wage growth over
the life-cycle, age-earnings profiles of the women gets steeper and thus, their
consumption smoothing-motives cancel out a higher percentage of the increase
in the life-time wealth due to the tax credit. Note that, the less significant
rise in the net assets implies that the women who are eligible for the EITC are
actually using the tax-credit for consumption purposes. This is in line with the
findings of Mendenhall et al. (2012) who interviewed the EITC recipients in
Chicago and asked how they are using the credit. Their findings indicate that
only 38% of the recipients use the credit for saving while others use the credit
on consumption expenditures such as going to fancy restaurants, repairing their
cars, moving to better school districts for their children, or even by taking their
children to Disney World.
Figure 8 shows the distribution of the change in average of the net assets
over the life-cycle for women who are eligible for EITC at least once in their life
times. The resulting distribution shows that while the mean percent change in
net assets is not different than zero, there is actually a significant increase in
the net assets of the women who belong to the target group. Since net assets is
60
a measure of both a woman’s liabilities and assets, this result suggests that the
effect of the debt relief provided by the tax credit is dominant for the majority
of the women. A further investigation reveals that the women who experience a
decline in their net assets have an average net worth of over $8,500. Evidently,
for these women with relatively higher levels of net worth, the consumption-
smoothing motive dominates the increase in the lifetime wealth as a result of
the EITC.
1.8 Policy Analysis
Recently, the EITC has been the focus of the budget negotiations as well as
the proposals concerning the cash transfer programs. Most notably, the recent
proposals by President Obama and Congressman Ryan involve expansions in
the credit for childless workers. In this section, I first analyze the long-term
benefits and provide an estimate of the cost of such an expansion. Next, I
consider imposing an asset test for the EITC similar to the asset limits in SNAP
and TANF. Public benefit programs have historically included asset tests that
prevent eligible individuals to accumulate assets and thus, move along the path
to financial security. Even though the EITC does not have a formal asset test,
in a counterfactual experiment, I analyze the impact of such a limit on women’s
behaviors in hope of shedding some light on the possible programs these asset
tests create for the other public programs’ recipients.
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1.8.1 Expanding the Tax Credit for Childless Women
Since its implementation, the EITC has undergone major expansions that
increased the generosity of the credit as well as the range of eligibility. However,
childless taxpayers have benefited the least from these expansions. To give an
example, a childless single women who works full time at the minimum wage is
not eligible for the tax credit as the level of her labor market earnings is above
the eligibility threshold that childless taxpayers face. As a result, the credit
fails to provide cash assistance to many low-wage childless taxpayers.
Recently several proposals have been made to expand the credit schedule
for the childless workers. Most notably, both President Obama and Congress-
man Ryan proposed to lower the eligibility age for this group to 21, to double
the maximum credit to $1,000, and to raise the ending income for the tax credit
to $18,000. These changes imply that both the credit rate and the phase-out
rate are doubled to 15.3% for the childless workers. Moreover, this proposal is
estimated to have a cost around $60 billion.
Table 15 presents the estimated change in the employment, hours of work,
average wages and net assets for single women under the proposed EITC ex-
pansion. The results show that under the new credit schedule, the employment
rate for single women is expected to rise by 2.2%. However, conditional on
employment, the responses in work hours are less responsive to the expansion
in the credit schedule. There are two main reasons that generate this result.
First, in the sample that I’m using for the empirical analysis, only 30% of the
single women have earnings less than $18,000 which is the threshold for eligibil-
ity. Thus, the change in the hours of work for eligible women is in fact 3.13%.
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Second, among the payment regions of the credit schedule, the subsidy region
provides the strongest work incentives. However, even with the EITC expansion
for the end income for the subsidy region is quite low. More specifically, for a
childless woman to be in the subsidy region, the level of her earnings needs to
be lower than $6,570 under the proposed credit schedule. That being said, only
6% of the childless women in my sample have earnings that fall in the subsidy
region. As a result, only a few women are subject to the full extent of the work
incentives the tax credit provides. Nevertheless, the average wage rate still rises
by 1.41% for single childless women. This means that the EITC eligible women
experience an increase in the average wage rate by 4.7%. Even though the credit
cannot extend the work incentives to the majority of eligible women, because
the eligibility age is lowered to 21 with the proposed expansion the effect of
human capital accumulation is significant. Finally, the eligible women increase
the average net assets by %1.53 (= 0.46/0.3). This result suggests that the con-
sumption smoothing motives for childless women is dominated by the wealth
effect created by the EITC.
1.8.2 Imposing an Asset Test
The second policy analysis I consider in this paper is imposing an asset
test as one of the eligibility requirement for the EITC. Recent discussions on
the effectiveness government transfer programs focus on eliminating the asset
tests on SNAP and TANF. The advocates of eliminating the asset limits for
government programs argue that these limits provide incentives to drive down
assets or to not save at all. However, considering the target population for
cash transfer programs, it is evident that helping these individuals in reaching
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financial security is a key component for eliminating dependency on government
transfers and thus, for promoting self-sufficiency. In line with these arguments,
recently several states have eliminated the asset limits for SNAP.
In order to assess whether these asset tests in fact decrease the effectiveness
of the government programs, in this section I analyze the responses of single
women to an introduction of an asset limit for EITC eligibility. For the analysis
I first use the 2002 tax and credit schedule and simulate life-cycle paths for single
women. Next, I again use the 2002 tax and credit schedule with an additional
requirement for EITC eligibility. More specifically, I impose an asset limit of
$5,000 and simulate the life-cycle paths of single women to see if there is any
change in their responses. The results from this exercise are presented in Table
16.
As can be seen from the table due to the asset test, the work incentives
provided by the EITC reach out to fewer women and thus the extensive-margin
responses to EITC are weaker. In particular, the employment rate fall by 1.5
percentage points or 1.7% as a result of the asset test. The decline in the
employment rate is generated by the behavior of women who are not working
but living off of their assets. The intensive-margin responses on the other hand
are not significantly altered by the introduction of an asset test. This is due to
two main factors. First, with the introduction of the asset test, fewer women
are now eligible for the EITC. More specifically, the fraction of EITC-eligible
women falls from 39% to 34%. Second, the women who are eligible for the EITC
work more than they do without the asset test. Since the incentives created by
the tax credit discourage saving, these women use their labor market experience
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as an insurance that replaces the insurance provided by assets. The change in
the wage growth is also negative but insignificant. The decline in the wage
growth with the asset test stems from the decline in the employment rate. As
mentioned before, career breaks have a detrimental impact on the wage rate a
single woman faces. However, due to the asset test, some women cannot benefit
from the work incentives the EITC provides and thus, remain unemployed.
This, in turn, leads to a decline in their future wages. Finally, the last row
of the table indicates that the average net assets of single women fall with the
introduction of an asset test. There are two main channels that generate this
result. First, the women who remain unemployed as a result of the introduction
of an asset test miss on labor market earnings for that period and thus, fail to
accumulate assets. In fact, some of these women even dissave as they live off
of their assets. Second, low-income women whose assets are slightly above the
asset limit decumulate their asset stock in order to be eligible for the tax credit.
Third, the women who are eligible for the EITC even with the asset limit cannot
accumulate assets unless their earnings are far above the income limit for the
tax credit. Therefore, the asset accumulation process slows down considerably.
Considering the fact that these women lack the safety net provided by spousal
earnings, this decline in the average net assets is quite dangerous. If there is a
labor market shock that leaves these women unemployed, they’d be dependent
on the government programs as they wouldn’t have the necessary savings that
would act as a buffer in the periods they remain unemployed.
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1.9 Conclusion
This paper develops and estimates a female life-cycle labor supply model
with human capital accumulation, borrowing constraints and unobserved het-
erogeneity in skills and preferences to assess whether the work incentives pro-
vided by the EITC is sufficient to promote wage growth. In the analysis, I
study the changes in the behavior of single women primarily because they lack
the safety net created by spousal earnings. Estimates of the structural param-
eters, derived using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics shed light on the
importance of human capital accumulation and career breaks on wage growth.
Comparing the life-cycle profiles simulated under the 2002 tax credit schedule to
those without the EITC, I find that EITC is successful in helping single women
climb the wage ladder. Further analysis reveals that this wage growth mostly
results from the human capital accumulation generated by the tax credit, rather
than its immediate effect on the per-period budget constraint.
Using the parameter estimates from the model, I first show that the expan-
sion of the credit for childless workers promotes further wage growth. However,
unless the eligibility range of the credit is increased even further, the impact of
the EITC would be constrained. In particular, a flatter but longer subsidy re-
gion might be more influential in helping childless single women climb the wage
ladder. Next, I investigate whether asset tests limit the benefits of government
transfers. In particular, I impose an asset limit of $5,000 as an eligibility re-
quirement for the EITC and find that both the work incentives and the wage
growth created by the EITC is hindered. More significantly, the asset test slows
down the asset accumulation process considerably and thus, leaves single women
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more vulnerable to labor market shocks.
A task for future research is to account for partnering and fertility deci-
sions in the model. By doing so, both the marriage penalties and the pro-natal
features of the EITC can be better understood. Moreover, as I am only focusing
on single women in this paper, the data I am using is not nationally represen-
tative. By utilizing a more representative data and a model that can replicate
the coupling and fertility dynamics in the data, it would be possible to make
a sound cost-benefit analysis for possible reforms on the tax credit. Further
research could also extend the model by endogenizing participation in welfare
and food stamp programs. This would enable an analysis on whether EITC
expansion crowds out welfare dependency. One final extension to this paper
could be to add the firm side to the model and to analyze the general equilib-
rium effects of the EITC. Such an examination would allow an understanding of
the complementarities between minimum wage policies and the EITC as both
policy instruments target the same group of people. Moreover, by adding the
firm side to the analysis, one can investigate the role of the EITC in protecting
individuals during recession times against macroeconomic shocks.
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1.10 Tables
Table 1.1: The Credit Schedule for 2013
Minimum Phase-out Range
Credit income for Phase-out
rate maximum Maximum rate Beginning Ending
(%) credit credit (%) income income
No child 7.65 6,370 487 7.65 7,970 14,340
One child 34 9,560 3,250 15.98 17,530 37,870
Two children 40 13,430 5,372 21.06 17,530 43,038
Three children 45 13,430 6,044 21.06 17,530 46,227
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Age 33.06 9.59 16 66
Fraction of blacks 0.65 0.48 0 1
Fraction of high school dropouts 0.15 0.36 0 1
Fraction of high school graduates 0.4 0.49 0 1
Fraction of college dropouts 0.25 0.44 0 1
Fraction of college graduate 0.19 0.39 0 1
Number of children 0.87 0.88 0 2
Age of youngest child 3.3 4.21 1 17
Fraction employed 0.86 0.34 0 1
Annual work hours among employed 1,819 682.9 10 3,576
Annual earnings among employed ($) 26,836 17,661 123 69,756
Fraction receiving EITC 0.38 0.49 0 1
Federal EITC among EITC recipients ($) 1,900 1,338 1 4,645
State EITC ($) 29.95 134.95 0 1,587.6
Fraction receiving TANF 0.12 0.33 0 1
Average TANF among recipients ($) 3,063 1,721 23 6,494
Fraction receiving SNAP 0.26 0.44 0 1
Average SNAP among recipients ($) 3,467 2,197 45 6,782
Net worth 3,545 12,347 -33,032 72,133
Note: All monetary values are in 2006 dollars.
Table 1.3: Earnings and EITC Recipients by Age and Education Groups
*
Avg. Avg. % of EITC Avg. Number of
Earnings Hours Recipients EITC Observations
Age≤25 17,680 1,500 36.3 1,966 1,110
25<Age≤30 24,224 1,667 41.7 2,043 1.043
30<Age≤40 24,584 1,594 41.9 1,968 1,448
40<Age≤50 25,495 1,562 34.6 1,808 719
50<Age≤60 28,266 1,447 25.3 1,110 273
High School Dropouts 10,212 1,058 56.6 2,074 710
High School Graduates 18,571 1,483 47.6 1,997 1,843
College Dropouts 27,070 1,789 35.2 1,724 1,158
College Graduates 38,316 1,897 8.5 1,503 882
*
Note: Number of observations refer to the number of observations with non-missing labor
market status. The average EITC amount reflects the average of the tax credit amont
EITC recipients.
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Table 1.4: Age, Education, and Hours Decomposition for EITC Recipients
Age Education Annual Work Hours
Age≤25 22.87 HS Dropout 22.81 Hours<350 8.75
25<Age≤30 24.69 HS Grad. 49.77 350≤Hours<1300 23.85
30<Age≤40 34.39 Coll. Dropout 23.16 1300≤Hours<1950 27.65
40<Age≤50 14.13 Coll. Grad. 4.26 1950≤Hours<2200 27.31
50<Age≤60 3.92 Hours>2200 12.44
Note: The numbers refer to the percentage of EITC recipients that belong to each relevant
group.





αcc1 Number of children 3.01
∗∗∗
(0.5848)
αcc2 If youngest child is between the age of 3 & 5 0.198
(0.7695)
αcc3 If youngest child is between the age of 6 & 10 −3.704
∗∗∗
(0.778)
αcc4 If youngest child is between the age of 11 & 17 −9.227
∗∗∗
(0.8838)
αcc5 Hours of work choice 0.412
∗∗∗
(0.0296)
σcc Standard deviation of the child care expenditure shock 14.007
Notes: Standard errors in paranthesis. ∗ indicates statistical significance at the 10% level;
∗∗ indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; and ∗∗∗ indicates statistical significance
at the 1 percent level. Child care cost is divided by 100.
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4 Number of children 0.149
(0.0946)
σtanf Standard deviation of the TANF benefit shock 0.8794
Notes: Standard errors in paranthesis. ∗ indicates statistical significance at the 10% level;
∗∗ indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; and ∗∗∗ indicates statistical significance
at the 1 percent level. All monetary variables including the benefits are divided by 100.
71



































































5 Number of children 0.409
∗∗∗
(0.0362)
σsnap Standard deviation of the SNAP benefit shock 0.7309
Notes: Standard errors in paranthesis. ∗ indicates statistical significance at the 10% level;
∗∗ indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; and ∗∗∗ indicates statistical significance
at the 1 percent level. All monetary variables including the benefits are divided by 100.
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αn31 Age of youngest child if there is a child 0.077
(0.1162)













αn32 Age of youngest child if there is a child −0.359
∗∗∗
(0.1378)
αn42 Number of children 10.556
∗∗∗
(0.3924)
Notes: Standard errors in paranthesis. ∗ indicates statistical significance at the 10% level;
∗∗ indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; and ∗∗∗ indicates statistical significance
at the 1 percent level. The probability of not having child is calculated using the above
probabilities, as having no child is the base group in the estimation.
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αk32 Number of children 0.208
∗
(0.1188)












αk33 Number of children 0.594
∗∗∗
(0.1439)













αk34 Number of children 0.682
∗∗∗
(0.2049)
αk44 Age of the youngest child 4.827
∗∗∗
(0.1862)
Notes: Standard errors in paranthesis. ∗ indicates statistical significance at the 10% level;
∗∗ indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; and ∗∗∗ indicates statistical significance
at the 1 percent level. The probability of the age of youngest child being less than 2 is
calculated using the above probabilities, as it is the base group in the estimation.
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Table 1.10: Estimates of the Flow Utility Parameters
Parameter Variable Estimate Std. Error
θc CRRA parameter 0.5123 0.0057
αu2 If the woman chooses to work between 1300
and 1950 hours (dhit = 2) 2.1522 0.0452
αu3 If the woman chooses to work between 1950
and 2200 hours (dhit = 3) 5.7481 0.0374
αu4 If the woman chooses to work more than 2200 hours (d
h
it = 4) 5.8303 0.0396
αu5 d
h
it = 1 and d
h
i,t−1 = 1 0.1472 0.0591
αu6 d
h
it = 2 and d
h
i,t−1 = 2 0.2031 0.0348
αu7 d
h
it = 3 and d
h
i,t−1 = 3 0.8412 0.0913
αu8 d
h
it = 4 and d
h
i,t−1 = 4 0.8532 0.0901
Marginal Utility of Consumption Shifters
αc01 If the woman belongs to type 1 4.1033 1.4820
αc02 If the woman belongs to type 2 2.105 0.4361
αc03 If the woman belongs to type 3 3.915 0.2182
αc04 If the woman belongs to type 4 2.082 0.1421
αc1 If the woman is younger than 25 -0.467 0.0902
αc2 If the woman is younger than 30 -0.168 0.1203
αc3 If the woman is older than 40 -1.279 0.2035
αc4 If the woman is older than 50 0.6 0.4783
αc5 Number of children 1.038 0.2917
Marginal Disutility of Work Shifters
αh0 Constant -1.2675 0.0394
αh12 If the woman is of type 2 -0.057 0.0487
αh13 If the woman is of type 3 0.134 0.0213
αh14 If the woman is of type 4 0.192 0.0349
αh2 If the woman is younger than 25 -1.2881 0.0183
αh3 If the woman is younger than 30 -1.2564 0.0304
αh4 If the woman is older than 40 -0.2708 0.0151
αh5 If the woman is older than 50 -1.3569 0.0428
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Table 1.11: Estimates of the Wage Equation and the Net Asset Lower Bound
Parameters
Parameter Variable Estimate Std. Error
Wage Parameters
αw0 Constant 3.1791 1.2451
αw12 If the woman belongs to type 2 0.11 0.0385
αw13 If the woman belongs to type 3 6.42 0.9412
αw14 If the woman belongs to type 4 6.93 0.8463
αw22 If the woman chooses to work between 1300 & 1950 hours 0.4995 0.2739
αw23 If the woman chooses to work between 1950 & 2200 hours 0.8246 0.1826
αw24 If the woman chooses to work more than 2200 hours 0.894 0.1731
αw3 Woman’s age 0.012 0.0247
αw4 If the woman is black -0.1664 0.0318
αw5 Educational attainment 0.041 0.0129
αw6 Experience stock 0.135 0.0379
αw71 If the woman worked less than 1300 hours last year 0.0086 0.0403
αw72 If the woman worked between 1300 & 1950 hours last year 0.0452 0.0178
αw73 If the woman worked between 1950 & 2200 hours last year 0.0673 0.0225
αw74 If the woman worked more than 2200 hours last year 0.0668 0.0289
αw8 Calendar year 0.0035 0.0120
αw9 State of Residence 0.0921 0.0311
Asset Bound Parameters
αb0 Constant 12.1543 0.9131
αb1 Age -0.131 0.0126
αb2 Age-squared -0.093 0.0899
αb3 Schooling -0.2029 0.0244
c Minimum consumption floor 2,118 371
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Table 1.12: Estimates of the Type Probabilities and the Error Distributions
Parameter Variable Estimate Std. Error
Prob. of Being a Type 2 Woman
αt02 Constant 1.953 0.7121
αt12 If the woman is a high school dropout 1.723 0.5234
αt22 If the woman has at least some college education -0.261 0.1041
Prob. of Being a Type 3 Woman
αt03 Constant 2.254 0.4551
αt13 If the woman is a high school dropout -0.712 0.2717
αt23 If the woman has at least some college education 0.683 0.1903
Prob. of Being a Type 4 Woman
αt04 Constant 0.879 0.2041
αt14 If the woman is a high school dropout -0.547 0.1031
αt24 If the woman has at least some college education 1.426 0.1923
Error Distributions
σh Standard deviation of the preference shock 1.1979 0.1923
σw Standard deviation of the wage shock 0.9897 0.0842
ρhw Correlation between the preference and the wage shock -0.5948 0.0679
σmw Standard deviation of the measurement error in wages 0.262 0.0213
σma,0 Constant of the standard deviation of the measurement
error in assets 1.324 0.1387
σma,1 Slope of the standard deviation of the measurement
error in assets 0.141 0.0171
Table 1.13: The Impact of the EITC on Employment, Hours of Work, Wages
and Net Assets
Without HC Accumulation With HC Accumulation
No EITC With EITC % Change No EITC With EITC % Change
Employment 0.78 0.80 +2.6 0.84 0.88 +4.8
Hours of Work 1,310 1,308 -0.15 1,802 1,835 +1.84
(cond. on employment)
Wage 11.12 11.15 +0.27 13.14 13.8 +5.02
Net Assets 3,143 3,197 +1.72 3,482 3,495 +0.37
Notes: The first two columns of the table show the simulations from the model when the
human capital accumulation channel is closed. This means the experience stock and the
work hours choice from the previous period has no effect on the wage level. The numbers
in the 3rd and the 6th columns show the percent changes between the responses with and
without the EITC.
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Table 1.14: Percent Change in Wage under EITC (Target Group)
Age groups Education Groups Nr. of Children
% Change % Change % Change
Age<25 +4 HS dropouts +16 No child +4
25<Age<40 +13 HS grads +14 One child +9
40<Age<50 +20 Coll. dropouts +8 Two children +16
50<Age<60 +23 Coll. grads +3
Notes: The numbers show the percent change in the wage rate as between the simulation
with and without the EITC.
Table 1.15: The Impact of an EITC Expansion for Childless Women on
Employment, Hours of Work, Wages, and Net Assets
Current EITC Schedule With EITC Expansion % Change
Employment 0.91 0.93 +2.2
Hours of Work 1,819 1,836 +0.94
(cond. on employment)
Wage 15.01 15.43 +1.41
Net Assets 5,604 5,630 +0.46
Notes: The first column of the table reports the averages of the corresponding variables
for single women from the simulations of the model using the current EITC schedule. The
second column does the same using the simulations under an EITC expansion for childless
workers. The numbers in the 3rd column shows the percent changes between the responses
with and without the EITC expansion.
Table 1.16: The Impact of an Asset Limit on Employment, Hours of Work,
Wages, and Net Assets
Current EITC Schedule With Asset Test % Change
Employment 0.88 0.865 -1.7
Hours of Work 1,835 1,820 -0.82
(cond. on employment)
Wage 13.8 13.4 -0.29
Net Assets 3,495 3,425 -2.01
Notes: The first column of the table reports the averages of the corresponding variables
for single women from the simulations of the model using the current EITC schedule. The
second column does the same using the simulations under an EITC expansion for childless
workers. The numbers in the 3rd column shows the percent changes between the responses
with and without the EITC expansion.
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1.11 Figures
Figure 1.1: EITC Schedule
Source:Eissa and Hoynes (2006)
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Figure 1.4: Within Sample Fit for Wage, Asset, Employment,
and Hours of Work
Note: Dashed lines represent data and solid lines represent simulations.
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Figure 1.5: The Distribution of the Change in Work Hours for the EITC
Target Group
Note: The red line is the mean of the distribution.
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Figure 1.6: The Life-Cycle Wage Path of the Women in the Target Group
Figure 1.7: Introducing the EITC at Different Stages of the Life-cyce
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Figure 1.8: The Distribution of the Change in Net Assets for the EITC
Target Group
Note: The red line is the mean of the distribution.
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Chapter 2
Wage Renegotiations with Labor
Market Frictions
2.1 Introduction
One of the distinguishing aspects of workers’ labor market experiences is
the amount of turnover they face. The reason is that job-to-job transitions
are very frequent in a worker’s career. Topel and Ward (1992) show that the
average number of full time jobs held in the first 10 years of a working career is
around 7. Even though some researchers, like Stern, Finkelstein, Stone, Latting,
and Dornsife (1994), believe that this turnover is inefficient and lead to wage
stagnations, the majority agrees on the fact that the job-to-job movements
a worker faces promote wage growth. Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), for
example, argue that employed workers move up the wage ladder thanks to the
employer-to-employer flows without intervening spells of unemployment. In
addition, Heckman (1993) asserts that “Job shopping promotes wage growth.
Turnover is another form of investment not demonstrably less efficient than
youth apprenticeships.”.
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Recent research have been using search theoretic models in order to ex-
plain wage ladders, job-to-job mobility, and wage inequality of seemingly iden-
tical workers in the labor market. These studies use two opposite descriptions
to characterize the labor market. The first and most commonly used descrip-
tion is called the random search model. In these models, workers and firms
are randomly paired together. Regardless of whether the wage is determined
through wage posting or bargaining, the worker does not know anything about
the wage before she is matched with that firm (Mortensen, 1970; Burdett and
Mortensen, 1998; Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002). In directed search models,
on the other hand, firms post wage offers and workers direct their search to
the most attractive alternative for them (Moen, 1997; Shimer, 1996). Random
search models are commonly used for analyzing unemployment spells, the con-
sequences of worker heterogeneity, and on-the-job search while directed search
models are used for examining the matching processes and wage determination.
Although random and directed search models try to explain the labor mar-
ket from two different perspectives, the labor market in real life falls somewhere
in between these two polar descriptions. In reality, firms are not completely
clueless regarding with which worker they are matched as argued by random
search models. They also do not post their wages and wait for workers to make
applications to fill their vacancies as dictated by directed search models. In fact,
labor markets comprise the main components of both of these models. Specif-
ically, firms do target a group of workers when posting their vacancies like in
directed search and in return some of the prospects of these job openings are
hidden from the workers until a match is formed between a worker and a firm
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similar to the random search models.
In this paper, I attempt to incorporate both random search and targeted
search by constructing a job search model with wage renegotiations that takes
into account the strategic behavior on the firm side. Workers search both when
unemployed and employed while firms decide whether to target their vacancies
to unemployed or employed workers and whether to match the offers coming
to their employees. There is asymmetric information in two dimensions in the
model. First, workers’ skills are only known to their current employers. Second,
workers have idiosyncratic preferences over different jobs and these preferences
are unobserved to the firms. Due to the asymmetric information over work-
ers’ skill levels, the probability of successfully recruiting an employed worker
is lower for a vacant firm. This is because a worker with higher productivity
receives matching offers from her current employer in the event of an outside
offer, and the only reason she would ever leave her current employer is due to
her idiosyncratic preferences that are unobserved to the firms. In equilibrium,
however, there is search in both markets because firms with vacancies are in-
different between searching in the unemployed workers’ and in the employed
workers’ markets. In the unemployed workers’ market, the average worker pro-
ductivity is lower but the probability of a successful recruit is higher than in the
employed workers’ market. The result is that less skilled workers have higher
job-to-job mobility than high skilled workers.
The contribution of this paper to the search theory literature is threefold.
First, the model incorporates both random and directed search in the labor
market. Specifically, firms decide in which market to search, a feature that
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makes the model closer to a directed search model. However at the same time
firms and workers are matched randomly and thus, the model in the paper also
resembles a random search model. To the best of my knowledge, this is the
first paper to combine these two different aspects of search theory. Second,
the model generates search in multiple markets in equilibrium. The studies
in the literature so far has only examined a firm’s decision as to whether to
enter the labor market or not. After the entry decision, firms are matched with
an employed or unemployed worker randomly. For this reason, there has been
no research that takes into account search in multiple markets.1 Finally, this
paper analyzes wage renegotiations with multiple firms using a non-cooperative
model of bargaining and asymmetric information. Even though there are a few
papers that consider a non-cooperative bargaining model for wage negotiations
under search frictions, there has been no research in the literature so far that
incorporates asymmetric information to this setup.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the liter-
ature this paper contributes to. In Section 3, I explain the details of the labor
market analyzed in the paper as well as define and characterize the equilibrium
in each subgame. In Section 4, I analyze the comparative statics regarding the
equilibrium in the employed workers’ market by imposing parametric assump-
tions on the model. Section 5 concludes.
1Searching in multiple markets is especially important in a general equilibrium setting
since the characteristics of the firms in each market are going to be determined endogenously
through firms’ decisions in such a setting. Even though in this paper I don’t consider a general
equilibrium set up, one can consider this paper as the first step in this research agenda.
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2.2 Literature Review
This paper mainly contributes to the literature on job search and wage ne-
gotiations. There are several studies that consider labor market frictions with
and without wage bargaining, including Burdett and Mortensen (1998); Dey
and Flinn (2005), and Shephard (2012). However, there are considerably fewer
examples of papers that incorporate both search frictions and wage renegotia-
tions (Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002; Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin, 2006).
Still, even in these papers there is no information asymmetry. Moreover, the
equilibra generated by these models state that the incumbent firms match all
outside offers up to the marginal productivity of their existing match, without
discriminating between workers. For this reason, how the number of job-to-job
movers change across skill groups depends on the productivity of the firm that
makes the outside offer.
Even though none of the papers in the labor literature incorporate both
random and directed search in their analyses, there is one study that has a
similar objective. Menzio (2007) studies a search model in which firms have
private information about their vacancies and they costlessly communicate this
information with unemployed workers. This kind of a setup differs from both
random and directed search models because the workers receive some informa-
tion about the vacancy before the match occurs and because the firms do not
post their wages to attract workers but rather they choose messages to advertise
their openings. Menzio finds that in equilibrium when the firm posts a more
optimistic message, workers demand a higher wage leading to a higher wage
outcome in equilibrium.
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Private information setting is not common in the analysis of random search
models but there are a few papers which focus on asymmetric information in
directed search models and in search models that consider auctions. Lauer-
mann and Wolinsky (2015), for example, analyze a sequential search model
with adverse selection and study how close the equilibrium prices are to the
full-information prices when search frictions are small. Guerrieri, Shimer, and
Wright (2010), on the other hand, study a directed search equilibrium where
workers have private information about the potential gains from trade. In this
setup, firms post contracts while agents observe these contracts and decide
where to apply. Guerrieri, Shimer and Wright show that firms offer separating
contracts to attract different types of agents in equilibrium.
2.3 The Model
In this section, I first describe the labor market and the characteristics of
the workers and firms that I analyze in this paper. Then, I explain the details
of the matching and wage barganining processes in this labor market.
2.3.1 The Environment
Consider a labor market in which a measure 1 of atomistic workers face
a continuum of competitive firms with a mass normalized to 1. There is no
heterogeneity in firm productivities while workers have different levels of skills.
A worker’s skill level is measured by the amount of efficiency units of labor, ε,
she supplies per unit time. The distribution of workers’ skills is exogenously
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determined. Specifically, the skills of unemployed workers follow a cumula-
tive distribution function Gu(ε) over the support [ε, ε] and this distribution is
assumed to be continuous with density gu. Similarly, the skill distribution of
employed workers has a cumulative distribution function Ge(ε) over the support
[ε, ε]. In addition, Ge(ε) first order stochastically dominates Gu(ε).
In this labor market, employed workers are also heterogenous with respect
to their idiosyncratic match qualities. The match quality is unobserved to the
firms and it captures the preferences of the worker concerning the location of
the job, company culture, etc. Moreover, the match quality affects the utility
of the worker and thus, her decision on whether to stay with the incumbent
firm or to accept the job offer of the poaching firm. The difference in the match
qualities between the current employer and the firm that makes an outside wage
offer to the already employed worker is denoted by d and it follows a uniform
distribution with support [−x, x].
Workers maximize their expected payoffs and firms maximize their ex-
pected profits. The utility a worker who is employed with a wage offer w and a
match quality q receives is
u(w, q) = w + q. (2.1)
An unemployed worker’s utility is determined by the income flow she receives in
the form of unemployment benefits. An unemployed worker receives an income
flow b, with b being a positive constant.2
2In U.S., benefits are generally paid by state governments and eligible workers receive
around 40− 50% of their previous pay depending on the state. In this specification, I ignore
this fact and assume that all workers receive the same benefits. It is possible to assume the
benefits are determined based on workers’ skills but that would require assuming the skill
level of a worker reflects her previous pay perfectly.
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The marginal productivity of a match between a worker with skill level
ε and a firm is h(ε) where h(.) is a strictly increasing, continuous, concave
function with h(ε) > 0, ∀ ε ∈ [ε, ε]. A firm which employs a type-ε worker from
a wage level w receives
π(ε, w) = h(ε)− w. (2.2)
On the other hand, a vacant firm receives a flow profit of π0. This flow profit
captures the firm’s valuation of a vacant job slot. However, note that this value
can potentially be negative to indicate a cost of remaining vacant. Throughout
this paper I assume that π0 = 0, which can be generated as a result of free entry
and exit for the firms in the search market.
2.3.2 Matching and Wage Bargaining
Before any matching occurs, firms with vacant positions choose to post
their vacancies either to the pool of unemployed or to the pool of employed
workers. In this paper, I assume that these two submarkets are already formed
during the period of analysis. The firms and workers are brought together
pairwise through a sequential, random and time-consuming search process. Un-
employed workers sample job offers with probability λu. Employed workers may
also search for other jobs and the offer arrival probability of offers for on-the-job
searchers is λe. I do not impose any restrictions on the relative magnitudes of
offer arrival probabilities in the employed and unemployed workers’ markets at
this point.
Wage bargaining occurs in an incomplete information setting. This is
because firms cannot observe the types of workers they are matched with before
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the wage is settled. In the unemployed workers’ market, firms make take-it-or-
leave-it wage offers to the workers after a match is formed. After observing this
wage offer, an unemployed worker then decides whether to take the job offer or
to stay unemployed. Correspondingly, once a vacant firm is matched with an
already employed worker in the employed workers’ market, the poaching firm
makes a take-it-or-leave-it wage offer and the incumbent firm which currently
employes the worker makes a counter-offer after observing the poaching firm’s
wage offer. Seeing both of these wage offers and taking her current wage into
consideration, an already employed worker then decides whether to stay at the
incumbent firm or to leave to work at the poaching firm. In this set up, the
incumbent firm has superior information over the poaching firm as the poaching
firm cannot observe the skill level of the worker, while the incumbent firm can.
However, note that neither of these firms know about what the worker thinks
about the match qualities. Therefore, a worker can have a lower wage once she
changes jobs even though she gets a greater payoff from working at her new job
due to a higher match quality. However, if the worker stays with the incumbent
after she receives an outside offer, the incumbent cannot impose a lower wage
than the worker’s wage before she received the outside offer. In addition, I
assume that there are no renegotiation costs.3
3This paper in fact considers a given period of a labor market that has existed since the
beginning of time. However in this setup workers and firms only consider their static payoffs
and do not take into account the continuation values from their actions. For this reason,
it might be more appropriate to characterize the model in this paper as one, that considers
the final period of a labor market. Even though this is a very restrictive specification, it is
suitable for the main goal of this paper.
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2.3.3 Unemployed Workers’ Market
In this section I define and characterize the equilibrium in the unemployed
workers’ market.
2.3.3.1 Equilibrium Definition
An equilibrium for the unemployed workers’ market consists of a wage
offer w∗u ∈ R+ by the firm and an acceptance strategy a
∗
u:[ε, ε]× R+ → [0, 1] for
the worker, where a∗u(ε, wu) denotes the probability that a type ε worker accepts
the wage offer wu, such that:
(i) For each ε and wu, the probability a
∗
u(ε, wu) maximizes worker’s expected
payoff:
a∗u(ε, wu) ∈ argmax
a∈[0,1]
awu + (1− a)b, (2.3)
(ii) Given a∗u(ε, wu), firm’s wage offer w
∗





a∗u(ε, w) [h(ε)− w] dGu(ε). (2.4)
The above definition states that when a vacant firm and an unemployed
worker is matched, the vacant firm makes a wage offer that maximizes its ex-
pected profits. The firm considers its expected profits in making this decision
because it cannot observe the skill level of the worker. The worker, on the




I characterize the equilibrium of this subgame using backward induction.
Therefore, I start with analyzing the worker’s strategy.
The worker gets b from remaining unemployed, while her payoff is wu if
she accepts the job offer. For this reason, the worker accepts the offer as long





1 if wu > b,
0 if wu < b,
a if wu = b,
(2.5)
for some a ∈ [0, 1]. However, I assume a = 1, which means that even if the
worker gets equal payoff from remaining unemployed and accepting the firm’s
job offer, she chooses to accept the firm’s offer.
The firm does not observe the worker’s skill. However, it knows that for a
given wu, the worker accepts the wage offer if and only if wu ≥ b. Therefore, if
the firm offers wu ≥ b, all unemployed workers, regardless of their skills, accept
the firm’s wage offer. Note that, offering wu = b strictly dominates offering
wu > b. This is because making a wage offer that is greater than b does not
change the worker’s probability of accepting the wage offer and only decreases
the profit the firm gets from hiring a worker with any given skill level. On
the other hand, when wu < b all unemployed workers reject the wage offer
since staying unemployed brings a higher payoff. Then, offering wu = b strictly
dominates offering wu < b if and only if
E [h(ε)]− b > 0, (2.6)
95
or in other words, if only if the expected marginal productivity of a worker is
higher than the unemployment benefits which is equal to the mininum marginal
cost of hiring a worker from the unemployed workers’ market. In order to have
an equilibrium in which firms can hire workers from the unemployed workers’
market, I assume that E [h(ε)] − b > 0 for the remainder of this paper. With
this assumption, it follows that the equilibrium wage offer by the firm is w∗u = b.
Morever, in equilibrium all unemployed workers who are matched with a firm
accept the wage offers they receive.
Now that the equilibrium strategies of unemployed workers and the va-
cant firms which post their vacancies to the unemployed workers’ market are
determined, I continue the analysis with comparative statics. Since whether the
firm offers wu = b or does not make an offer at all depends on equation (2.6)
being satisfied, I start with the impact of the level of unemployment benefits
on the equilibrium. Let b̄ be the level of unemployment benefits that is equal to
the mean marginal productivity of the workers in this labor market. That is,
E[h(ε)]− b̄ = 0. (2.7)
Then, it is possible to infer that ∀b > b̄, there is no hiring in equilibrium in
the unemployed workers’ market and ∀b < b̄, all firms offer w∗u = b and all
unemployed workers who are matched with a firm accept their wage offers in
equilibrium. If b = b̄, then a firm receives equal expected profit from offering b
and from not making a wage offer at all. In that case, the firm randomizes.
Second, I analyze how the equilibrium changes with respect to the skill
distribution of the workers in the unemployed workers’ market Gu(ε). Consider
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two distribution functions, F (ε) and G(ε), that describe the skill distribution in
this market. Moreover, suppose F (ε) first order stochastically dominates G(ε).
The definition of first order stochastic dominance implies that
EF [h(ε)] > EG[h(ε)], (2.8)
as long as h(ε) is strictly increasing. This means that the expected marginal
productivity in the unemployed workers’ market is higher if the distribution of
skills in this market is defined by F (ε) rather than by G(ε). Next, let b̄F and
b̄G be the levels of unemployment benefits that are equal to the mean marginal
productivities of unemployed workers under the skill distributions F (.) and G(.),
respectively. Equation (2.8) implies that
b̄F > b̄G. (2.9)
Therefore, in equilibrium there is hiring in the unemployed workers’ market for
a larger interval of b values if the skills in this market are distributed with F (ε)
rather than with G(ε). In other words, if the firms have a greater probability
of matching with workers with higher skills, there is hiring in equilibrium even
for higher levels of unemployment benefits.
Finally, let us consider how the equilibrium changes with respect to the
changes in the marginal productivity function h(ε) in this market. Specifically,
consider c(ε) to be a concave transformation of the baseline marginal produc-
tivity function h(ε). This means that when c(ε) defines marginal productivity,
the incremental increase in the marginal productivity of a worker with an in-
cremental increase in the skill level is smaller compared to the increase when
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h(ε) defines the marginal productivity of the workers in this market. Note that,
a concave transformation of a strictly increasing concave function need not be
strictly increasing. Moreover depending on the specific function choice for the
concave transformation, the way equlibrium outcomes change is affected dras-
tically. I show this with two specific examples. First, let the strictly increasing




Next, consider two strictly increasing concave transformations of this function,









Moreover, suppose the distribution of skills in the unemployed workers’ market
follows a uniform distribution over the support [1
2
, 1]. Whether the marginal
productivity in this market is defined by h(.), c1(.), or c2(.) does not change
the equilibrium strategies of the unemployed workers or the firms that post
their vacancies to the unemployed workers’ market. However, these specifica-
tions matter for the level of unemployment benefits for there to be hiring in
this market. The expected marginal productivities in this market under these






These results imply that when c1(ε) defines the marginal productivity in this
market instead of h(ε), in equilibrium these is hiring for higher levels of unem-
ployment benefits. However if we compare the expected marginal productivities
under h(ε) and c2(ε), the result is the opposite. In fact for any b ≥ 0, there is
no hiring in this market when c2(ε) specifies how the skills of a worker impact
her marginal productivity in a given firm. For this reason, it is not possible to
make a generalization about how changes in the function h(ε) affects equilibrium
outcomes.
2.3.4 Employed Workers’ Market
This section defines and characterizes the equilibrium in the employed
workers’ market. I first explain the worker’s decision, then consider the incum-
bent firm’s strategy and finally, analyze the poaching firm’s strategy.
Before moving on to defining the equilibrium in the employed workers’
market, let me clarify why I use the difference in match qualities rather than
using the individual match qualities for both the incumbent and the poaching
firms in the following analysis. First, let qinc and qpf be the match qualities the
worker gets from working at the incumbent and the poaching firms, respectively.
In order to decide which firm to choose the worker compares the payoffs she
gets from working at these two firms. In other words, the worker compares
max{winc, w}+qinc to wpf+qpf when making her decision. If we denote worker’s
probability of staying at the incumbent firm as ae(ε, qinc, qpf , winc, wpf ), then the
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worker’s maximization problem can be written as
ae(ε, qinc, qpf , winc, wpf ) ∈ argmax
a∈[0,1]
a [max{winc, w}+ qinc] + (1− a) [wpf + qpf ] ,
(2.13)
Equation (2.13) can also be written in the following form
ae(ε, qinc, qpf , winc, wpf ) ∈ argmax
a∈[0,1]
a [max{winc, w} − wpf + qpf − qinc]+wpf+qpf ,
(2.14)
which is equivalent to
ae(ε, d, winc, wpf ) ∈ argmax
a∈[0,1]
a [max{winc, w} − wpf + d] . (2.15)
For this reason, in the following analysis I work with the difference in the match
qualities between the poaching and the incumbent firms rather than working
with the individual match qualities for these two firms.
2.3.4.1 Equilibrium Definition
An equilibrium for the employed workers’ market consists of a wage offer
w∗pf by the poaching firm, a wage offer w
∗
inc : [ε, ε]×R+ → R+ by the incumbent
firm, and a staying strategy a∗e : [ε, ε] × [−x, x] × R+ × R+ → [0, 1] for the
worker, where a∗e(ε, d, winc, wpf ) denotes the probability that a type ε worker
who sees the difference between the match qualities of the two firms as d and
receives wage offers winc and wpf from the incumbent and the poaching firms
respectively stays at the incumbent firm, such that:
(i) For each ε, d, winc(ε, wpf ), and wpf , the probability a
∗
e(ε, d, winc(ε, wpf ), wpf )
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maximizes worker’s payoff:
ae(ε, d, winc(ε, wpf ), wpf ) ∈ argmax
a∈[0,1]
a [max{winc(ε, wpf ), w} − wpf + d] ,
(2.16)
(ii) Given a∗e(ε, d, winc(ε, wpf ), wpf ), the incumbent firm’s wage offer w
∗
inc(ε, wpf )
maximizes incumbent firm’s expected profits for each ε and wpf :




a∗e(ε, d, w, wpf ) [h(ε)− w] dF (d) (2.17)
(iii) Given a∗e(ε, d, winc(ε, wpf ), wpf ) and w
∗
inc(ε, wpf ), the poaching firm’s wage









inc(ε, w), w)[h(ε)− w]dGe(ε) dF (d) (2.18)
According to this equilibrium definition, the poaching firm chooses the
wage offer that maximizes its expected profits by incorporating the workers
with different skills, who face different match qualities have different staying
strategies and incumbent firms that employ workers with different skills offer
different wages to their current employees after these workers receive outside
offers. After observing the wage offer by the poaching firm, the incumbent
decides on its counter-offer based on the skill level of its curent employee. The
incumbent also considers its expected profit when deciding on the level of the
wage it’s going to offer. This is because the incumbent cannot observe what the
workers think of the difference in the match qualities between the poaching and
the incumbent firms. Finally, after observing the wage offers by the poaching
firm and the incumbent, the worker chooses its staying strategy by comparing
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her payoff from staying at her current job to her payoff from working at the
poaching firm.
2.3.4.2 Equilibrium Characterization
In order to characterize the equilibrium, I use backward induction which
necessitates starting with an analysis of the worker’s staying strategy.
The worker stays at the incumbent firm as long as the payoff she gets from
the incumbent is at least as high as the payoff she gets from the poaching firm.4
Then, the worker’s best response can be defined as:
a∗e(ε, d, winc(ε, wpf ), wpf ) =
{
1 if max{winc, w} ≥ wpf + d,
0 if max{winc, w} < wpf + d.
(2.19)
Before moving on to the equilibrium strategy of the incumbent firm, let
me first talk about the current wage w of the workers. In this paper, I consider
only one period of a dynamic labor market. However, because the current
wage of a worker w in any given period is determined through the events of
the previous periods, I assume w is exognous and I don’t specify how it is
determined. Just to give an idea, consider an employed worker who entered the
employed workers’ market last period. From the analysis of the unemployed
workers’ market, we know that her current wage should be equal to the level
of unemployment benefits b. On the other hand, if we consider another worker
who has been employed for several periods, it is not possible to determine her
current wage by only knowing the equilibrium strategies of the incumbent and
4With this statement, I am ignoring the possibility that the worker randomizes when the
payoffs from the two firms are equal. I assume the worker stays at the incumbent firm even if
leaving gives her the same payoff. This assumption is without loss of generality because the
random variable d is continuous. Due to the definition of d, max{winc, w} being equal to wpf
is actually a zero-probability event.
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the poaching firms. The number of outside offers this worker has received so
far and the realizations of d in each of these events are important in order to
understand whether the worker changes jobs or stays with the incumbent. For
all these reasons, I treat w as an exogenous variable. In doing so, I also make
the following assumption
Ee[h(ε)] ≥ w + 3x, (2.20)
which tells that the mean marginal productivity in the employed workers market
is significantly great than the current wage. This assumption is important for
the analysis because it implies that the poaching firm never offers a wage level
that is smaller than w + x. If that is the case, the incumbent need to make a
counter wage offer rather than keeping the wage at the current level in order
to keep its employee. Therefore, assuming the inequality in (2.20) holds in fact
implies that
max{winc, w} = winc. (2.21)
Now that we know more about the current wage the incumbent pays, it is
possible to move on to characterize the equilibrium strategy of the incumbent.
The incumbent firm observes the type of the worker but not the match quality
differences between the two firms. Moreover, the incumbent infers that the
worker stays at her current job if and only if
w∗inc(ε, wpf ) ≥ wpf + d. (2.22)
Since d is uniformly distributed over the support [−x, x], Pr(d ≤ w∗inc(ε, wpf )−
wpf ) is equal to
w∗inc(ε, wpf )− wpf + x
2x
. Therefore, the optimization problem of
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the incumbent can be written as
w∗inc(ε, wpf ) ∈ argmax
w∈R+
(
w − wpf + x
2x
)
(h(ε)− w) . (2.23)
Assuming an interior solution, the first order condition leads to the following
solution for the incumbent’s wage offer.
w∗inc(ε, wpf ) =
h(ε) + wpf − x
2
(2.24)
This solution tells that the incumbent’s wage offer is equal to the arithmetic
average of the worker’s marginal productivity h(ε), which is the highest possible
wage the incumbent ever offers, and the lowest possible wage offer with which the
incumbent can keep its worker, wpf −x.
5 Note that, the incumbent never makes
a wage offer that is higher than the marginal productivity of the worker because
such a wage offer brings negative profits.6 However, this interior solution does
not take into account the fact that the incumbent never makes a wage offer
higher than h(ε). In fact, when the poaching firm’s wage offer wpf is great than
h(ε) + x, the incumbent is indifferent between offering any wage taht falls in
the interval [0, h(ε)]. Therefore, I assume without loss of generality that the
incumbent offers winc = 0 when wpf > h(ε) + x. The following function, then,
5As mentioned before, the worker compares wpf − d and winc in order to decide which
offer to accept. Therefore, the incumbent needs to offer at least wpf − x if it wants to have a
chance of keeping its employee.
6In a dynamic settng, the incumbent may offer a wage that is higher than the marginal
productivity of the worker in order to reach a higher level of profit in the future. This is not
possible in the static model this paper considers because the agents in the labor market do
not take into account the continuation values of their actions.
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defines the incumbent’s equilibrium strategy:




0 if wpf > h(ε) + x,




The definition in (2.25) implies that when wpf > h(ε) + x, the incumbent
loses its worker to the poaching firm because max{winc, w} < wpf + d for all
d ∈ [−x, x]. Moreover, losing its worker means that the incumbent receives zero
profit. However, when wpf ≤ h(ε) + x, the incumbent gets to keep the worker
as long as d ≤
h(ε)− wpf − x
2
. In that case the incumbent’s profit is equal to
h(ε)− wpf + x
2
.
The poaching firm cannot observe the type of the worker or the match
qualities. However, it can infer that the equilibrium strategy of the incumbent
is defined by the function in (2.25). First, let us consider the case where wpf ≤
h(ε) + x. Figure 2.1 depicts the relation between wpf , winc, and h(ε) when
wpf ≥ h(ε)+x. The length of the interval labelled as A in Figure 2.1 is equal to
h(ε)− wpf + x
2
. If this interval A is larger than 2x, it implies that wpf+d < winc
for all d ∈ [−x, x]. Therefore when
h(ε)− wpf + x
2
> 2x or h(ε) − 3x > wpf ,
the worker stays at her current job and the poaching firm gets zero profit. In
addition, this means that for a given wpf , the poaching firm can never capture
the workers whose skill levels satisfy
ε > h−1(wpf + 3x) (2.26)
However if A is smaller than or equal to 2x, or h(ε) − 3x ≤ wpf , the
poaching firm gets the worker depending on the realization of the difference in
the match qualities, d. In order for the poaching firm to capture the worker,
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the sum of its wage offer and the match quality difference needs to be greater
than the wage offer by the incumbent firm. This inequality defines the interval
for d that leads to the worker to switch to the poaching firm.
wpf + d > winc,
wpf + d >








Therefore for a given wpf , the poaching firm captures the workers with skill
levels that satisfy
ε ≤ h−1(wpf + 3x) (2.28)
if only if d >
h(ε)− wpf − x
2
. When that happens, the poaching firm’s profit is
h(ε)− wpf .
Next, consider the case where wpf > h(ε) + x. In this case, the worker
always switches to the poaching firm regardless of the realization of d. This is
because for all d ∈ [−x, x], wpf + d > max{winc, w} = w. This implies that for
any given wpf , workers with skill levels
ε < h−1(wpf − x) (2.29)
always switch to the poaching firm. However, the poaching firm makes a loss
from hiring these workers as their marginal productivity is low.
Putting all these facts together, the poaching firm chooses the wage level
it is going to offer to the employed workers by maximizing its expected profit
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The first order condition for this maximization problem leads to the following
















h(ε) dGe(ε) = 0
(2.31)
Once again, the implicit definition of w∗pf in equation (2.31) assumes that the
solution is an interior solution. However, as I have established before, the
poaching firm never offers a wage that is lower than w+ x. For this reason, the
equilibrium strategy of the poaching firm can be written as in equation (2.32),
where w∗ is the wage level that satisfies equation (2.31):
w∗pf = max{w
∗, w + x}. (2.32)
Unfortunately, it is not possible to examine whether the wage level that satisfies
equation (2.31) is greater than w + x. Therefore in order to talk about com-
parative statics, I impose parametric assumptions on the model in the following
sections.
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2.3.5 Firm’s Market Choice
2.3.5.1 Equilibrium Definition
An equilibrium for this subgame consists of a market choosing startegy
a∗f ∈ [0, 1] for a vacant firm, where a
∗
f denotes the probability that a firm posts
its vacancy to the unemployed workers’ market, such that:




e(ε, d, winc(ε, wpf ), wpf ), w
∗
inc(ε, wpf ), and w
∗
pf , the proba-








































This equilibrium definition states that a vacant firm decides whether to
post its vacancy to the employed workers’ market or to the unemployed workers’
market by comparing the expected profits it is going to receive from these two
choices. If it chooses to post its vacancy to the unemployed workers’ market,
with probability λu it’s going to get matched to an unemployed worker and it is
going to offer a wage w∗u defined by its equilibrium strategy in the unemployed
workers’ market. In that case, the unemployed worker this firm is matched with
decides whether to accept the wage offer w∗u based on her equilibrium strategy
a∗u(ε, w
∗
u). If the firm is not matched with any workers, which happens with
probability 1− λu, it stays vacant and receives zero profit this period.
7In a more realistic scenario, many of the objects such as λu, λe, Gu(ε), Ge(ε) are endoge-
nous and are determined by the firm’s market choice, but in this setup I am assuming away
their endogeneity.
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On the other hand, if the vacant firm decides to post its vacancy to
the employed workers’ market, it’s going to be matched with an employed
worker with probability λe. Then, the worker follows her equilibrium strat-






pf ), based on the realization of the difference in match
qualities d and the wage offers she receives from both her current employer and
the vacant firm, to decide whether to stay at the incumbent firm or not. If the
firm is not matched with any workers in the employed workers’ market, which
happens with probability 1− λe, it stays vacant and receives zero profit.
2.3.5.2 Equilibrium Characterization with an Example
Following the equilibrium definition above, a vacant firm decides to post its
vacancy to the unemployed worker’s market when its expected profit from doing
so is higher than the expected profit from posting its vacancy to the employed
workers’ market. Since there is no heterogeneity in firms’ productivities, all firms
make the same decision regardless of the realizations of the random variables.
That being said, the only case where there is search8 in both markets is when
the vacant firms randomize. In order for this to happen, a vacant firm must get
equal expected profits from entering the unemployed workers’ market and the
employed workers’ market.
To assess whether it is possible for a vacant firm to randomize posting its
vacancy between the two markets in equilibrium, more specific assumptions are
needed regarding the functional forms of h(ε), Gu(ε), Ge(ε) as well as the values
of the parameters such as λe, λu, x, and θ. However even with these assumptions,
closed form solutions for the equilibrium wages in the employed workers’ market
8Here with search I refer to the existence of a market with both firms and workers.
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may not emerge. Thus, I use numerical solutions of the equilibrium strategies
for the discussions in the rest of the paper.
One concern for the vacant firm’s posting decision is whether the lemons
problem exists. The reasoning is as follows. In any given point in time, the
average skill level of the workers in the employed workers’ market is higher
than the average skill level of those in the unemployed workers’ market. Even
though a vacant firm cannot observe the skill levels of these workers before
actually employing them, it knows that the distribution of skills in the employed
workers’ market first order stochastically dominates the skill distribution in
the unemployed workers’ market. Knowing that the unemployed workers are
more likely to be “lemons”, the vacant firm therefore might opt for posting in
the employed workers’ market regardless of the specific functional forms and
parameter values. Moreover, knowing that the incumbent firm will match the
offers coming to its high-skilled workers, the vacant firm might not choose to
make an offer to an employed worker. These problems, however, are resolved in
this model due to the match quality parameter that captures the idiosyncratic
preferences of workers. The fact that the average skill level in the employed
group is higher than that in the unemployed group makes it more attractive
to approach employed workers. However, conditional on making an offer to
a worker with a higher skill level, the probability that it will be accepted is
lower in the employed group as the incumbent firms will match the offer coming
to their skilled workers and the poaching firms, thus, end up hiring only the
skilled workers that are discontent with their existing match. These costs and
benefits balance each other in the equilibrium leading to a case where posting
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in the unemployed workers’ market or in the employed workers’ market doesn’t
dominate one another at all times. In fact, with the baseline specification in
Table 2.1, it is possible to show that there is search in both markets.9 In
addition, it can be shown that the vacant firm randomizes between posting in the
employed and unemployed workers’ market not only at these parameter values
but also at a differnet combination of other parameters within a neighborhood
of these values. I leave the explanation of the functional forms and an analysis
of comparative statics to the next section.
2.4 Numerical Example
As mentioned in the previous section, I make use of the numerical solution
of the model in the following comparative static analyses.10 Table 2.1 shows
the baseline specification I use in calculating the equilibrium. The marginal
productivity of a worker is defined as h(ε) = εα, where ε represents the skill
level of the worker and α is the parameter that determines how much a given
skill is productive at any job. In this analysis, I assume α = 0.5 to ensure the
marginal productivity function is strictly concave and differentiable. The skill
distribution in both the unemployed and the employed workers’ markets are
9So far, I have assumed the skill distribution in the employed workers’ market and in the
unemployed workers’ market have the same support. However, in the baseline specification
the skill distribution in the employed workers’ market has a different support than that of
the unemployed workers’ market. Assuming the two distributions are defined over the same
support is a an assumption without loss of generality because assuming these two distributions
have different supports do not change any of the theoretical analysis.
10In all the numerical exercises I consider in this section, I randomly draw 1000 values
from the distribution of the match quality difference for each skill level. Next, I calculate the
equilibrium wage levels and the decision of the workers. The fraction of job-to-job movers for
each skill level is the fraction of the workers who decide to take the poaching firm’s job offer
among these 1000 cases.
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assumed to be uniform. However, the range of the skill levels in the employed
workers’ market is wider since I initially assumed that the skill distribution
in the employed workers’ market first order stochastically dominates the skill
distribution in the unemployed workers’ market. The parameter values for the
arrival rates of job offers in both markets are assumed to be equal in order to
make sure the difference in the expected profits from entering these two markets
do not result from a difference in the arrival rates. The unemployment benefit
parameter as well as the value of the match quality to the worker is set arbitrarily
in order to make sure it is possible for a firm to get equal expected profits from
entering these two markets. However, later in this section I also show how the
model’s predictions change with respect to a change in these variables.
First, I analyze how the wage offers by the incumbent and the poaching
firms change across skill levels. Figure 2.2 displays the patterns. The poaching
firm’s wage offer does not change with respect to the skill level, because the
poaching firm cannot observe the worker’s skills. However, the superior infor-
mation the incumbent firm has over the worker’s skill level allows it to offer a
different wage offer for workers with different skill levels. Specifically, the in-
cumbent’s wage offer increase with the worker’s skill level, consistent with its
equilibrium strategy. Notice that, until the skill level is around 3 the poaching
firm’s wage offer is always higher than the incumbent’s wage offer. Moreover, for
workers with skill level ε < 1.6, the poaching firm actually makes a loss from hir-
ing the worker. This is because for these skill levels, the marginal productivity
of the worker is lower than the poaching firm’s wage offer.
Even though the poaching firm’s wage offer is greater than the incumbent’s
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wage offer for the workers with skill levels that are lower than 3, it doesn’t nec-
essarily mean that these workers change jobs whenever they receive an outside
wage offer. In fact, Figure 2.3 shows that fraction of job-to-job movers are
considerably lower than one for the workers with skill levels lower than 3. The
reason for this pattern is the workers’ idiosyncratic preferences about match
quality. Similarly, when the incumbent’s wage offer is greater than that of the
poaching firm, it does not mean that the worker is going to stay at her cur-
rent job. As can be seen from the figure, the fraction of job-to-job movers
stay well above 0.3 for the workers with higher skill levels. Therefore, even
though the poaching firm knows that the incumbent matches the offers coming
to its skilled workers, posting a vacancy to the employed workers’ market might
enable the poaching firm to hire skilled workers depending on the realization
of the difference in match qualities between the two firms. Nonetheless, this
result certainly changes with respect to the range over which the distribution
of the match quality parameter is defined. For this reason, I look at how the
equilibrium outcomes change with respect to x in the remainder of this section.
Figure 2.4 demonstrates the equilibrium wage offers by the incumbent for
workers with different skill levels at different levels of x. First, the fact that
the incumbent’s wage offer increases as the worker is more skilled does not
change across different levels of x. Next, the figure shows that as the level of x
increases, the equilibrium wage curves of the incumbent initially shifts down and
after a threshold they shift back up, thought not to the level of the initial wage
curve. The increase in x means an increase in the variance of the match quality
difference distribution without a change in the mean. The equilibrium wage
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offer strategy of the incumbent tells that the firm offers a wage that is equal to
the average of the marginal productivity of the worker and the poaching firm’s
wage offer minus x. This means that the incumbent offers a wage that is in
the middle of the highest wage it would pay for that worker and the lowest
wage with which it can hire the worker. When the variance of the distribution
increases, the highest wage the incumbent would pay for the worker does not
change as the marginal productivity of this worker stays the same. On the
other hand, when x increases, the lowest wage with which the incumbent can
hire this worker decreases for a given level of wpf . Therefore, for low levels of
x, when x increases the incumbent’s equilibrium wage offer declines. However
when x > 0.6, the rise in the poaching firm’s equilibrium wage offer dominates
the rise in x and leads to an increase in the incumbent’s wage offer. As a result,
the incumbent’s wage offer has a non-monotonic relation with the level of x, or
in other words the variance of the match quality distribution.
The change in the wage offer by the poaching firm with respect to x is
shown in Figure 2.5. Unlike the incumbent’s equilibrium wage offer, the wage
offer by the poaching firm monotonically increases as x increases. Nevertheless,
note that the increase in the wage level is higher for higher levels of x. This
fact also explains the reason why we see a non-monotonic relation between the
incumbent’s wage offer and x. The poaching firm’s equilibrium wage strategy
given by Equation (2.31) tells that as x increases, the interval of skill levels from
which the poaching firm is going to make a loss, if the worker accepts its offer,
declines. Moreover, again as x increases, the interval of the skill levels from
which the poaching firm can potentially hire considerably gets larger. For this
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reason, the wage offer by the poaching firm increases with x. Also, notice that
the rise in the poaching firm’s wage offer is higher than the rise in x for x > 0.6.
Finally, Figure 2.6 displays how the fraction of job-to-job movers vary with
respect to changes in x. As expected, the fraction of job-to-job movers rise with
x. This is mostly generated by the increase in the poaching firm’s wage offer.
However, the interesting thing is the fact that the increase in job-to-job movers
gets smaller for higher values of x. This is because initially the poaching firm’s
wage offer increases while the incumbent’s wage offer decreases. Adding the
increase in x on top of the rising difference between the two firms’ wage offers
explains the increase in the fraction of job-to-job movers for all skill levels. Still,
the change in the probability of moving becomes smaller for higher levels of x.
It is true that the increase in the poaching firm’s wage offer is higher for these
values of x, but at the same time the variance of the match quality is also higher.
Therefore, even though the difference between the wage offers between the two
firms rise, the probability of receiving a very low match quality rises as well.
For this reason, the change in the fraction of movers is lower for higher values
of x.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper constructs a job search model with wage negotiations and rene-
gotiations in which targeted and random search happens at the same time. In
the model, firms choose whether to post their vacancies in the employed or
unemployed workers’ market and whether to match to offers coming to their
employees. Workers on the other hand decide whether to accept a job offer
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when they are unemployed and whether to stay at the incumbent firm or switch
to poaching firm after they receive an offer when they are employed. Work-
ers also have idiosyncratic preferences over different jobs which is unobserved
to the employers. This extra dimension of asymmetric information eliminates
the lemons problem and leads to an equilibrium with search in both employed
workers’ and unemployed workers’ markets. In addition, the model predicts
that workers who switch to the poaching firm are less skilled on average. This
is because, the workers who are switching to the poaching firm mainly change
jobs because the incumbent chooses not to match their wage offer. For this
reason, the model generates a negative relation between the skill level of the
worker and the rate of job-to-job mobility.
As mentioned earlier, this paper is a first step in achieving a dynamic
general equilibrium search model in which firms’ strategic decisions determine
the job offer rates as well as the firm productivity distributions in both markets.
In this paper, I try to characterize the equilibrium strategies by ignoring the
continuation values of the agents’ and by only taking into account the static
payoffs. However, when the workers’ and firms’ decisions change their future
prospects of finding a job, wage growth and hiring, the model may well generate
different equilibria. Moreover, in such a setup, the model’s predictions regarding
the steady state job-to-job mobility rates can be tested from the data. Finally,
in this paper I have assumed the current wage of a worker is determined exoge-
nously as I do not model the previous periods of this labor market. However, the
current wage has significant impact on both incumbent’s and poaching firm’s
equilibrium strategies. Therefore, the next step in this research agenda would
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be to endogenize this variable by analyzing a dynamic labor market in the same
setup.
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2.6 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: The Baseline Specification for the Numerical Solution
The marginal productivity of a worker h(ε) = εα
Skill distribution in the unenmployed workers’ market Gu(ε) ∼ U [0.5, 2]
Skill distribution in the enmployed workers’ market Ge(ε) ∼ U [1, 4]
Arrival rate of offers in the unemployed workers’ market λu = 0.7
Arrival rate of offers in the employed workers’ market λe = 0.7
The utility a worker gets from high match quality x = 0.5
Parameter defining worker’s productivity α = 0.5
Unemployment benefits b = 0.9868
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Figure 2.1: Incumbent’s and Poaching Firm’s Wage Offers When wpf + x ≤ ε
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
wpf − x winc h(ε)
Figure 2.2: Incumbent’s and Poaching Firm’s Wage Offers Across Skill Lev-
els




















Figure 2.3: Fraction of Job-to-Job Movers Across Skill Groups




























Figure 2.4: Incumbent’s Wage Across Different Levels of x























Figure 2.5: Poaching Firm’s Wage Across Different Levels of x

















x=0.2 x=0.4 x=0.6 x=0.8 x=1
122
Figure 2.6: Fraction of Job-to-Job Movers Across Different Levels of x




































An Anatomy of U.S. Personal
Bankruptcy under Chapter 13
This chapter is joint work with Hülya Eraslan, Wenli Li, and
Pierre-Daniel Sarte.
3.1 Introduction
On April 20, 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Pro-
tection Act (BAPCPA) was signed into law and ended a comprehensive legisla-
tive effort that began under the Clinton administration. The most significant
(and controversial) change introduced by the new personal bankruptcy law was
to impose a “means test” on debtors contemplating a bankruptcy filing. The
aim was to ensure that debtors with sufficient income would file under Chapter
13 and complete a repayment plan out of future income. The key presumption
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underlying this provision was that a large number of households did not repay
as much as their income allowed. In particular, it was thought that Chapter 13
would perform better, both as a collection device for creditors and as a means
to provide debtors with a financial fresh start, if stricter rules were imposed on
repayment plans.1
The objective of our paper is to take a first step at evaluating the impact
of these stricter rules. Specifically, we aim to assess the effect of section 1325,
paragraph 4, which was added to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code under BAPCPA
and imposes additional restrictions on the length of repayment plans for debtors
with income above the state median. In order to do so, we build and estimate a
structural model of Chapter 13 bankruptcy using a novel data set we construct.
For a side contribution, we provide empirical evidence regarding the outcomes
under Chapter 13 and its performance both as a collection device for creditors
and as a means to provide debtors with a financial fresh start.
Our model captures the salient features of personal bankruptcy under
Chapter 13. In our model, a debtor first makes decisions regarding whether or
not to file under Chapter 13 and, if so, what repayment plan to propose. Since
the law requires that all of a debtor’s excess income be applied to his repayment
plan, the debtor’s choice of repayment plan boils down to its length. In choosing
what plan to propose, the debtor recognizes that its duration has a bearing
on the confirmation outcome that is determined by the recommendations of a
bankruptcy trustee appointed to oversee the bankruptcy process. Under the
bankruptcy law, in deciding whether to confirm a plan or not, the trustee must
1See, for example, https://www.tinyurl.com/bapcpa2005.
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form an opinion as to the fairness and feasibility of the plan. The fairness
condition is satisfied as long as the debtor contributes all excess income into
the plan payments. The feasibility condition requires that the debtor’s excess
income is sufficient to pay the unsecured creditors over a three- to five-year
period an amount no less than they can recover under liquidation of the debtor’s
assets. To capture the idea that the trustee has some leeway in the interpretation
of the bankruptcy law, in our model, whether the trustee views a given plan as
fair and feasible or not is random from the perspective of the debtor. Specifically,
whether the trustee views a plan as fair and feasible depends on the debtor’s
characteristics and the plan length.
Even if a plan is initially confirmed, it may nonetheless become unfair
or infeasible due to fluctuations in the debtor’s financial condition. We model
this possibility by introducing shocks to income or expenses of the debtor at
a random date. Following the shocks, the trustee reevaluates the feasibility of
the plan under the new debtor characteristics. If the case is not dismissed, the
debtor decides whether to continue or voluntarily default on his plan.
Overall, our model highlights a basic trade-off debtors face in proposing
long repayment plans versus short ones. Long repayment plans are costly in that
they impose restraints on debtors for longer periods, but these plans may also be
more likely to be confirmed by the court and, ultimately, to result in a financial
fresh start. In addition, our model highlights the importance of shocks to excess
income during the bankruptcy process. In particular, even though a plan may
be fair and feasible at the time a debtor files for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, it may
cease to be so later on before the repayment plan is complete.
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We estimate our model using newly collected data contained in court
files on all Chapter 13 personal bankruptcies recorded by the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware between August 2001 and Au-
gust 2002. From the court documents, we extract information concerning the
filers’ financial and demographic information at the time of filing and the final
outcome of their cases. Specifically, we collect data on the outcomes predicted
by our model: the choice of plan length, whether the plan is confirmed or not,
whether the case is successfully completed or not, and the recovery rate of the
creditors. In addition to these endogenous outcomes, in our model the deci-
sion to file for Chapter 13 in the first place is also endogenous. Although all
the debtors in our sample have chosen to file for Chapter 13, we identify the
parameters associated with this decision through the variation in the decision
to continue or voluntarily default on the plan following the shocks to financial
conditions.
We estimate our model using the maximum likelihood approach. Our
estimates confirm that the debtor’s choice of plan length indeed affects the
trustee’s opinions on the fairness and feasibility of the plan. In particular, after
controlling for exogenous debtor characteristics, we find that longer plans are
more likely to be confirmed in the first place and less likely to be dismissed after
the original plan becomes infeasible. However, whether a debtor’s income is
above the state median level does not play a significant role in the confirmation
of the plan.2 As such, the means test established under BAPCPA appears
inconsequential. In addition, we find that changes in debtors’ conditions during
2Whether income is above the state median appears immaterial for the confirmation of the
plan; however, income plays an important role through the determination of excess income
(income minus necessary expenses) and therefore the required plan payments.
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bankruptcy play a significant role in governing Chapter 13 outcomes, including
the ability of debtors to obtain a financial fresh start. In particular, negative
shocks to excess income, especially when experienced early in the program, raise
the probability of dismissal significantly.
We next conduct policy experiments to assess the effect of section 1325,
paragraph 4, that was added to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code under BAPCPA.
This policy imposes additional restrictions on the length of payment plans for
debtors with income above the state median. Our results predict that this
new policy would not materially affect creditor recovery rates and would not
necessarily make discharge more likely for debtors with income above the state
median. This finding is robust to alternative policy experiments that require
bankruptcy plans to meet stricter standards in other ways, such as proposing a
higher recovery rate. In fact, in these alternative experiments, some Chapter 13
filers no longer choose to file, with the result that recovery rates and discharge
rates even decline. It appears, therefore, that a stricter bankruptcy code can
make it more difficult for debtors to obtain a fresh start but without necessarily
helping to raise creditor recovery rates.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 the discusses
related literature. Section 3 presents institutional details associated with U.S.
personal bankruptcy law as well as a summary of creditors’ options outside
bankruptcy. Section 4 provides a description of the data. Section 5 presents
a structural model of Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Section 6 presents econometric
specification. Section 7 presents our estimation results. Section 8 assesses the
effects of policy experiments directly related to BAPCPA as well as hypothetical
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ones. Section 9 offers some concluding remarks.
3.2 Related Literature
Our paper contributes to a growing literature on households’ bankruptcy
decisions. With some exceptions, this literature has largely focused on house-
holds’ bankruptcy decisions under Chapter 7. In early work, Domowitz and
Sartain (1999) combine a sample of households who filed for bankruptcy in the
early 1980s with data from the Survey of Consumer Finances for 1983. They find
that households with more credit card debt are more likely to file for bankruptcy.
Gross and Souleles (2002) study individuals’ credit card account data and con-
clude that a decrease in stigma associated with bankruptcy is partly responsible
for the increase in bankruptcy filing rates between 1995 and 1997. Using data
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Fay, Hurst, and White (2002) test
the role of financial benefits in households’ bankruptcy decisions and find sup-
port for underlying strategic considerations. In particular, households are more
likely to file when their financial benefit from filing is higher.3
More recently, given the debates that surrounded the proposal and even-
tual passage of BAPCPA, attention has shifted toward consumer bankruptcy
3Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (1989, 2000) and Himmelstein, Warren, Thorne,
and Woolhandler (2005) provide vivid narratives of debtors and creditors who end up in
bankruptcy court. Conclusions underscore that bankruptcy is often caused by crises in
debtors’ lives, including divorce, job loss, and medical problems. There is also a separate
empirical literature that examines the effects of personal bankruptcy law on the supply and
demand for credit (Gropp, Scholz, and White (1997) and Lin and White (2001)), on the
ability of households to insure against labor income risk (Athreya, Tam, and Young, 2012),
on consumption behavior (Filer and Fisher (2005) and Grant (2004)), on labor supply (Han
and Li, 2007), and on mobility (Elul and Subramanian, 2002).
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under Chapter 13. Similarly to our methods, Sullivan, Warren, and West-
brook (2003) and Norberg and Velkey (2006) construct data on Chapter 13
bankruptcy filers using U.S. bankruptcy court files. However, their focus is
entirely descriptive. By contrast, we estimate a structural model and conduct
policy experiments to evaluate stricter rules imposed under BAPCPA.4
Our paper also informs a literature in macroeconomics that has provided
tractable models relating documented empirical facts on consumer bankruptcy
to aggregate considerations. A number of studies have used calibration and
simulation exercises to explain observed aggregate U.S. consumer bankruptcy
filing rates and have evaluated the effects of information, financial innovation,
and changes in bankruptcy laws on these rates and other economic aggregates.
Examples include Athreya (2002); Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Ŕıos-
Rull (2007); Drozd and Nosal (2008); Li and Sarte (2006); Livshits, MacGee,
and Tertilt (2007, 2011), and Sanchez (2010). These papers abstract from the
details of the personal bankruptcy laws, and do not distinguish between Chapter
7 and Chapter 13 personal bankruptcies.
3.3 Legal Background
This section first briefly reviews creditors’ legal remedies outside bankruptcy.
It then addresses the main features of U.S. personal bankruptcy law focusing in
detail on Chapter 13 court procedures.
4See Eckstein and Wolpin (1989b); Rust (1996); Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010), and
Keane, Todd, and Wolpin (2011) for surveys of structural dynamic choice models.
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3.3.1 Creditors’ Legal Remedies Outside of Bankruptcy
When a debtor defaults on his debt obligations without explicitly filing
for bankruptcy, secured creditors, such as mortgage lenders or car loan lenders,
seize property to recover what they are owed. Unsecured creditors, such as
credit card issuers, often start with making calls and writing letters soliciting
payments. They then typically sell their debts to collecting agencies. Unsecured
creditors also have the option to sue the debtor and obtain a court judgment
against him. They collect on the judgment by having the court order that the
debtor’s employer take a portion of his paycheck and remit that money to the
sheriff, who then forwards the payment appropriately. This process is known as
“wage garnishment.” Unsecured creditors can also potentially seize a debtor’s
bank account and/or foreclose on his home. State laws typically restrict the
amount and type of assets that can be seized to different degrees. Therefore,
the process of seizing an account or foreclosing on a property can be costly and,
in practice, unsecured creditors rarely do so.
3.3.2 Main Features of U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Law
Prior to BAPCPA
U.S. personal bankruptcy law features two distinct procedures: Chapter 7
and Chapter 13. Prior to BAPCPA, debtors had the right to choose between the
two chapters.5 Chapter 7 is often referred to as “liquidation.”Under Chapter
7, the debtor surrenders all assets above an exemption level that varies across
5Given the time span covered by our data set and the objectives of this paper, the ba-
sic features of personal bankruptcy law we provide below predate the passage of the 2005
Bankruptcy Reform Act.
131
states. In exchange, he obtains the discharge of most of his unsecured debt such
as credit card debt, medical bills, personal loans, utility bills, etc.6 A debtor
cannot file again for Chapter 7 during the six years that follow the last filing. In
contrast, Chapter 13 is formally known as “adjustment of debts of consumers
with regular income.”Under Chapter 13, a portion of a debtor’s future earnings
are used to meet part of his debt obligations. The repayment plan can last for
a period of up to five years. While the debtor’s assets are unaffected under
Chapter 13, at the end of the payment plan, any remaining debt is discharged.
A debtor is prevented from filing again under Chapter 13 for a period of 180
days following his last filing.
3.3.3 Bankruptcy Procedure under Chapter 13
A Chapter 13 case begins when a debtor files a petition with the bankruptcy
court. This petition gives a description of, among other information, the debtor’s
assets, debts, income, and expenditures. In the petition, the debtor also pro-
poses a repayment plan that devotes all of his excess income to the payment
of unmet claims. Bankruptcy law defines excess income as any income net of
necessary living expenses including housing expenses, which is in the form of
mortgage payments for most of the debtors. In order to be confirmed by the
court, the proposed plan must provide to repay the debt over a three- to five-
year period. It must also be filed in good faith.7 In particular, the debtor must
6Discharge prevents the creditors who are owed the discharged debts from taking any
action against the debtor, including any communication with the debtor regarding unpaid
debts.
7Trustees typically ask Chapter 13 filers to start submitting periodic payments according
to the plan as soon as the plan is filed. Payments are distributed to creditors only if the
plan is confirmed and are otherwise refunded. This practice, together with other court rules,
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propose to pay at least as much as the value of the assets creditors would have
otherwise received under Chapter 7. Finally, the plan must cure any default on
secured debt at the time of filing before providing for payments to unsecured
creditors. Because the law requires debtors to devote all of their disposable
income to the payment plan, the key element of the repayment plan is the
proposed plan length.
Upon the filing of a petition, a trustee is appointed by the bankruptcy
court. The trustee is responsible for evaluating and recommending whether or
not to confirm a proposed plan. He also works as a disbursing agent during the
implementation of the plan, collecting payments from debtors and distributing
them to creditors. Within a month of the petition filing, the trustee schedules a
section 341 meeting. At this meeting, creditors are given an opportunity to ask
any questions regarding the debtor’s financial situation that may affect the plan.
Ultimately, the trustee recommends to the court that a proposed plan either be
confirmed, along with the implied repayment schedule, or be dismissed.
If the plan is dismissed, the case ends. Creditors can resume legal reme-
dies outside bankruptcy, as described above, to pursue the repayment of their
loans. If a repayment plan is confirmed, the debtor starts making payments
as specified in that plan.8 Once plan payments are completed, any remaining
debt is discharged. It is possible for a plan that is initially confirmed to be
subsequently altered. In particular, the debtor is free to prepay his debts in the
discourages debtors from staying in Chapter 13 bankruptcy without a confirmed plan for too
long.
8In Delaware, the trustee receives 6% of total payments made under a confirmed plan.
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event that his assets appreciate or he receives additional income from an unex-
pected source, such as an inheritance. The debtor can also potentially convert
the case to a Chapter 7 filing, even after confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan,
or voluntarily default on the confirmed plan and have the case dismissed. When
a debtor benefits from a substantial increase in income after confirmation of a
repayment plan, the law requires the debtor to increase his payments by the
amount of additional income received (unless expenses for basic maintenance
have also changed). Ultimately, the final plan that is carried out can look very
different from the proposed and confirmed plan.
3.4 The Data
3.4.1 Data Collection
The data collected in this paper are obtained using an electronic public
access service to case and docket information from Federal Bankruptcy courts
and the U.S. Party/Case Index. This service is known as Public Access to
Court Electronic Records (PACER) and offers bankruptcy court information
including i) a listing of all parties and participants including judges, attorneys,
and trustees, ii) a chronology of the dates of case events entered in the case
record, iii) a claims registry, and iv) the types of documents filed for specific
cases and imaged copies of these documents.
The docket sheet together with the court files it contains allow us to extract
information concerning important dates that mark the Chapter 13 bankruptcy
procedure, including the filing date, the confirmation date, and the dismissal or
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discharge date, as well as filers’ financial and income information at the time of
filing and the final outcome of the case. The court files include debtor petitions,
attorney disclosure forms, statements of financial affairs, Chapter 13 plans, and
the trustee report. The debtor petitions contain different schedules, labeled A
through J, that set forth the financial situation of the debtor, including real
property that is owned, other personal assets in the form of furniture, cash, or
insurance, liabilities such as secured debt and unsecured priority debt (taxes),
and maintenance expenses for food, clothes, and transportation, among other
basic expenses.
The court files are mostly PDF images from which information cannot
be directly extracted using software. We manually collected all of our data by
downloading these images and coding them into a database. The data were
entered twice and the corresponding entries were cross-checked. The data were
also checked against different sources where the same information was reported.
For instance, the summary of schedules provides headline numbers on filers’
assets, debts, income, and expenditures, while petition schedules A through J
provide the same information in greater detail.
There were 1, 085 Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases filed in Delaware over our
sample period (August 2001 to August 2002). Of the 1, 085 cases, we deleted
from our sample 134 cases that have incomplete information resulting from ei-
ther court recording or filing errors, and that were therefore trivially dismissed.
In addition, 130 cases were omitted from the data due to inconsistent informa-
tion filed by the debtors. Our final sample contains 821 cases, of which 364 (or
44%) resulted in a discharge upon successful completion of the repayment plans
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while 457 cases were dismissed under Chapter 13. Of the dismissed cases, 52
were later converted to Chapter 7 filings. Table 1 summarizes this information.
3.4.2 Data Description
3.4.2.1 Selected Characteristics of Chapter 13 Debtors
Most of the variables we use in our analysis are directly available from
the court files. Others are constructed on the basis of these original variables.
For comparison, demographics, employment status, and income information
are obtained for the State of Delaware from the 2000 Census and the Mortgage
Bankers Association. We also report data on expenditures from the northeast
region of the 2001 Consumer Expenditure Survey. Balance sheet information
at the national level is obtained from the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances.
The debtors in our sample are somewhat less likely to be unemployed than
the average Delaware resident, with approximately 4% of the filers being unem-
ployed compared to 5% in Delaware. This is not surprising since Chapter 13
bankruptcy is designed for curing the debts of individuals with regular income.
What is more surprising is that about 5% of the filers are self-employed. Aver-
age monthly household income for the debtors in our sample is $2, 938, which
falls short of Delaware’s average adjusted gross income by about 30%. Filers for
whom we have income data for both the current and previous year experience
a nearly 20% average decline in income prior to filing.
The court files also provide information regarding debtors’ monthly ex-
penses that define basic maintenance under Chapter 13. Debtors in our sample
136
spend on average $1,164 on housing expenses (mortgage or rent). While housing
expenses are shielded by law, a provision prohibits debtors from boosting these
expenses prior to filing. In our sample, housing expenses, including expenses
for home maintenance, account on average for 40% of total monthly expenses.9
Debtors in Chapter 13 spend about $442 a month on average for food and
clothing, which is considerably less than the $600 monthly average reported for
the northeast region of the Consumer Expenditure Survey. Food and cloth-
ing represent 19% of debtors’ monthly expenses in our sample. The remaining
categories that define maintenance expenses include alimony payments,10 insur-
ance premia, medical expenditures, transportation expenses, and discretionary
expenses. Discretionary expenses include recreation and entertainment. These
expenses are arguably the least related to basic necessities and the most subject
to interpretation by the trustee. In our sample, however, discretionary expenses
account for approximately 2.5% of total monthly expenses on average.
We refer to a debtor as a repeat filer if he has filed for either Chapter 7
or Chapter 13 bankruptcy at least once prior to the current filing, since 1980.
In our sample, about 24% of the debtors are repeat filers and thus have already
been exposed to the experience of bankruptcy.
As expected, the most striking aspect of Chapter 13 filers relates to their
level of indebtedness. Specifically, their median total debt, including mortgages,
9About 87% of the debtors in our sample own their homes, which exceeds the 70% state
homeownership rate. That said, over one-fifth of homeowners who file for bankruptcy have
pending foreclosure lawsuits, much higher than the state average foreclosure rate of 0.35%.
10Compared to their peers, Chapter 13 filers in our sample are less likely to be married,
with 46% of the sample being recorded as married versus 54% for the state of Delaware.
Approximately 6% of the filers listed alimony as part of either their monthly income or
monthly expenses, thus suggesting a recent divorce.
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car loans, and credit card debt, is about $121,852, around six times the national
median, while their median total assets are $104,000, less than half of the corre-
sponding national median. Their median unsecured debt is $14,737, compared
to a national median of zero. Median arrears11 amount to $12,517. Together,
total debt in default (henceforth, total debt) for the median filer - arrears as
well as unsecured debt - amounts to approximately to the debtor’s annual gross
income. Specifically, the debtor with the median income earns $31,284 and the
debtor with the median total debt in default owes $30,834 in past-due debt. By
contrast, the debtor with the median total debt, including mortgages, car loans,
and credit card debt, owes about $121,852. The large difference is due to the
fact that some of the debt is not in default.
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the debtor characteristics we use
in our analysis. As can be seen from this table, monthly rent or mortgage
payments average a little under $850 a month, which amounts to about 31% of
monthly income. For about 8.5% of filers, medical debt constitutes over 10% of
their total debt in default.12 About a quarter of filers have above-state-median-
income at the time of filing. Moreover, on average, the debtors in our sample
have been in their current job for about five months. A little over 1% of the
filers did not hire an attorney. Those who did hired experienced attorneys in the
sense that their attorneys handled, on average, 94 cases in our sample. Finally,
the majority of the filers proposed long repayment plans (over four years), with
the proposed recovery rates over 65%.
11Arrears are missed payments that are past due on a (secured) loan. This is particularly
relevant for mortgage debt in the case of consumer bankruptcy. For secured debt, the part of
the debt that is in default is only the arrears.
12We calculate medical debts by flagging keywords such as “health,”“medical,”or “Lab-
corp,”that are listed for either the debt type or the associated creditor.
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To sum up, Chapter 13 filers in our sample tend to earn noticeably less
than average and are very heavily indebted. These observations are broadly
consistent with previous findings in the literature (see, for example, Domowitz
and Sartain (1999); Nelson (1999), and Fay, Hurst, and White (2002)).
3.4.2.2 Outcomes under Chapter 13
Two of the key outcomes of the personal bankruptcy process are creditors’
recovery rate and debtors’ ability to obtain a discharge. These outcomes depend
crucially on the length of plans that are chosen by debtors and whether these
plans are confirmed13 by the trustee. Hence, this paper focuses on these four
quantifiable aspects of Chapter 13.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate noteworthy aspects of proposed Chapter 13
plans in our sample. First, proposed plan lengths in Figure 1 are nearly bimodal,
with the majority of filers proposing either three-year or five-year plans. In what
follows, we will refer to plans shorter than four years as three-year plans and
the plans longer than four years as five-year plans.
The fact that a large fraction (84%) of the debtors propose five-year plans
is not surprising given that it often takes at least three years for filers to repay
arrears in full.
Second, there exists considerable variation in proposed creditor recovery
rates. As shown in Figure 3.2a, the majority of filers propose to repay at least
half of their total debt. The mean and median proposed recovery rates are
13Cases that are not confirmed are either converted to Chapter 7 or dismissed. Given the
small number of Chapter 7 conversions in our sample, we do not formally distinguish between
dismissal and chapter conversion in our analysis, even though a case that is converted to
Chapter 7 may eventually be discharged under that chapter.
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close to 66 cents and 60 cents on the dollar, respectively. Around 20% of filers
propose to pay their creditors back in full.
Third, as illustrated in Figure 3.2b, these recovery rates are strikingly
lower than those implied by the proposed plans. An important reason for the
discrepancy is that many debtors in bankruptcy end up not carrying out their
plans in full, either because they are dismissed by the trustee at a later stage or
because they voluntarily exit Chapter 13 before completing their plans. Accord-
ingly, the distribution of actual recovery rates looks very different, depending
on whether debtors completed Chapter 13 and were successfully discharged or
not. This is shown in Figure 3.3a. Furthermore, Figure 3.3b illustrates that
the proposed plan length also matters somewhat for the distribution of recovery
rates. Interestingly, although their average recovery rates are similar, debtors
that propose five-year plans are associated with a lower median recovery rate
than those that propose three-year plans. Specifically, the actual median re-
covery rates are 15% for the debtors with five-year plans versus 19% for the
debtors with three-year plans. One possible reason is that debtors who seek to
smooth their payments over longer periods could be the ones in greater financial
distress.
The average recovery rate for the creditors is 29%, with a median recovery
rate of 14%. The mean and median recovery rates conditional on the debtor
being discharged are 59% and 55%, respectively.14 This recovery rate is the
weighted average of the recovery rates of the unsecured and secured creditors.
14Chapter 13 recovery rates are necessarily zero for cases that are dismissed without con-
firmation.
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The mean recovery rate on unsecured debt is 17% while the median is 0%. Con-
ditional on discharge, the mean and median recovery rates on unsecured debt
are 38% and 25%, respectively. By contrast, the mean recovery rate on secured
debt is 49% while the median is 39%. By law, the recovery rate on secured
debt conditional on discharge must be 100%. The unconditional recovery rate
on secured claims is, however, lower than 100% for two reasons. First, when
the debtor does not obtain a discharge in Chapter 13, he does not necessarily
pay his secured creditors in full. Second, for secured debt other than mortgages
(for example, car loans), it is possible that the value of the claim is reduced
during the bankruptcy proceedings through cram-down. Although we do not
have the data on cram-down, we do not expect the recovery rates we report to
be too different from the actual recovery rates since most of the secured debt is
mortgage debt, which cannot be crammed down.
The descriptive statistics for the variables we just discussed as well as the
remaining outcomes are summarized in Table 3.3. As can be seen, close to 20%
of the cases in our sample are dismissed without ever obtaining the confirmation
of a plan, and only 55% of the confirmed plans are carried out to completion.
In summary, creditor recovery rates are considerably lower than those that are
first proposed. In addition, more than half of the debtors fail to obtain the
financial fresh start potentially afforded by the bankruptcy law. A natural
question is this: what debtor characteristics, or other aspects of Chapter 13,
are associated with these outcomes? To answer this question, the next section
builds a structural model of Chapter 13 bankruptcy.
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3.5 The Model
In this section, we model the behavior of debtors while they are in Chap-
ter 13 bankruptcy, taking as given trustees’ decision rules. We do not explic-
itly model the creditors’ problem since they don’t actively participate in the
bankruptcy process.
Our analysis begins with a debtor’s decision to file for bankruptcy under
Chapter 13. We let F ∈ {0, 1} denote the debtor’s decision to file for Chapter
13 bankruptcy, where F = 1 if and only if the debtor files for Chapter 13. In
order to be able to discharge his debts, the debtor must propose a repayment
plan, have it confirmed by the court, and carry it out in full. The payoff of
the debtor depends on the payments P he makes in Chapter 13 and whether or
not he obtains a discharge. We let D ∈ {0, 1} denote the discharge outcome,
where D = 1 if and only if a discharge in Chapter 13 is obtained. The payoff
from discharge is normalized to zero, and the payoff from exiting Chapter 13
without a discharge is given by V (Z), where Z denotes the predetermined debtor
characteristics at the time of filing for bankruptcy.15 We assume that the payoff
of the debtor is additively separable over payments and the discharge outcome
and that it is given by u(P,D) = −P + (1−D)V (Z).
Since the law requires all of the debtor’s excess income to be applied to
the repayment plan, he has little say over per-period plan payments, and these
are treated as exogenous. As discussed in the previous section, discretionary
expenses account for a negligible fraction of the monthly expenses. As such, we
15Since payments (if any) made outside Chapter 13 are not available, the payoff from options
that do not involve Chapter 13 must be estimated.
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assume the monthly payment amount is exogenously given by the excess income,
denoted by X, and the debtor’s choice regarding the plan consists solely of its
length. We assume the debtor can propose either a three-year (short-term) plan
or a five-year (long-term) plans and we denote the plan length by L.16
Once a plan is proposed, a trustee must decide whether or not to confirm
the proposed plan. We assume that the trustee is nonstrategic and that his deci-
sion rule is exogenous, which the debtor takes as given. In addition, we assume
that the decision rule is stochastic. This captures the idea that the interpre-
tation of the bankruptcy law is not entirely unambiguous, and the trustee has
some leeway in the interpretation of its provisions. How the trustee interprets
the ambiguous provisions is unobservable to the debtor. We let C ∈ {0, 1} de-
note the confirmation outcome, where C = 1 if and only if the plan is confirmed.
At the time the trustee makes the decision to confirm the case or not, he ob-
serves the plan length L and the debtor characteristics Z, and his confirmation
decision rule is characterized by the probability Pr(C|L).17
If the plan is confirmed, then the debtor starts making payments accord-
ing to the plan. In particular, he is expected to pay his excess income X in
each period t ∈ {1, . . . , L}. However, his excess income may change during
bankruptcy due to unexpected shocks.18 Specifically, we assume the existence
of an additive shock η ∈ R to excess income. In addition, we assume the timing
16While this assumption is made for simplicity, it is consistent with the observed distribution
of proposed plan lengths being highly bimodal around these two values (recall Figure 3.1).
17In our estimation, we allow this probability to depend on the debtor characteristics Z as
well. We suppress this dependency in our notation.
18For example, once a plan is confirmed, a debtor may switch employment, gain additional
income in the form of inheritance, or obtain access to refinancing on secured debt. These
changes can in principle be observed by the trustee, but they are not documented and therefore
are unavailable to us.
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of this shock is random and given by τ ∈ [0, L].
We assume that once the shocks to excess income are realized, the trustee
reevaluates the plan in light of the changes to the excess income and thus to the
per-period payment amount and therefore to the total payments. Specifically,
the total plan payments are now given by Xτ + (L− τ)(X + η). As before, we
take the trustee’s decision rule as exogenous and stochastic. We let S ∈ {0, 1}
denote the trustee’s reevaluation outcome, where S = 1 if and only if the trustee
dismisses the case. At the time the trustee makes the decision to dismiss the case
or not, he observes the shock η to excess income and its timing τ in addition to
the plan length L and the debtor characteristics Z. We let Pr(S|L, η, τ) denote
the probability that characterizes the dismissal decision rule by the trustee.19
Even if a plan is not dismissed by the trustee at τ , the debtor may decide to
voluntarily exit Chapter 13 bankruptcy without a discharge. We let E ∈ {0, 1}
denote the debtor’s decision to exit Chapter 13, where E = 1 if and only if the
debtor voluntarily exits Chapter 13 following the realization of the shock to his
excess income.20
Figure 3.4 summarizes the timing of events. First, the debtor chooses F .
If F = 1, then the debtor chooses L. Given L, the confirmation outcome C is
realized. If C = 1, the shocks η and τ are realized followed by the realization of
the dismissal outcome S. If S = 0, then the debtor chooses E. The decisions
F, L, and E together with the realizations of random variables C, S, η, and τ
19As before, in our estimation, we allow this probability to depend on the debtor charac-
teristics Z as well.
20Note that this decision resembles the decision to file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in the first
place. Since in our data set we observe only people who chose to file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy,
the debtor’s decision to exit Chapter 13 or plays an important role in our identification.
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determine whether the debtor obtains a discharge D, as well as the payments
P made in Chapter 13 bankruptcy. We explain this next.
3.5.1 Discharge and Payment Outcomes under Chapter
13
If F = 0, then the debtor obtains no discharge, and the payments in
Chapter 13 are zero, i.e., D = 0 and P = 0. If F = 1, then there are four cases:
(i) If C = 0, then the plan is not confirmed, the case is terminated with-
out a discharge, and the creditors do not collect anything in Chapter 13.
Consequently D = 0 and P = 0 in this case.
(ii) If C = 1 and S = 1, then the case is dismissed after the shocks to debtor’s
excess income are realized, and again the debtor fails to obtain a discharge
D = 0. In this case, the payments in Chapter 13 consist of the payments
made up to the realization of the shock to excess income at time τ , that
is, P = Xτ .
(iii) If C = 1, S = 0, and E = 1, then the case is not dismissed at time τ but
the debtor decides to exit the bankruptcy voluntarily. In this case, too,
we have D = 0 and P = Xτ .
(iv) If C = 1, S = 0, and E = 0, then the debtor decides to remain in
bankruptcy and his payments are modified to X + η. Because he already
paid X per year until time τ , and he pays X + η per year from τ to L,
and because he does not need to pay more than what he owes, the total
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payment in this case is P = min{Xτ +(X+η)(L− τ), B}, where B is the
total debt at the time of filing for bankruptcy.21 In this case, the debtor
obtains a discharge, and so D = 1.
Note that, the variables F , L and E are determined as the solution to the
debtor’s dynamic optimization problem. We next discuss how these variables
are determined.
3.5.2 The Debtor’s Problem
In this section, we characterize the debtor’s optimal choices F̂ , L̂, and Ê
using backward induction. First, consider the debtor’s choice of Ê at time τ after
his excess income becomes X + η. If the debtor decides to exit bankruptcy, his
utility is given by−Xτ+V (Z ′), where Z ′ reflects the debtor’s new characteristics
at time τ , after taking into account the reduction in his debt due to the payments
he has already made, and his new excess income, taking into account the shock
η it received. If the debtor decides to remain in bankruptcy, his utility is given
by −min{Xτ + (X + η)(L− τ), B}. As such, Ê = 0 if and only if −min{Xτ +
(X + η)(L− τ), B} ≥ −Xτ + V (Z ′).22
Next consider the debtor’s choice of plan length. This choice has two
consequences. First, it affects the probability that the plan will be confirmed.
Second, it affects the payoff conditional on the plan being confirmed. Let V (L)
21As mentioned earlier, the trustee collects a 6% fee from the total payments. To account
for this, we adjust the total debt amount.
22We assume that the debtor remains in bankruptcy when indifferent. Under the assump-
tions we make on the distribution of η in the next section, this is a zero probability event.
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denote this conditional payoff.23 Formally, we have
V (L) = Eη,τ [Pr(S = 1|L, η, τ)[−Xτ + V (Z
′)]
+ Pr(S = 0|L, η, τ)[max{−min{Xτ + (X + η)(L− τ), B},−Xτ + V (Z ′)}].
(3.1)
The debtor’s choice of plan length must maximize his expected utility, i.e.,
L̂ ∈ argmax
L∈{3,5}
Pr(C = 1|L)V (L) + (1− Pr(C = 1|L))V (Z). (3.2)
Finally, the debtor’s choice of filing must be optimal. Assuming that the
debtor files for Chapter 13 when indifferent, we have F̂ = 1 if and only if
Pr(C = 1|L̂)V (L̂) + (1 − Pr(C = 1|L̂))V (Z) ≥ V (Z) or, equivalently, if and
only if V (L̂) ≥ V (Z).
We now turn to our empirical specification.
3.6 Econometric Specification
3.6.1 Likelihood Function
The solution of the optimization problem just discussed serves as the in-
put into estimating the parameters of the model given data on choices made
by the debtors and the confirmation and discharge outcomes. As mentioned
earlier, for each individual in the data, we observe the choice of plan length L̂,
23Of course, this payoff depends on the debtor characteristics Z as well, which we suppress.
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discharge outcome D, confirmation outcome C, and the recovery rate of their
creditors, which is equivalent to observing the payments P . The contribution
to the likelihood function of each debtor in our sample is therefore equal to the
probability of observing (L̂, C, P,D) conditional on the vector of (exogenous)
debtor characteristics Z, and the model’s parameters β.24 Given the optimiza-
tion decisions faced by debtors under Chapter 13, the likelihood of each debtor
can be written as
Pr(L̂, C, P,D|Z, β) = Pr(L̂|Z, β) Pr(C|L̂;Z, β) Pr(P,D|C, L̂;Z, β). (3.3)
The sample likelihood is the product of the probabilities in (3.3) over all the
debtors in the data set. The remainder of this section addresses each of the
components on the right-hand side of (3.3), suppressing the conditioning on Z
and β.
Although the choice of plan length is deterministic for the debtor, it is
probabilistic from our view since we do not have the same information the
debtor has. A debtor’s health or educational status, for instance, may affect
the probability of a plan being confirmed, which in turn affects the choice of plan
length. To reconcile any potential discrepancy between the model’s predictions
and observed plan length choices, we allow for the fact that the debtor evaluates
the probability Pr(C = 1|L) of confirmation of the proposed plan L using
information that is unavailable to us. We let εL denote a multiplicative error
term that lets us differentiate between the debtors’ probability assessment of
24The expected payoff from filing under Chapter 13 is also endogenous in the model. As
explained later in this section, the vector of endogenous events therefore implicitly takes into
account the fact that all debtors in our sample have chosen to file under that chapter.
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initial plan confirmation and the analogous evaluation made by us. Hence, the
true conditional probability of confirmation is given by
Pr(C = 1|L, εL) = Q(C = 1|L)εL, (3.4)
where Q(C = 1|L) reflects our assessment of initial plan confirmation and is
parameterized below. We assume that εL is distributed with a cumulative dis-
tribution function G(εL|L) with support EL. (The fact that the probability
of confirmation lies in [0, 1] imposes restrictions on EL. We discuss these re-
strictions explicitly in the next section.) Although the debtor’s estimate of the
confirmation probability of his proposed plan uses more information than is
available to us, there is no a priori reason why our estimate of Pr(C = 1|L)
should be biased. Therefore, we require that E(εL) = 1 ∀L, which immediately
implies that
Pr(C = 1|L) = E[Pr(C = 1|L, εL)] = Q(C = 1|L). (3.5)
From (3.2) and (3.5), it follows that
Q(C = 1|L̂)εL̂V (L̂) + (1−Q(C = 1|L̂))εL̂V (Z)
≥ Q(C = 1|L)εLV (L) + (1−Q(C = 1|L)εL)V (Z)
(3.6)
for all L 6= L̂. Since this is trivially satisfied when L = L̂. There are three cases
to consider:
(i) If V (L̂) < V (Z), then Pr(L̂) = 0. This is because the expected payoff
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V (L̂) from filing under Chapter 13 is endogenous in the model, and for the
debtor to be observed in the data set, we must have V (L̂) ≥ V (Z).
(ii) If V (L) < V (Z) and V (L̂) ≥ V (Z), the left-hand side of (3.6) is at
least as large as V (Z) and the right-hand side of (3.6) is less than V (Z). Thus
(3.6) is always satisfied regardless of εL̂ and εL, implying Pr(L̂) = 1.
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This completes the derivation of Pr(C|L̂) and Pr(L̂), the first two terms
on the right-hand side of (3.3). We now turn to the derivation of the last term,
i.e., the derivation of Pr(P,D|C, L̂), making use of the discussion in Section
3.5.1.
First, consider the case when C = 0. In this case, we have




1 if P = 0 and D = 0,
0 otherwise.
(3.9)
Next, consider the case C = 1. Note that, in this case, the payment P and
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the discharge outcome D depend on the realization of the random variables η
and τ . Since we do not observe the realization of these variables, we integrate
them out:
Pr(P,D|C = 1, L̂) = Eη,τ{Pr(P,D|C = 1, L̂, η, τ)}. (3.10)
When C = 1 and D = 0, there are two possibilities. Either S = 1, which
happens with probability Pr(S = 1|L̂, η, τ), or S = 0 and E = 1, which happens
with probability Pr(S = 0|L̂, η, τ) when
−min{Xτ + (X + η)(L̂− τ), B} < −Xτ + V (Z ′). (3.11)
Although we do not observe S and E per se, in both of these cases, we must
have P = Xτ and D = 0. Since we know the excess income X, observing the
total payment P allows us to infer the realized value of τ . Substituting it in
(3.11), we obtain


















−min{P + (X + η)(L̂−
P
X




where fτ denotes the density function of τ and 1(.) is an indicator function that
takes the value 1 when the statement in parentheses is true.25
Finally, when C = 1 and D = 1, we must have S = 0 and E = 0, which
25Note that, as discussed earlier, Z ′ depends on η and τ .
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happens with probability Pr(S = 0|L̂, η, τ) when
−min{Xτ + (X + η)(L̂− τ), B} ≥ −Xτ + V (Z ′). (3.13)
In this case, we observe full debt repayment if and only ifXτ+(X+η)(L̂−τ) ≥ B
or, alternatively, η ≥ B−XL̂
(L̂−τ)
. Therefore,
Pr(P = B,D = 1|C = 1, L̂) = Eη,τ
{
Pr(S = 0|L̂, η, τ)
1
(
−min{Xτ + (X + η)(L̂− τ), B} ≥ −Xτ + V (Z ′)






By contrast, when we observe less than full payment, i.e., for P < B, we must
have P = Xτ + (X + η)(L̂ − τ) and consequently η = P−XL̂
L̂−τ
. Therefore, for
P < B, we have






















In order to maximize the likelihood function (3.3), several objects must
first be parameterized, taking into account the restrictions implied by both our
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model and the econometric specification. These objects relate to the conditional
probability of initial plan confirmation, Q(C|L,Z), the probability of dismissal
after the shocks η and τ are realized, Pr(S = 1|L, η, τ, Z), the payoff associated
with options outside Chapter 13, V (Z), the density functions that govern the
shocks η and τ , fη(η|L,Z) and fτ (τ |L,Z), respectively, and the distribution of
εL, G(εL|L,Z).
We assume Q(C|L,Z) is specified as a logistic function:










+ βc3ratio arrears debt+ β
c
4ratio rent mortgage inc
+ βc5medical debt+ β
c
6job tenure
+ βc7inc above med+ β
c
8repeat filer
+ βc9attorney exp+ β
c
10p recovery rate,
and the βCi ’s are parameters to be estimated.
26
We next discuss the parametrization ofG(εL|L,Z). We assumeG(εL|L,Z)
26All the observed variables are defined in Table 3.4.
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is specified by a power distribution, i.e.,
G(εL|L,Z) = [εLQ(C = 1|L,Z)]
ϕ(L,Z). (3.17)
for εL ∈ EL. To ensure that the conditional probability P (C = 1|L,Z) of plan
confirmation lies in [0, 1], the support of εL must be bounded. In addition, recall






. These restrictions, therefore, tie down both the shape
and the support of G(εL|L,Z).
We assume Pr(S = 1|L, η, τ, Z) is also specified as a logistic function,
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We estimate the payoff associated with options that do not involve Chapter 13
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as
V (Z) = βD1 arrears+ β
D
2 unsecured debt+ β
D
3 assets. (3.19)
This specification allows for the possibility that debtors’ payoff outside Chapter
13 decreases with both the amount of debt they carry and the amount of assets
that would have otherwise been protected under Chapter 13.
We assume that τ has a power distribution with density




for τ ∈ [0, L]. (3.20)















The family of distribution functions we choose has enough flexibility to capture
any potential effects of a debtor’s plan length choice and characteristics on
the likelihood that his case will be confirmed and discharged, as well as the
determination of his implied recovery rate.
3.7 Results
Tables 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 present the maximum likelihood estimates of the
model’s parameters. Specifically, Table 3.5 presents the maximum likelihood
estimates of the parameters of the confirmation probability Q(C = 1|L,Z) given
by (3.16), Table 3.6 presents the estimates of the parameters of the dismissal
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probability Pr(S = 1|L, η, τ, Z) given by equation (3.18), and Table 3.7 presents
the estimates of the parameters of the outside payoff V (Z) given by (3.19), the
distribution of the shock η given by (3.21), and the distribution of its timing τ
given by (3.20).
These estimates allow us to directly answer two questions of interest. First,
what debtor characteristics significantly influence the likelihood that a Chapter
13 bankruptcy plan will be confirmed by the bankruptcy court? In a related
vein, do these characteristics still matter at a later bankruptcy stage as the
debtor’s circumstances have changed and the trustee reevaluates the plan? With
the answers to these questions, we can indirectly infer how particular debtor
attributes affect creditor recovery rates.
Table 3.5 indicates that, all else equal, long-term plans are more likely to
be initially approved by the trustee than are short-term plans. Longer plans
typically imply higher proposed recovery rates in our sample. Even after con-
trolling for the proposed recovery rate, the probability of a proposed plan being
confirmed is higher when the proposed plan length is longer.
In addition, as can be seen from Table 3.6, longer plans make it less likely
that the plan will be dismissed later on in the bankruptcy.
Recall that a Chapter 13 plan must propose to pay all arrears in order
for a plan to be confirmed and must be able to pay them all in order to be
discharged. As a result, having considerable arrears in relation to total debt
in default decreases the confirmation probability and increases the dismissal
probability.
Having a high housing expense relative to monthly income decreases the
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confirmation probability and increases the dismissal probability. This is con-
sistent with our conversations with the Chapter 13 Trustee for the District of
Delaware, who emphasized the importance of fairness and feasibility as the most
important criteria for confirming plans and allowing them to continue. Recall
that the bankruptcy law requires the debtors to pay all of their excess income
to the Chapter 13 plan, and excess income is calculated after taking out all
expenses, including the housing expense. A high housing expense relative to
monthly income may be viewed as a luxurious consumption at the expense of
creditors and thus not fair. In addition, a high housing expense makes the
debtor more vulnerable to negative shocks to excess income, making it more
difficult for him to pay the arrears in full and therefore less likely to pass the
feasibility test.
A longer job tenure suggests some degree of stability in the debtor’s finan-
cial situation. As a result, the plan is more likely to be feasible when the debtor
has a longer job tenure. Consistent with this, longer job tenure increases the
probability that the trustee will confirm the plan and decreases the dismissal
probability.
The fact that a debtor is a repeat filer decreases the probability that his
plan will be confirmed. There are two main reasons for why a debtor might
be a repeat filer. First, a debtor whose case is not initially confirmed has little
chance of seeing his financial situation improve without outside help and, by
law, he must wait at least 180 days before attempting a new filing. A repeat
filer, therefore, could simply be someone who is unable to extricate himself from
a dire financial situation on his own. Second, a repeat filer might be someone
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who abuses the bankruptcy system by periodically filing for bankruptcy and
discharging his debt. One would think that a debtor who is in the first category
is more likely to file for bankruptcy as soon as that option becomes available
to him, whereas a debtor in the second category is more likely to strategically
acquire debt first and delay bankruptcy filing. In our data set, 88% of repeat
filers had their previous filings around 180 days prior to the current bankruptcy
filing and hence fall in the first category. For the rest of the filers, we are
unable to identify the reasons for their repeat filing behavior. It is possible
that the same nonstrategic cause (for example, health problems) is the reason
for multiple bankruptcy filings. Although we do not observe the cause for the
repeat filing, the trustee has access to much more information. Regardless
of the cause, being a repeat filer reduces the likelihood of confirmation. One
possibility is that debtors in the first category are unlikely to propose feasible
plans, whereas debtors in the second category are unlikely to propose fair plans.
Having an experienced attorney helps to have a plan confirmed, but it
also increases the probability of dismissal after the debtor’s financial situation
changes. Recall that we measure attorney experience by the number of cases in
the sample associated with the attorney representing the debtor. One would ex-
pect that more experienced attorneys have higher demand for their services and
better bargaining power regarding their fee structure. In the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Delaware, the fee charged by an attorney for a Chapter
13 case must be approved by the bankruptcy court. The structure of the fee,
however, is not defined by the law. In particular, the attorneys can ask to be
paid prior to or after filing the case and can stipulate whether the fee is to be
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paid directly by the debtor or by the Chapter 13 trustee. The court then ap-
proves a fee it finds to be reasonable. If more experienced attorneys charge fees
that are mostly front-loaded, then they may prefer to devote less of their time
to cases that are already confirmed and have less time to finish, since less fees
can then be collected. As such, it is not surprising that having an experienced
attorney is helpful initially but may backfire later on in the case.
Notably, Table 3.6 also indicates that the trustee puts significant weight
on information regarding changes in the debtor’s conditions after initial confir-
mation of his plan. The likelihood of dismissal falls with τ , since the longer
a debtor has stuck by his initial plan before facing a change in circumstances,
the more he has already contributed to this plan. Similarly, the likelihood of
dismissal falls with η, since increases in excess disposable income raise creditors’
recovery rate.
The parameters governing the distributions of η and τ are reported in
Table 3.7 and are all statistically significant at the 1% level. We estimate that,
on average, debtors who file for short-term plans are less likely to experience a
negative shock to their excess incomes during bankruptcy, although the variation
in experiences for those debtors is considerable. Specifically, the excess income
of debtors with short-term plans reduces by $464 while the excess income of
debtors with long-term plans reduces by $704, on average. While these amounts
are small, they do not imply that the actual recovery rate will be close to the
proposed recovery rate. The standard deviation of η conditional on a short-term
plan is $3,217, while the standard deviation conditional on a long-term plan is
$3,395; as a result, there is considerable variation in shocks to excess income.
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Many debtors for whom there is a substantial negative shock to excess income
see their plans dismissed by the trustee in the second stage. Thus, for those
debtors, the recovery rate is in fact close to zero.
Finally, Table 3.7 indicates that the payoff obtained outside Chapter 13
decreases with the updated level of arrears and assets held at the time of exit,
while it does not depend on the level of unsecured debt at the time of exit.
This is because once a filer is no longer eligible under Chapter 13, his assets
are no longer protected and thus secured creditors can seize property to recover
what they are owed. Secured creditors are more likely to aggressively seek
a filer’s assets when the assets are more valuable and the secured debt (i.e.,
arrears) is higher. By contrast, unsecured creditors have little power outside
the bankruptcy system.
3.7.1 Effects of Debtor Characteristics on the Distribu-
tion of Recovery Rates
The second question of interest in this section relates to the effects of spe-
cific debtor characteristics on Chapter 13 outcomes and, in particular, on the
distribution of creditor recovery rates.27 For example, given that we have identi-
fied being a repeat filer as a significant variable in the trustee’s confirmation and
dismissal decisions, what are the implications for the distribution of recovery
rates? In answering this question, the lens provided by the particular model at
hand is crucial since the distribution of the recovery rates depends not only on
27In our model and in our empirical specification, we focused on the payment P . We present
our results below in terms of the recovery rates to make them comparable across debtors with
different levels of debt.
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the exogenous characteristics of debtors, but also on the endogenous decisions
they make. The model allows us to create a data set of artificial debtors that
resembles the raw data in all dimensions but one, say, being a repeat filer, by
bootstrapping from observed debtor characteristics (outside of being a repeat
filer). Having created these artificial debtors, we can then explore, using the
estimated model, how the distribution of recovery rates changes depending on
whether, in addition, these debtors are assumed to be repeat filers.28
Figure 3.5a illustrates how the distribution of creditor recovery rates changes
depending on one’s experience with bankruptcy. We can see that repeat filers
are generally associated with lower recovery rates, with 50% of debtors repaying
between 0% to 20% of their debt. In contrast, only 41% of debtors are asso-
ciated with the lowest recovery rates among first-time filers. More generally,
creditors recover 38% of what they are owed on average from first-time filers,
but only 31% from repeat filers. Similarly, Figure 3.5b depicts changes in the
distribution of recovery rates depending on the amount of arrears debtors hold
as a fraction of their total debt in default. Debtors for whom arrears constitute
25% of their debt (arrears being equal to 25% of debt corresponds to the 25th
percentile in the raw data) are associated with a 35% average recovery rate,
and 44% of those debtors repay between 0% and 20% of their debt. In contrast,
when debtors hold arrears equal to 69% of their debt (arrears being equal to
69% of debt corresponds to the 75th percentile in the raw data), the average
recovery rate falls to 25%, while the measure of debtors repaying less than 20%
increases by 16 percentage points.29
28See Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo (2003) for alternative applications of this procedure in
a political economy context and in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy environment, respectively.
29More specifically, we first calculate the 25th percentile and the 75th percentile of the
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Finally, Figure 3.5c illustrates the extent to which the distribution of re-
covery rates changes conditional on debtors having a given ratio of excess (an-
nual) income to debt. This measure essentially determines what debtors can
potentially repay depending on the plan length they choose. Debtors in the
lowest 25th percentile, those with excess income representing 8% of their debt,
repay 23% of what they owe on average. Debtors in the highest 25th percentile,
those whose excess income represents 19% of their debt, are associated with a
significantly higher 42% average recovery rate.30
Figure 3.6 provides lower and upper bounds in terms of what creditors
can expect to recover in Chapter 13 by considering extreme debtor types based
on the experiments carried out in Figure 3.5. The distribution of recovery rates
related to “bad types” conditions on being a repeat filer, having high arrears,
and having low excess income relative to debt. This “worst case” scenario gen-
erates an average recovery rate of only 15%, with a substantial 74% of debtors
repaying less than 20% of their debt and only 3% repaying more than 80%. At
the other extreme, the distribution of recovery rates for “good types” is con-
ditional on being a first-time filer, having low arrears, and having high excess
income relative to debt. This distribution is associated with a much higher 51%
average recovery rate, with only 31% of the debtors repaying between 0% and
20% of their debt and 34% of debtors repaying at least 80%.
distribution for the ratio of arrears to debt in default. We then bootstrap a data set of
artificial debtors from the raw data such that all characteristics of debtors resemble the raw
data while the values for the ratio of arrears to debt is set to the 25th percentile of the
distribution in the raw data. Next, we repeat this procedure and construct another data
set of artificial debtors, where the values for the ratio of arrears to debt are set to the 75th
percentile of the distribution in the raw data.
30The method for constructing the data with artificial debtors is similar to that used in
creating Figures 3.5a and 3.5b.
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3.7.2 Importance of Shocks in Bankruptcy
We saw in Table 3.6 that the shock η and its timing τ play a significant
role in the trustee’s reevaluation of previously confirmed cases.
To quantify their importance, we provide in Table 3.8 a comparison of
Chapter 13 outcomes between our benchmark model and the model estimated
without latent variables η and τ . In the absence of shocks after a plan con-
firmation, we find that debtors are less willing to commit to long-term plans.
Debtors with unfavorable characteristics tend to file for longer plans to increase
their chances of confirmation and decrease the probability of dismissal. How-
ever, with the elimination of the dismissal process later in the plan, fewer debtors
feel the need to file for long plans. The confirmation rate stays unchanged even
if the ratio of debtors who file for longer plans declines. The reason is that
the composition of debtor characteristics conditional on plan length is differ-
ent compared to the benchmark model. Without shocks, the negative effect on
confirmation rates coming from the fact that fewer debtors file for long plans
counteracts the positive effect resulting from the more favorable characteristics
of short-plan filers. Furthermore, without being affected by changing circum-
stances while in bankruptcy, all debtors with confirmed plans are eventually
discharged. We find that 81% of debtors in our sample are discharged absent
shocks as opposed to only 46% in the benchmark model. Furthermore, absent
any income shocks, debtors are able to repay on average 48% of their debt as
opposed to 29% in the benchmark model. This finding arises, because without
shocks, all plans are carried out to completion. Therefore, aside from debtor
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characteristics that are observable at the time of filing, changes in debtors’ con-
ditions after the start of a bankruptcy procedure play a key role in governing
Chapter 13 outcomes.
3.7.3 Goodness of Fit
In order to gauge the fit of our model, we present figures that compare
its predictions for the distributions of endogenous variables with the analogous
empirical distributions in the data. Each figure focuses on a key aspect of
Chapter 13 bankruptcy: the distribution of plan length chosen by debtors, the
confirmation rate, the discharge rate, and the distribution of recovery rates. We









where f(.) denotes the empirical density function, or histogram, of a given
endogenous variable and f̂(.) is the corresponding maximum likelihood estimate
of the density function of that variable. N is the number of observations, and
K is the number of bins used in the histogram.
Figure 3.7, panel a shows a comparison of the distribution of plan length
chosen by debtors generated by the model (left columns) with the correspond-
ing distribution in the data (right columns). As indicated in the figure, the χ2
goodness-of-fit test does not reject the model at conventional significance levels.
Panels b and c of Figure 3.7 illustrate similar comparisons with respect to the
confirmation rate and the discharge rate. In both cases, the model is capable
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of reproducing the empirical distributions quite well, and the χ2 goodness-of-fit
tests cannot reject the model at conventional significance levels. Finally, we can
see from Figure 3.7, panel d, that the shape of the distribution of recovery rates
produced by the model closely matches that of the corresponding empirical dis-
tribution. The model slightly under-predicts the fraction of debtors associated
with relatively higher recovery rates, which implies a slightly lower average re-
covery rate than observed in the data. As in the other cases, however, the χ2
goodness-of-fit test does not reject the model at standard significance levels.
3.8 Policy Analysis
Recent changes in the bankruptcy law embodied in BAPCPA were pri-
marily intended to raise creditor recovery rates for subsets of debtors perceived
to be benefiting from too lenient a bankruptcy code. One such change now pro-
hibits all debtors with income above the state median from filing for short-term
plans. Specifically, the law states that “the applicable commitment period shall
be (...) not less than five years, if the current monthly income of the debtor and
the debtor’s spouse combined, when multiplied by 12, is not less than (...) the
median family income of the applicable state.”31 Using the structural model we
estimated, we now explore the quantitative effects of such a change on Chapter
13 outcomes.
31See 11 U.S.C § 1325(b)(4)(A)(ii).
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3.8.1 Requiring Five-Year Plans for Above-Median-Income
Debtors
Table 3.9 summarizes the effects of requiring debtors with above-state-
median-income to file for five-year plans. Note that, following the policy change,
debtors who had initially filed for three-term plans, but who no longer have that
option, may well decide not to file Chapter 13 altogether, rather than filing for
Chapter 13 and proposing a five-year plan. Put another way, and recalling
equation (3.1), debtors for whom V (L) ≥ V (Z) when L = 3 in the benchmark
model may well have V (L) < V (Z) when L = 5 if forced to make the higher
payments implied by a five-year plan. We find that this effect is somewhat
muted in this policy experiment, as only 1% of above-median-income debtors
choose to exit Chapter 13 following the policy change.
Interestingly, for the set of debtors targeted by the policy change, the main
finding is a minimal increase in creditor recovery rates without considerably
changing the discharge and confirmation rates. In other words, requiring the
above-median-income debtors to file for five-year plans makes neither a financial
fresh start more likely for that subset of debtors nor the creditors materially
better off. At first look, it is puzzling that the confirmation rates and the
discharge rates go down when these debtors are required to file five-year plans
in light of our estimation results, which indicate that five-year plans are more
likely to be confirmed and less likely to be dismissed. However, two additional
effects need to be taken into consideration. First, the debtors who opt out
of Chapter 13 as a result of this policy are likely to be the ones who are in
better financial condition and therefore, more likely to have confirmed plans
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prior to the implementation of the new policy. Once these debtors drop out
of Chapter 13, confirmation rates go down. Second, the debtors who file for
five-year plans are more likely to receive negative shocks to their excess income,
making dismissal more likely, and therefore discharge less likely.
We should also note that, although the policy change lowers the Chapter
13 filing rate by 1%for above-median-income debtors, the outcomes in the overall
sample are not materially affected. This follows from the fact that debtors whose
income exceeds the state median represent only 23% of the filers in our sample.
An important consideration under this policy provision is that, while more
debtors are being pushed into five-year plans, the analysis assumes that their
other characteristics remain unchanged. This simplifying assumption reflects a
limitation of our data. As a direction for future research, it would be ideal to
sample the general population and, given this sample, consider both bankruptcy
and chapter choices explicitly.32
32For now, this more challenging exercise remains beyond the scope of this paper. While
some existing data sets such as the Survey of Consumer Finances, the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics, and the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men provide us with financial and
income statements pertaining to the general U.S. population, the challenge lies in the collection
of data on bankruptcy filers, and more precisely Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 filers separately,
within that general population, as well as the resolution of their respective bankruptcy cases.
For this reason, the different policy experiments in this paper are conditional on the observed
distribution of the debtor characteristics.
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3.8.2 Imposing a Minimum Proposed Recovery Thresh-
old
Because the BAPCPA policy change targeted at above-median-income
debtors proved ineffective in raising their recovery rates, we explore an alterna-
tive policy experiment that instead requires these debtors to propose at least a
30% recovery rate in order to have their plan confirmed by the court. In other
words, we impose that all debtors with above-state-median-income propose at
least the observed mean recovery rate in our sample.
Table 3.10 suggests that, when confronted with this alternative policy
change, a considerable fraction of debtors (13%) now find it optimal not to file
under Chapter 13 in the first place. Accordingly, substantially fewer debtors
ultimately obtain a financial fresh start under Chapter 13; the discharge rate
falls, from 0.48 to 0.41, for this group of affected filers.
The average creditor recovery rate under this policy experiment falls slightly,
from 0.31 to 0.29, for the affected debtors. The latter result can be understood
in the following way. First, above-state-median-income debtors who were al-
ready proposing to repay at least 30 cents on the dollar see their fate (confirma-
tion, discharge, and repayment rates) essentially unchanged by the new policy.
Hence, any effect of the policy change on bankruptcy outcomes must come from
debtors who were initially proposing less than a 30% recovery rate. Second,
the latter debtors are precisely those associated with low Chapter 13 recovery
rates in the benchmark model; they tend to have high levels of arrears and
high levels of debt more generally (and therefore low ratios of excess income to
debt). Consequently, the fact that they are now opting out of Chapter 13 and
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are assigned zero (rather than small but positive) recovery rates, has very little
effect on overall repayment rates. Stated differently, the analysis suggests that
debtors associated with low proposed recovery rates simply opt out of Chapter
13 if required to propose a higher recovery rate. However, since these debtors
repay very little in the benchmark model, recovery rates for the overall targeted
population are left virtually unchanged. In the end, the model suggests that
the hypothetical minimum recovery rate policy studied here makes it more dif-
ficult for debtors to obtain a financial fresh start without necessarily increasing
creditor recovery rates.
3.8.3 Implications for Overall Recovery Rates
Thus far, our policy experiments have tracked bankruptcy outcomes, and
in particular creditor recovery rates, within Chapter 13 bankruptcy only. In
computing recovery rates, therefore, we did not particularly focus on debtors
who wound up outside Chapter 13 for one reason or another. For some policy
experiments, this is not necessarily a problem since the fraction of debtors who
opt out of Chapter 13 following a given policy change is small, as in the case of
BAPCPA. In other cases, however, as in the experiment that imposes a mini-
mum proposed recovery threshold to obtain confirmation of a case, the fraction
of debtors who chose not to file for Chapter 13 is sizable. In addition, recall
that some debtors are also dismissed out of Chapter 13 at a later bankruptcy
stage. In such cases, debtors may be able to file under Chapter 7 or simply
default on their loans. Since our focus in this paper is on Chapter 13, we model
the payoff outside Chapter 13 as an indirect utility.
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A question remains as to how overall recovery rates are affected by the
recovery rates outside Chapter 13. To be able to answer this question, we would
need to model what happens outside Chapter 13. Unfortunately, we do not
have the data to be able to estimate such a richer model, and to the best of our
knowledge, such micro data is not available. At a more aggregated level, Flynn,
Bermant, and Bakewell (2002) document that during the year ended June 30,
2002, in approximately 96% of Chapter 7 filings, the case closed without any
funds being collected by the trustee and distributed to creditors. In general,
studies report a 0% average return to creditors from Chapter 7 filers. Indeed,
this is what motivated BAPCPA to push debtors into Chapter 13 in the first
place.
Taking into account the possibility that the debtors in our data set can be
in better financial shape than those debtors considered in the above statistics,
Table 3.11 presents overall recovery rate calculations based on the assumption
that debtors outside Chapter 13 repay either 10% or 20% of their debts. The
table considers the experiment where above-state-median-income debtors must
propose at least a 30% recovery rate in order to have their case confirmed by the
court. Recall that in contrast to the BAPCPA experiment we considered, this
policy experiment was associated with a sizable fraction of debtors no longer
choosing to file under Chapter 13. The benchmark model in Table 3.11 refers
to the situation without the policy change, but is nevertheless relevant since,
even in that case, some debtors are either dismissed by the trustee or volun-
tarily exit Chapter 13 after initial confirmation. As expected, overall recovery
rates increase, both in the benchmark model and in the policy experiment,
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when debtors outside Chapter 13 repay positive amounts on their debts. This
increase, however, remains somewhat contained, even at the extreme where
debtors outside Chapter 13 repay 20 cents on the dollar. More importantly, as
in Table 3.10, the policy change is unable to yield a substantive increase, and
may even yield a decrease, relative to the higher recovery rates generated in the
benchmark model. As before, this result is driven by the fact that debtors who
opt out of Chapter 13 were repaying very little in the benchmark model.
3.9 Conclusion
From court dockets recorded in the state of Delaware between 2001 and
2002, we built and estimated a structural model of Chapter 13 bankruptcy. We
find that several factors significantly affect the distribution of creditor recovery
rates: whether debtors are first-time filers, their arrears at the time of filing,
and their income in excess of that required for basic maintenance. The analy-
sis further underscores the importance of changes in debtors’ conditions while
in bankruptcy in governing Chapter 13 outcomes, including debtors’ ability to
obtain a financial fresh start. Our model predicts that the more stringent provi-
sions of Chapter 13 in BAPCPA, in particular those that force subsets of debtors
to file for long-term plans, would not materially affect creditor recovery rates
and would not make discharge materially more likely for that subset of debtors.
The results are also true in the context of alternative policy experiments that
required bankruptcy plans to meet stricter standards in order to be confirmed
by the court.
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The analysis has an important caveat. Because of data limitations, we do
not model simultaneously households’ bankruptcy and chapter choice decisions.
At this point, the payoff that debtors achieve outside of Chapter 13 is cap-
tured by way of an estimated indirect utility. However, this modeling strategy
precludes a more detailed study of policy reforms that directly target chapter
choice decisions. We leave this work to future research.
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3.10 Tables





Converted to Chapter 7 52
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Standard Median Min Max
Deviation
Assets ($) 117,739 98,797 104,000 295 1,239,220
Assets/debt 4.42 4.79 3.28 0.02 55.46
Arrears ($) 15,492 12,517 11,000 30.43 132,012
Arrears/debt 0.48 0.29 0.46 0.001 1
Unsecured debt ($) 25,767 42,289 14,737 0 642,642
Excess income ($) 4,550 3,425.7 3,708 600 34,932
Medical debt (if exceeds 10% of total debt)∗ 0.08 0.28 0 0 1
Job tenure (years) 4.91 7.61 1 0 40
Income above median∗ 0.23 0.42 0 0 1
Repeat filer∗ 0.24 0.42 0 0 1
Attorney experience∗ (number of cases) 94.05 51.67 108 0 165
Monthly rent or mortgage payments ($) 845.75 431.25 760 2.5 4,299
Monthly rent or mortgage payment/monthly income 0.31 0.13 0.29 0.0009 1.06
Note: ∗ indicates dummy variables; zero attorney experience indicates that the filer did
not hire an attorney.
173
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics
Fraction of Three-Year Plans∗ 0.16
Confirmation Rate 0.81
Discharge Rate 0.44








∗Three-year plans are defined as plans less than or equal to 48 Months
Table 3.4: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
L The debtor’s choice of plan length: 3 or 5 years.
ratio asset debt Total assets as a fraction of debt in default at the time of filing.
ratio arrears debt Arrears accumulated on secured debt as a fraction of debt in default
at the time of filing.
ratio rent mortgage inc Monthly rent or mortgage payments as a fraction of monthly income.
medical debt Whether medical debts exceed 10% of total debt in default.
job tenure The debtor’s tenure in years in his current job.
(If the debtor is unemployed, this variable is equal to zero.)
inc above med Whether the debtor’s most recent annual income at the time of filing
is above the state median.
repeat filer Whether the debtor has previously filed for bankruptcy.
attorney exp Attorney experience in handling bankruptcy cases, measured as the
in-sample frequency.
eligible 7 Whether the debtor is eligible for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
p recovery rate The proposed recovery rate defined as total proposed payments over
total debt in default.
discharge recovery rate The recovery rate obtained upon discharge. It is calculated as total
payments over total debt in default, conditional on the trustee not
dismissing the debtor after the realization of shocks to excess income.
dismiss recovery rate The recovery rate obtained upon dismissal. It is calculated as the
ratio of total payments made by the debtor under the plan, prior to
the realization of the shocks to excess income, to total debt in default.
η Excess income shock.
τ Timing of the excess income shock.
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βc2 -0.015 assets as a fraction of debt in default at the time of filing.
(0.013)
βc3 -1.696
∗∗∗ arrears accumulated on secured debt.
(0.276)
βc4 -1.042
∗∗ rent or mortgage payments as a fraction of monthly income.
(0.492)





βc7 0.237 whether the debtor’s annual income is above the state median.
(0.181)
βc8 -0.388
∗∗ whether the debtor has previously filed for bankruptcy.
(0.165)
βc9 0.005
∗∗∗ attorney experience in handling bankruptcy cases.
(0.001)
βc10 0.083 proposed recovery rate.
(0.140)
∗ indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; ∗∗ indicates statistical significance at
the 5% level; and ∗∗∗ indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Table 3.6: Maximum Likelihood Estimates - Dismissal Probability









∗∗∗ assets as a fraction of debt in default at the time of filing.
(0.020)
βd3 3.916
∗∗∗ arrears accumulated on secured debt.
(0.447)
βd4 4.046
∗∗∗ rent or mortgage payments as a fraction of monthly income.
(0.830)
βd5 -6.326






∗∗∗ whether the debtor’s annual income is above the state median.
(0.263)
βd8 1.458
∗∗∗ whether the debtor has previously filed for bankruptcy.
(0.287)
βd9 0.006
∗∗∗ attorney experience in handling bankruptcy cases.
(0.002)
βd10 0.006 recovery rates to be obtained upon discharge.
(0.007)
βd11 -0.856
∗∗ recovery rates to be obtained upon dismissal.
(0.376)
βd12 -0.980
∗∗∗ dollar amount of the shock to excess income.
(0.337)
βd13 -1.078
∗∗∗ timing of the shock to excess income.
(0.090)
∗ indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; ∗∗ indicates statistical significance at
the 5% level; and ∗∗∗ indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
176













∗∗∗ parameter of the distribution of τ when proposed pay length is 3.
(0.027)
βτ5 0.315




∗∗∗ mean of the distribution of η when proposed pay length is 3.
(31.036)
βη1,3 3217.090
∗∗∗ standard deviation of the distribution of η when proposed pay length is 3.
(81.360)
βη0,5 -703.762
∗∗∗ mean of the distribution of η when proposed pay length is 5.
(20.572)
βη1,5 3395.419
∗∗∗ standard deviation of the distribution of η when proposed pay length is 5.
(47.959)
∗ indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; ∗∗ indicates statistical significance at
the 5% level; and ∗∗∗ indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
Table 3.8: Effects of Changes in Debtors’ Conditions
Model Model Without η and τ
Whole Sample
Plan Length
Fraction Proposing L = 3 0.22 0.32
Fraction Proposing L = 5 0.78 0.68
Confirmation Rate 0.81 0.81
Discharge Rate 0.42 0.81
Mean Recovery Rate 0.29 0.48
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Table 3.9: Implementing BAPCPA-Required 5-year Plans
Benchmark Model Experiment
Above-Median-Income Debtors
Fractions No Longer Filing 0 0.01
Plan Length
Fraction Proposing L = 3 0.24 0.00
Fraction Proposing L = 5 0.76 1.00
Confirmation Rate 0.85 0.84
Discharge Rate 0.48 0.47
Mean Recovery Rate 0.31 0.33
Whole Sample
Confirmation Rate 0.82 0.82
Discharge Rate 0.42 0.41
Mean Recovery Rate 0.28 0.29
Table 3.10: Imposing a 30% Recovery Rate Threshold
Benchmark Model Experiment
Above-Median-Income Debtors
Fraction No Longer Filing 0 0.13
Plan Length
Fraction Proposing L = 3 0.24 0.14
Fraction Proposing L = 5 0.76 0.73
Confirmation Rate 0.85 0.73
Discharge Rate 0.48 0.41
Mean Recovery Rate 0.31 0.29
Whole Sample
Confirmation Rate 0.82 0.80
Discharge Rate 0.42 0.40
Mean Recovery Rate 0.28 0.27
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Table 3.11: Imposing a 30% Recovery Rate Threshold - Outside Recovery
Outside Recovery Rate: 0.10 Outside Recovery Rate: 0.20
Benchmark Model Experiment Benchmark Model Experiment
Above-Median-Income Debtors
Fraction No Longer Filing 0 0.13 0 0.13
Initial Dismissal Rate 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.14
Dismissed after Confirmation 0.37 0.32 0.37 0.32
Mean Recovery Rate
Under Chapter 13 0.31 0.29 0.31 0.29
Overall 0.35 0.35 0.40 0.40
Whole Sample
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“A Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default,”
Econometrica, 75(6), 1525–1589.
Cogan, J. F. (1981): “Fixed Costs and Labor Supply,” Econometrica, 49(4),
945–964.
Connolly, H., and P. Gottschalk (2004): “Do Earnings Subsidies Affect
Job Choice?,” IZA Discussion Paper.
Decreuse, B., and P. Granier (2005): “Education, Mobility and Employ-
ers’ Monopsony Power: A Search-theoretic Analysis,” Labour, 19(3), 531–562.
Del Boca, D., C. Flinn, and M. Wiswall (2014): “Household Choices
and child development,” The Review of Economic Studies, 81(1), 137–185.
Dey, M., and C. Flinn (2005): “An Equilibrium Model of Health Insurance
Provision and Wage Determination,” Econometrica, 73, 571–627.
Diamond, P. A. (1971): “A Model of Price Adjustment,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 3(2), 156–168.
Diermeier, D., H. Eraslan, and A. Merlo (2003): “A Structural Model
of Government Formation,” Econometrica, 71(1), 27–70.
188
Domowitz, I., and R. L. Sartain (1999): “Determinants of the Consumer
Bankruptcy Decision,” The Journal of Finance, 54(1), 403–420.
Drozd, L. A., and J. B. Nosal (2008): “Competing for Customers: A Search
Model of the Market for Unsecured Credit,” .
Eckstein, Z., S. Ge, and B. Petrongolo (2006): “Job and Wage Mobility
in a Search Model with Non-Compliance (Exemptions) with the Minimum
Wage,” IZA Discussion Papers.
Eckstein, Z., and K. I. Wolpin (1989a): “Dynamic Labour Force Partic-
ipation of Married Women and Endogenous Work Experience,” The Review
of Economic Studies, 56(3), 375–390.
(1989b): “The Specification and Estimation of Dynamic Stochastic
Discrete Choice Models: A Survey,” Journal of Human resources, pp. 562–
598.
Eissa, N., and H. W. Hoynes (2006): “Behavioral Responses to Taxes:
Lessons from the EITC and Labor Supply,” in Tax Policy and the Economy,
Volume 20, pp. 73–110. The MIT Press.
Eissa, N., and H. W. Hoynes (2011): “Redistribution and Tax Expenditures:
The Earned Income Tax Credit,” National Tax Journal, 64(2, Part 2), 689–
730.
Eissa, N., and J. B. Liebman (1996): “Labor Supply Response to the Earned
Income Tax Credit,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(2), 605–637.
Elul, R., and N. Subramanian (2002): “Forum-Shopping and Personal
Bankruptcy,” Journal of Financial Services Research, 21(3), 233–255.
Fallick, B., and C. A. Fleischman (2004): “Employer-to-Employer Flows
in the US Labor Market: the Complete Picture of Gross Worker Flows,”
Federal Reserve Board Working Paper Series.
Fay, S., E. Hurst, and M. J. White (2002): “The Household Bankruptcy
Decision,” American Economic Review, pp. 706–718.
Filer, L. H., and J. D. Fisher (2005): “The Consumption Effects Associated
with Filing for Personal Bankruptcy,” Southern Economic Journal, pp. 837–
854.
189
Flinn, C., and J. Mabli (2009): “On-the-Job Search, Minimum Wages, and
Labor Market Outcomes in an Equilibrium Bargaining Framework,” New
York Unversity, Department of Economics.
Flinn, C., and J. Mullins (2015): “Labor Market Search and Schooling
Investment,” International Economic Review, 56(2), 359–398.
Flinn, C. J. (2006): “Minimum Wage Effects on Labor Market Outcomes
Under Search, Matching, and Endogenous Contact Rates,” Econometrica,
74(4), 1013–1062.
Flynn, E., G. Bermant, and K. Bakewell (2002): “Bankruptcy by the
Numbers,” American Bankruptcy Institute Journal, 21(8), 20.
Francesconi, M. (2002): “A Joint Dynamic Model of Fertility and Work of
Married Women,” Journal of Labor Economics, 20(2), 336–380.
Gladden, T., and C. Taber (2000): “Wage Progression among Less Skilled
Workers,” in Finding Jobs: Work and Welfare Reform, ed. by D. Card, and
R. M. Blank, pp. 160–192. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Grant, C. (2004): “Evidence on the Effect of US Consumer Bankruptcy Ex-
emptions,” Working Paper.
Grogger, J. (2005): “Welfare Reform, Returns to Experience, and Wages:
Using Reservation Wages to Account for Sample Selection Bias,” National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Gropp, R., J. K. Scholz, and M. J. White (1997): “Personal Bankruptcy
and Credit Supply and Demand,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(1),
217–251.
Gross, D. B., and N. S. Souleles (2002): “An Empirical Analysis of Per-
sonal Bankruptcy and Delinquency,” Review of Financial Studies, 15(1), 319–
347.
Guerrieri, V., R. Shimer, and R. Wright (2010): “Adverse Selection in
Competitive Search Equilibrium,” Econometrica, 78(6), 1823–1862.
Han, S., and W. Li (2007): “Fresh Start or Head Start? The Effects of
Filing for Personal Bankruptcy onWork Effort,” Journal of Financial Services
Research, 31(2-3), 123–152.
Heckman, J. (1993): “Assessing Clinton’s Program on Job Training, Workfare,
and Education in the Workplace,” National Bureau of Economic Research.
190
Heckman, J., L. Lochner, and R. Cossa (2002): “Learning-by-Doing vs.
On-the-Job Training: Using Variation Induced by the EITC to Distinguish
Between Models of Skill Formation,” National Bureau of Economic Research.
Himmelstein, D. U., E. Warren, D. Thorne, and S. Woolhandler
(2005): “MarketWatch: Illness And Injury As Contributors To Bankruptcy,”
Health Affairs.
Hotz, V. J., and J. K. Scholz (2003): “The Earned Income Tax Credit,” in
Means-Tested Transfer Programs in the United States, ed. by R. A. Moffitt,
pp. 141–198. University of Chicago Press.
Hoynes, H. W. (2009): “The Earned Income Tax Credit, Welfare Reform,
and the Employment of Low-Skilled Single Mothers,” Strategies for improving
economic mobility of workers: bridging research and practice, p. 65.
Imai, S., and M. P. Keane (2004): “Intertemporal Labor Supply and Human
Capital Accumulation*,” International Economic Review, 45(2), 601–641.
Jolivet, G., F. Postel-Vinay, and J.-M. Robin (2006): “The Empirical
Content of the Job Search Model: Labor Mobility and Wage Distributions in
Europe and the US,” European Economic Review, 50(4), 877–907.
Keane, M. P. (2009): “Income Taxation in a Life Cycle Model with Human
Capital,” Unpublished Manuscript.
(2011): “Labor supply and taxes: A survey,” Journal of Economic
Literature, 49(4), 961–1075.
Keane, M. P., and R. Rogerson (2012): “Micro and Macro Labor Supply
Elasticities: A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom,” Journal of Economic
Literature, 50(2), 464–476.
Keane, M. P., P. E. Todd, and K. I. Wolpin (2011): “The Structural
Estimation of Behavioral Models: Discrete Choice Dynamic Programming
Methods and Applications,” Handbook of Labor Economics, 4, 331–461.
Keane, M. P., and K. I. Wolpin (1994): “The Solution and Estimation of
Discrete Choice Dynamic Programming Models by Simulation and Interpo-
lation: Monte Carlo Evidence,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, pp.
648–672.
(2001): “The Effect of Parental Transfers and Borrowing Constraints
on Educational Attainment,” International Economic Review, pp. 1051–1103.
191
(2010): “The Role of Labor and Marriage Markets, Preference Hetero-
geneity, and the Welfare System in the Life Cycle Decisions of Black, Hispanic,
and White Women,” International Economic Review, 51(3), 851–892.
Lauermann, S., and A. Wolinsky (2015): “Search with Adverse Selection,”
Working Paper.
Lee, Y. (2012): “Labor Supply Effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit under
Labor Supply Restrictions,” Mimeo: University of Wisconsin Madison.
Li, W., and P.-D. Sarte (2006): “U.S. Consumer Bankruptcy Choice: The
Importance of General Equilibrium Effects,” Journal of Monetary Economics,
53(3), 613–631.
Liebman, J. B. (1998): “The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit on
Incentives and Income Distribution,” Tax Policy and the Economy, 12, 83–
119.
Lin, E. Y., and M. J. White (2001): “Bankruptcy and the Market for Mort-
gage and Home Improvement Loans,” Journal of Urban Economics, 50(1),
138–162.
Livshits, I., J. MacGee, and M. Tertilt (2007): “Consumer Bankruptcy:
A Fresh Start,” The American Economic Review, pp. 402–418.
(2011): “Costly Contracts and Consumer Credit,” National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Manning, A. (2000): “Moving Up: Interpreting The Earnings–Experience
Profile,” Bulletin of Economic Research, 52(4), 261–295.
Mendenhall, R., K. Edin, S. Crowley, J. Sykes, L. Tach, K. Kriz,
and J. R. Kling (2012): “The Role of Earned Income Tax Credit in the
Budgets of Low-Income Families,” Social Service Review, 86(3), 367–400.
Menzio, G. (2007): “A Theory of Partially Directed Search,” Journal of Po-
litical Economy, 115(5), 748–769.
Meyer, B. D., and D. T. Rosenbaum (2001): “Welfare, the Earned Income
Tax credit, and the Labor Supply of Single Mothers,” The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 116(3), 1063–1114.
Miller, R. A., and S. G. Sanders (1997): “Human Capital Development
and Welfare Participation,” in Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Pub-
lic Policy, vol. 46, pp. 1–43. Elsevier.
192
Moen, E. R. (1997): “Competitive Search Equilibrium,” Journal of Political
Economy, 105(2), 385–411.
Moffitt, R. A. (2002): “Welfare Programs and Labor Supply,” Handbook of
Public Economics, 4, 2393–2430.
Mortensen, D. T. (1970): “A Theory of Wage and Employment Dynamics,”
pp. 167–211. Norton New York.
Mortensen, D. T., and C. A. Pissarides (1999): “Job Reallocation, Em-
ployment Fluctuations and Unemployment,” Handbook of Macroeconomics,
1, 1171–1228.
Nelson, J. P. (1999): “Consumer Bankruptcy and Chapter Choice: State
Panel Evidence,” Contemporary Economic Policy, 17(4), 552–566.
Neumark, D., and W. Wascher (2001): “Using The EITC to Help Poor
Families: New Evidence and a Comparison with the Minimum Wage,” Na-
tional Tax Journal, pp. 281–317.
Norberg, S. F., and A. J. Velkey (2006): “Debtor Discharge and Creditor
Repayment in Chapter 13,” Creighton Law Review, 39, 473–961.
Olson, L. M., and A. Davis (1994): The Earned Income Tax Credit: Views
from the Street Level. Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research, North-
western University.
Porter, K. (2011): “The Pretend Solution: An Empirical Study of
Bankruptcy Outcomes,” Texas Law Review, 90, 103–162.
Postel-Vinay, F., and J.-M. Robin (2002): “Equilibrium Wage Dispersion
with Heterogenous Workers and Firms,” Econometrica, 70(6), 2295–2350.
Rogerson, R., R. Shimer, and R. Wright (2005): “Search-Theoretic Mod-
els of the Labor Market: A Survey,” Journal of Economic Literature, 43(4),
959–988.
Romich, J. L., and T. Weisner (2000): “How Families View and Use the
EITC: Advance Payment versus Lump Sum Delivery,” National Tax Journal,
pp. 1245–1265.
Rust, J. (1996): “Estimation of Dynamic Structural Models, Problems and
Prospects: Discrete Decision Processes,” in Advances in econometrics: Sixth
world congress, ed. by C. A. Sims, vol. 2, pp. 119–170. Cambridge University
Press.
193
Sanchez, J. M. (2010): “The IT Revolution and the Unsecured Credit Mar-
ket,” .
Scholz, J. K. (1994): “The Earned Income Tax Credit: Participation, Com-
pliance, and Antipoverty Effectiveness,” National Tax Journal, pp. 63–87.
Shephard, A. (2012): “Equilibrium Search and Tax Credit Reform,” Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, Department of Economics.
Shimer, R. (1996): “Essays in Search Theory,” Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology.
Sicherman, N., and O. Galor (1990): “A Theory of Career Mobility,”
Journal of Political Economy, 98(1), 169–192.
Smeeding, T. M., K. R. Phillips, and M. O’Connor (2000): “The EITC:
Expectation, Knowledge, Use, and Economic and Social Mobility,” National
Tax Journal, pp. 1187–1209.
Stern, D., N. Finkelstein, J. Stone, J. Latting, and C. Dorn-
sife (1994): Research on School-to-Work Transition Programs in the United
States. National Center for Research in Vocational Education, Graduate
School of Education, University of California at Berkeley.
Sullivan, T. A., E. Warren, and J. L. Westbrook (1989): “As We
Forgive Our Debtors,” New York: Oxford University Press.
(2000): The Fragile Middle Class: Americans in Debt. Yale University
Press.
(2003): “Who Uses Chapter 13?,” in Consumer Bankruptcy in Global
Perspective, ed. by J. Niemi-Kiesilainen, I. Ramsay, and W. C. Withford. Hart
Publishing.
Topel, R. H., and M. P. Ward (1992): “Job Mobility and the Careers of
Young Men,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(2).
Van der Klaauw, W. (1996): “Female Labour Supply and Marital Status
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